The effects of resource limitation and consensual incentives on cooperation

Exploring the evolution of cooperation has been one of the most challenging topics and attracted increasing attention in various realms. Hereby, we institute an analytic model where the relationship between the common benefits and contributions is the typical saturation nonlinearity. We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation with and without consensual incentives respectively. The population always evolves to full defection when the incentives are absent. Cooperation, however, can be promoted by consensual incentives when the degree of cooperators' preferences for incentives is great. There exists an intermediate amount of resources at which the positive effect of consensual incentives on cooperation is minimized. Furthermore, there is a U-shape relationship between the degree of cooperators' preference for an incentive and the evolution of cooperation. A greater basin of full cooperation can be induced when the cooperators' preference for reward is more pronounced than that for punishment.     

Carathéodory's method for a class of dynamic games

The method of equivalent variational methods, originally due to Carathéodory for free problems in the calculus of variations is extended to investigate feedback Nash equilibria for a class of n-person differential games. Both the finite-horizon and infinite-horizon cases are considered. Examples are given to illustrate the presented results.     

合作联盟资源集成计划一种新方法

合作联盟里，资源集成计划往往是联盟成员群体谈判博弈的结果。本以两人博弈为例，对联盟的资源集成计划给出一个谈判博弈模型，能够较好地模仿和反映合作联盟资源整合计划的制订过程。     

Upper Bounds of the Pursuer Control Based on a Linear-Quadratic Differential Game

Differential game formulations provide an adequate basis for a guidance law synthesis against highly maneuvering targets. This paper deals with a guidance law based on a linear-quadratic differential game formulation. This guidance law has many attractive properties: it is continuous, linear with respect to the state variables, and its gain coefficients can be precalculated offline. Nevertheless, due to the lack of hard control constraints in the formulation, the magnitude of the control can exceed the admissible level imposed by the nature of the problem. In this paper, the upper bound of the interceptor control is obtained depending on the system parameters and the penalty coefficients of the game performance index. It is shown that the interceptor can guarantee an arbitrarily small miss distance without exceeding the control constraints if it has sufficient maneuverability and if the penalty coefficients are chosen properly. By manipulating the penalty coefficients, it is possible to reduce significantly the maneuverability requirements compared to the case of zero interceptor penalty coefficient.     

Dynamic Strategic Pricing and Speed of Diffusion

Defining speed of diffusion as the amount of time it takes to get from one penetration level to a higher one, we introduce a dynamic model in which we study the link between pricing policy, speed of diffusion, and number of competitors in the market. Our analysis shows that, in the case of strategic (oligopolistic) competition, the speed of diffusion has an important influence on the optimal pricing policy. In particular, we find that higher speeds of diffusion create an incentive to strategically interacting firms to lower their prices.     

弱1—凸对策及其解的性质

本文提出了一类特殊的ｎ人合作对策模型─—弱１—凸对策，研究了弱１—凸对策的解的性质，并证明弱１—凸对策的解满足所有常见的公理化特征．     

Sequencing games without initial order

In this note we study uncertainty sequencing situations, i.e., one-machine sequencing situations in which no initial order is specified. We associate cooperative games with these sequencing situations, study their core, and provide links with the classic sequencing games introduced by Curiel et al. (Eur J Oper Res 40:344–351, 1989). Moreover, we propose and characterize two simple cost allocation rules for uncertainty sequencing situations with equal processing times.     

Sufficient optimality conditions and duality in vector optimization with invex-convexlike functions

We prove the Kuhn-Tucker sufficient optimality condition, the Wolfe duality, and a modified Mond-Weir duality for vector optimization problems involving various types of invex-convexlike functions. The class of such functins contains many known generalized convex functions. As applications, we demonstrate that, under invex-convexlikeness assumptions, the Pontryagin maximum principle is a sufficient optimality condition for cooperative differential games. The Wolfe duality is established for these games.The author is indebted to the referees and Professor W. Stadler for valuable remarks and comments, which have been used to revise considerably the paper.     

Some properties of the bilevel programming problem

The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the difficulties accompanying the development of efficient algorithms for solving the bilevel programming problem (BLPP). We begin with a pair of examples showing that, even under the best of circumstances, solutions may not exist. This is followed by a proof that the BLPP is NP-hard.This work was partially supported by a grant from the Advanced Research Program of the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board.     

Avoider-Enforcer games

Let p and q be positive integers and let H be any hypergraph. In a (p,q,H) Avoider-Enforcer game two players, called Avoider and Enforcer, take turns selecting previously unclaimed vertices of H. Avoider selects p vertices per move and Enforcer selects q vertices per move. Avoider loses if he claims all the vertices of some hyperedge of H; otherwise Enforcer loses. We prove a sufficient condition for Avoider to win the (p,q,H) game. We then use this condition to show that Enforcer can win the (1,q) perfect matching game on K2n for every q?cn/logn for an appropriate constant c, and the (1,q) Hamilton cycle game on Kn for every q?cnloglogloglogn/lognlogloglogn for an appropriate constant c. We also determine exactly those values of q for which Enforcer can win the (1,q) connectivity game on Kn. This result is quite surprising as it substantially differs from its Maker-Breaker analog. Our method extends easily to improve a result of Lu [X. Lu, A note on biased and non-biased games, Discrete Appl. Math. 60 (1995) 285-291], regarding forcing an opponent to pack many pairwise edge disjoint spanning trees in his graph.