On balking from an empty queue

The intuition while observing the economy of queueing systems, is that one’s motivation to join the system, decreases with its level of congestion. Here we present a queueing model where sometimes the opposite is the case. The point of departure is the standard first-come first-served single server queue with Poisson arrivals. Customers commence service immediately if upon their arrival the server is idle. Otherwise, they are informed if the queue is empty or not. Then, they have to decide whether to join or not. We assume that the customers are homogeneous and when they consider whether to join or not, they assess their queueing costs against their reward due to service completion. As the whereabouts of customers interact, we look for the (possibly mixed) join/do not join Nash equilibrium strategy, a strategy that if adopted by all, then under the resulting steady-state conditions, no one has any incentive not to follow it oneself. We show that when the queue is empty then depending on the service distribution, both ‘avoid the crowd’ (ATC) and ‘follow the crowd’ (FTC) scenarios (as well as none-of-the-above) are possible. When the queue is not empty, the situation is always that of ATC. Also, we show that under Nash equilibrium it is possible (depending on the service distribution) that the joining probability when the queue is empty is smaller than it is when the queue is not empty. This research was supported by The Israel Science Foundation Grant No. 237/02.     

The busy period of an M/M/1 queue with balking and reneging

It has been shown by (R.O. Al-Seedy, A.A. El-Sherbiny, S.A. El-Shehawy, S.I. Ammar, Transient solution of the M/M/c queue with balking and reneging, Comput. Math. Appl. 57 (2009) 1280–1285) that a generating function technique can be successfully applied to derive the transient solution for an M/M/c queueing system. In this paper, we further illustrate how this technique can be used to obtain the busy period density function of an M/M/1 queue with balking and reneging. Finally, numerical calculations are presented.     

Optimal and equilibrium balking strategies in the single server Markovian queue with catastrophes

We consider a Markovian queue subject to Poisson generated catastrophes. Whenever a catastrophe occurs, all customers are forced to abandon the system, the server is rendered inoperative and an exponential repair time is set on. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the system or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. We study the balking behavior of the customers and derive the corresponding Nash equilibrium and social optimal strategies.     

Explicit solutions for the steady state distributions in M/PH/1 queues with workload dependent balking

We consider an M/PH/1 queue with balking based on the workload. An arriving customer joins the queue and stays until served only if the system workload is below a fixed level at the time of arrival. The steady state workload distribution in such a system satisfies an integral equation. We derive a differential equation for Phase type service time distribution and we solve it explicitly, with Erlang, Hyper-exponential and Exponential distributions as special cases. We illustrate the results with numerical examples.     

Busy period analysis for <Emphasis Type="Italic">M</Emphasis>/<Emphasis Type="Italic">PH</Emphasis>/1 queues with workload dependent balking

We consider an M/PH/1 queue with workload-dependent balking. An arriving customer joins the queue and stays until served if and only if the system workload is no more than a fixed level at the time of his arrival. We begin by considering a fluid model where the buffer content changes at a rate determined by an external stochastic process with finite state space. We derive systems of first-order linear differential equations for the mean and LST (Laplace-Stieltjes Transform) of the busy period in this model and solve them explicitly. We obtain the mean and LST of the busy period in the M/PH/1 queue with workload-dependent balking as a special limiting case of this fluid model. We illustrate the results with numerical examples.      

Transient analysis of a two-heterogeneous servers queue with impatient behavior

Recently, [1] have obtained the transient solution of multi-server queue with balking and reneging. In this paper, a similar technique is used to drive a new elegant explicit solution for a two heterogeneous servers queue with impatient behavior. In addition, steady-state probabilities of the system size are studied and some important performance measures are discussed for the considered system.     

Strategic joining in M/M/1 retrial queues

The equilibrium and socially optimal balking strategies are investigated for unobservable and observable single-server classical retrial queues. There is no waiting space in front of the server. If an arriving customer finds the server idle, he occupies the server immediately and leaves the system after service. Otherwise, if the server is found busy, the customer decides whether or not to enter a retrial pool with infinite capacity and becomes a repeated customer, based on observation of the system and the reward–cost structure imposed on the system. Accordingly, two cases with respect to different levels of information are studied and the corresponding Nash equilibrium and social optimization balking strategies for all customers are derived. Finally, we compare the equilibrium and optimal behavior regarding these two information levels through numerical examples.     

Equilibrium customer strategies in a single server Markovian queue with setup times

We consider a single server Markovian queue with setup times. Whenever this system becomes empty, the server is turned off. Whenever a customer arrives to an empty system, the server begins an exponential setup time to start service again. We assume that arriving customers decide whether to enter the system or balk based on a natural reward-cost structure, which incorporates their desire for service as well as their unwillingness to wait. We examine customer behavior under various levels of information regarding the system state. Specifically, before making the decision, a customer may or may not know the state of the server and/or the number of present customers. We derive equilibrium strategies for the customers under the various levels of information and analyze the stationary behavior of the system under these strategies. We also illustrate further effects of the information level on the equilibrium behavior via numerical experiments.      

Synchronous working vacation policy for finite-buffer multiserver queueing system

This paper presents modeling and analysis of unreliable Markovian multiserver finite-buffer queue with discouragement and synchronous working vacation policy. According to this policy, c servers keep serving the customers until the number of idle servers reaches the threshold level d; then d idle servers take vacation altogether. Out of these d vacationing servers, d_W servers may opt for working vacation i.e. they serve the secondary customers with different rates during the vacation period. On the other hand, the remaining d − d_W = d_V servers continue to be on vacation. During the vacation of d servers, the other e = c − d servers must be present in the system even if they are idle. On returning from vacation, if the queue size does not exceed e, then these d servers take another vacation together; otherwise start serving the customers. The servers may undergo breakdown simultaneously both in regular busy period and working vacation period due to the failure of a main control unit. This main unit is then repaired by the repairman in at most two phases. We obtain the stationary performance measures such as expected queue length, average balking and reneging rate, throughput, etc. The steady state and transient behaviours of the arriving customers and the servers are examined by using matrix analytical method and numerical approach based on Runge-Kutta method of fourth order, respectively. The sensitivity analysis is facilitated for the transient model to demonstrate the validity of the analytical results and to examine the effect of different parameters on various performance indices.     

Equilibrium balking strategies in the observable single-server queue with breakdowns and repairs

We consider the Markovian single-server queue that alternates between on and off periods. Upon arriving, the customers observe the queue length and decide whether to join or balk. We derive equilibrium threshold balking strategies in two cases, according to the information for the server’s state.