Computing power indices: Multilinear extensions and new characterizations

Johnston [Johnston, R.J., 1978. On the measurement of power: some reactions to Laver. Environment and Planning A 10, 907–914], Deegan and Packel [Deegan, J., Packel, E.W., 1979. A new index of power for simple n-person games. International Journal of Game Theory 7, 113–123], and Holler [Holler, M.J., 1982. Forming coalitions and measuring voting power. Political Studies 30, 262–271] proposed three power indices for simple games: Johnston index, Deegan–Packel index, and the Public Good Index. In this paper, methods to compute these indices by means of the multilinear extension of the game are presented. Furthermore, a new characterization of the Public Good Index is given. Our methods are applied to two real-world examples taken from the political field.     

A reformulated Shapley-like value for cooperative games with interval payoffs

In this paper, a new value for cooperative interval games is proposed which may remedy the disadvantages of the interval Shapley-like value and of the improved interval Shapley-like value introduced by Han et al. (2012). Moreover, it is shown that the reformulated interval value uniquely satisfies the properties of efficiency, indifference null player, symmetry, and additivity.     

Axiomatizations of team logics

In a modular approach, we lift Hilbert-style proof systems for propositional, modal and first-order logic to generalized systems for their respective team-based extensions. We obtain sound and complete axiomatizations for the dependence-free fragment FO(～) of Väänänen's first-order team logic TL, for propositional team logic PTL, quantified propositional team logic QPTL, modal team logic MTL, and for the corresponding logics of dependence, independence, inclusion and exclusion.As a crucial step in the completeness proof, we show that the above logics admit, in a particular sense, a semantics-preserving elimination of modalities and quantifiers from formulas.     

An axiomatic approach to egalitarianism in TU-games

A core concept is a solution concept on the class of balanced games that exclusively selects core allocations. We show that every continuous core concept that satisfies both the equal treatment property and a new property called independence of irrelevant core allocations (IIC) necessarily selects egalitarian allocations. IIC requires that, if the core concept selects a certain core allocation for a given game, and this allocation is still a core allocation for a new game with a core that is contained in the core of the first game, then the core concept also chooses this allocation as the solution to the new game. When we replace the continuity requirement by a weak version of additivity we obtain an axiomatization of the egalitarian solution concept that assigns to each balanced game the core allocation minimizing the Euclidean distance to the equal share allocation.     

Hjelmslev's geometry of reality

During the first half of the 20th century the Danish geometer Johannes Hjelmslev developed what he called a geometry of reality. It was presented as an alternative to the idealized Euclidean paradigm that had recently been completed by Hilbert. Hjelmslev argued that his geometry of reality was superior to the Euclidean geometry both didactically, scientifically and in practice: Didactically, because it was closer to experience and intuition, in practice because it was in accordance with the real geometrical drawing practice of the engineer, and scientifically because it was based on a smaller axiomatic basis than Hilbertian Euclidean geometry but still included the important theorems of ordinary geometry. In this paper, I shall primarily analyze the scientific aspect of Hjelmslev's new approach to geometry that gave rise to the so-called Hjelmslev (incidence) geometry or ring geometry.     

Semi-marginalistic Values for Set Games

Concerning the solution theory for set games, the paper focuses on a family of values, each of which allocates to any player some type of marginalistic contribution with respect to any coalition containing the player. For any value of the relevant family, an axiomatization is given by means of three properties, namely one type of an efficiency property, the equal treatment property and one type of a monotonicity property. We present one proof technique which is based on the decomposition of any arbitrary set game into a union of simple set games, the value of which are much easier to determine. A simple set game is associated with an arbitrary, but fixed item of the universe.     

A measure-theoretic axiomatization of fuzzy sets

Using measurement theory, this paper examines three empirical structures that underlie the representation of fuzzy sets: the fuzzy membership structure, the fuzzy component structure, and the fuzzy system structure. These qualitative structures justify the use of the standard min-max system to represent fuzzy sets. The results of this study facilitate the development of a sound measurement-theoretic axiomatization of fuzzy systems.     

Axiomatizations of Lovász extensions of pseudo-Boolean functions

Three important properties in aggregation theory are investigated, namely horizontal min-additivity, horizontal max-additivity, and comonotonic additivity, which are defined by certain relaxations of the Cauchy functional equation in several variables. We show that these properties are equivalent and we completely describe the functions characterized by them. By adding some regularity conditions, these functions coincide with the Lovász extensions vanishing at the origin, which subsume the discrete Choquet integrals. We also propose a simultaneous generalization of horizontal min-additivity and horizontal max-additivity, called horizontal median-additivity, and we describe the corresponding function class. Additional conditions then reduce this class to that of symmetric Lovász extensions, which includes the discrete symmetric Choquet integrals.     

基于最小描述交的覆盖广义粗糙集

针对Bonikowski覆盖广义粗糙集模型的不足,给出了基于最小描述史的覆盖上下近似算子.通过和Pawlak经典粗糙集以及Bonikowski的覆盖广义粗糙集比较,发现给出的覆盖上、下近似算子具有了对偶关系,并得到了相关重要性质;进一步讨论了在新定义下覆盖广义粗糙集的约简和公理化问题,丰富了覆盖广义粗糙条理论,并为覆盖广义粗糙集的应用提供了更确切的理论根据.     

The outflow ranking method for weighted directed graphs

A ranking method assigns to every weighted directed graph a (weak) ordering of the nodes. In this paper we axiomatize the ranking method that ranks the nodes according to their outflow using four independent axioms. Besides the well-known axioms of anonymity and positive responsiveness we introduce outflow monotonicity – meaning that in pairwise comparison between two nodes, a node is not doing worse in case its own outflow does not decrease and the other node’s outflow does not increase – and order preservation – meaning that adding two weighted digraphs such that the pairwise ranking between two nodes is the same in both weighted digraphs, then this is also their pairwise ranking in the ‘sum’ weighted digraph. The outflow ranking method generalizes the ranking by outdegree for directed graphs, and therefore also generalizes the ranking by Copeland score for tournaments.