排序方式: 共有1条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
1
1.
Jawad Abrache Teodor Gabriel Crainic Michel Gendreau Monia Rekik 《Annals of Operations Research》2007,153(1):131-164
Combinatorial auctions are an important class of market mechanisms in which participants are allowed to bid on bundles of
multiple heterogeneous items. In this paper, we discuss several complex issues that are encountered in the design of combinatorial
auctions. These issues are related to the formulation of the winner determination problem, the expression of combined bids,
the design of progressive combinatorial auctions that require less information revelation, and the need for decision support
tools to help participants make profitable bidding decisions. For each issue, we survey the existing literature and propose
avenues for further research.
An earlier version of this paper appeared in 4OR 2, 1–33, 2004. 相似文献
1