Inclusive fragment production in84Kr +197Au atE/A=35 MeV

Inclusive cross sections of intermediate mass fragments from the reaction⁸⁴Kr+¹⁹⁷Au atE/A=35 MeV were measured over the range 8°≦Θ _lab≦70° with a low detection threshold. A moving-source parameterization was used to fit the double-differential cross sections. The integrated cross section for fragment production exceeds the total reaction cross section thus indicating a large probability for multi-fragment processes. The deduced large temperature parameters can be explained by assuming emission from a rotating source. From the comparison to reactions with¹²C and⁴⁰Ar projectiles at E/A=30 MeV a systematics of inclusive fragment production as a function of the projectile mass is obtained.     

Applying a one-shot and infinite repeated inspection game to materials management

An inspection game models a conflict situation between an inspector and an inspectee. The mathematical analysis aims to determine optimal behaviour of the inspectee. In this paper, the controller’s (inspector) job is to audit a planner’s (inspectee) decision with regard to its optimality and to submit a report to the company’s top managers. Based on Fandel and Trockel (Int J Prod Econ 133:256–261, 2011) this inspection game is discussed here as an infinite two-person game under the aspect of costs minimization. The results show that a higher costs deviation because of a competitive behaviour of the strategic players will decrease their payoffs, so that the optimal cooperative behaviour will finally lead to a better solution for the company with respect to cost minimization as normally expected.     

Avoiding non-optimal management decisions by applying a three-person inspection game

An inspection game models a conflict situation between an inspector and an inspectee. The mathematical analysis aims to generate optimal behavior of the inspectee under the assumption that an undesirable action of the inspectee could otherwise be carried out strategically. In this paper the controller’s (inspector’s) particular job is to audit a manager’s (inspectee’s) decision and to submit a report to the company’s top managers for examination. Thus, a conflict as regards the choice of behavioral actions of the manager, the controller and the top management impends. Based on Fandel and Trockel (2011a) this modified inspection game is discussed here for the first time as a three-person game in the context of a manager’s faulty decision that will unnecessarily add to the company’s costs and that the top management understandably wishes to minimize. We will first examine the conditions under which a Nash equilibrium occurs in this three-person game in which poor management, poor monitoring and poor revision coincide. We will then examine the effects that the penalties and bonuses exert on the Nash equilibrium solution. We will find that penalties and bonuses can neutralize each other in their effects on the improved decision making by the manager and the controller.     

Investments in supplier-specific economies of scope with two different services and different supplier characters: two specialists

Central European Journal of Operations Research - Firms have to choose their market positions. Suppliers can offer a wide range of services as generalists or they act as specialists by offering a...