试析国有资产营运机构和政府的委托-代理关系

国有资产营运机构和政府的关系是构建国资营运机构治理模式的基础。本文通过委托-代理模型剖析国有资产营运机构与政府之间的关系。基本委托-代理模型，结合国有资产营运机构的特点，引入概率约束参数来反映国有资产运营机构参与国有资产经营管理的约束条件，得出国资营运机构的努力成本系数是影响营运绩效的重要因素，政府应通过有效的激励与约束机制降低国有资产运营中的努力成本系数，完善与营运机构之间的委托-代理关系，实现双方利益的最优化。     

Effective Incentive and Discipline Mechanisms for Top manage-ment in SOEs

Key to energize State-Owned-Enterprises (hereinafter SOEs) is to set up effective incentive and discipline mechanisms. First of all, the paper analyses the problems existing in the current incentive and discipline mechanism system in SOEs, including low transparency income and considerable covert income, insider control, corporate governance nominalization and so on; next, the paper explores the causes behind these problems, such as incomplete corporate governance and imperfect market mechanism; finally, the paper proposes a series of solutions from the aspects of incentive mechanism and discipline mechanism.