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Molecular Structure,Vibrational Spectra,Molecular Docking,and ADMET Study of Cellulose Triacetate II
Celik Sefa Demirag A. Demet Ozel Aysen E. Akyuz Sevim 《Optics and Spectroscopy》2020,128(8):1138-1150
Optics and Spectroscopy - People have started to look for alternative sources because of the health problems created by petrochemical products used in all areas of human life and environmental... 相似文献
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Ozgun Caliskan Demirag Pinar Keskinocak 《European Journal of Operational Research》2011,215(1):268-280
Promotions are important tools for matching supply and demand in many industries. In the United States automotive industry, promotions are frequently offered, which may be given directly to customers (rebates) or given to dealers (incentives) to stimulate demand. We analyze the performance of customer rebate and retailer incentive promotions under competition. We study a setting with two manufacturers making simultaneous pricing and promotion decisions, and with two price-discriminating retailers as Stackelberg followers making simultaneous order quantity decisions. In the benchmark case with no promotions, we characterize the equilibria in closed form. We find that retailer incentives can be used by manufacturers to simultaneously improve each of their profits but can potentially lead to lower retailer profits. When manufacturers use customer rebates, we show that a manufacturer is able to decrease the profit of her competitor while increasing her own profit, although she is also at risk for her competitor to use rebates in a similar fashion. Unlike the monopoly case where the manufacturers are always better off with retailer incentives, customer rebates can be more profitable under some cases in the presence of competition. Using numerical examples we generate insights on the manufacturers’ preference of promotions in different market settings. 相似文献
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Supply chain performance and consumer surplus under alternative structures of channel dominance 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Supply chain partnerships exhibit varying degrees of power distribution among the agents. This has implications for pricing and operational decisions in the channel and eventually influences the end customers. To understand how different power schemes affect the supply chain partners’ performance and consumer surplus, we study channel structures with a dominant manufacturer, a dominant retailer, and no single-agent dominance. Under random and price sensitive demand, channel dominance is interpreted in our setting as exerting power to determine the retail and wholesale prices as well as to transfer the inventory risk to the weaker party. We analyze all problems in a game-theory based framework and characterize the equilibrium retail price, wholesale price, and order/production quantity. We show that the manufacturer-dominated channel structure leads to the highest production quantity, the lowest retail price, and the largest expected surplus for an individual buyer; on the other hand, the entire channel profit and the total consumer surplus are highest when the retailer holds the channel dominance. While both the manufacturer and the retailer are better off when they become a power agent individually, channel dominance does not always guarantee higher share of channel profits, as we show under the manufacturer-dominated structure. Further insights are derived analytically and numerically from comparisons of the manufacturer/retailer dominance schemes with the no single-agent dominance structure and integrated channel. We also study extensions to investigate the effect of demand model and risk sharing, and we address industry settings with alternative schemes of holding cost, shortage penalty and salvage value. 相似文献
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