Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Two Types of Positively Correlated Networks

We study the effects of degree correlations on the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner＇s dilemma game with individuals located on two types of positively correlated networks. It is shown that the positive degree correlation can either promote or inhibit the emergence of cooperation depending on network configurations. Furthermore, we investigate the probability to cooperate as a function of connectivity degree, and find that high-degree individuals generally have a higher tendency to cooperate. Finally, it is found that small-degree individuals usually change their strategy more frequently, and such change is shown to be unfavourable to cooperation for both kinds of networks.     

Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on highly clustered community networks

This paper studies the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a highly clustered community network in which the clustering coefficient and the community size can be tuned. It finds that the clustering coefficient in such a degree-homogeneous network inhibits the emergence of cooperation for the entire range of the payoff parameter. Moreover, it finds that the community size can also have a marked influence on the evolution of cooperation, with a larger community size leading to not only a lower cooperation level but also a smaller threshold of the payoff parameter above which cooperators become extinct.     

Evolutionary Self-Questioning Games with Local Contribution

We investigate the evolutionary Prisoner＇s Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game on small-world networks in a realistic social context where individuals consider their local contributions to their group and update their strategies by self-questioning. An individual with introspection can determine whether its current strategy is superior by playing a virtual round of the game and its local contribution is defined as the sum of all the payoffs its neighbors collect against it. In our model, the performance of an individual is determined by both its payoff and local contribution through a linear combination. We demonstrate that the present mechanism can produce very robust cooperative behavior in both games. Furthermore, we provide theoretical analysis based on mean-field approximation, and find that the analytical predictions are qualitatively consistent with the simulation results.     

Payoff-based accumulative effect promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma

We study the effect of accumulative payoff on the evolution of cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma on a square lattice. We introduce a decaying factor for the accumulative payoff, which characterizes the extent that the historical payoff is accumulated. It is shown that for fixed values of the temptation to defect, the density of cooperators increases with the value of the decaying factor. This indicates that the more the historical payoff is involved, the more favourable cooperators become. In the critical region where the cooperator density converges to zero, cooperators vanish according to a power-law-like behaviour. The associated exponents agree approximately with the two-dimensional directed percolation and depend weakly on the value of the decaying factor.