Dynamic Strategic Pricing and Speed of Diffusion

Defining speed of diffusion as the amount of time it takes to get from one penetration level to a higher one, we introduce a dynamic model in which we study the link between pricing policy, speed of diffusion, and number of competitors in the market. Our analysis shows that, in the case of strategic (oligopolistic) competition, the speed of diffusion has an important influence on the optimal pricing policy. In particular, we find that higher speeds of diffusion create an incentive to strategically interacting firms to lower their prices.     

Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Differential Game Solutions to an Investment and Pricing Problem

A monopoly possesses a finite stock of a resource and wishes to determine an optimal pricing policy. The competitive fringe invests in production capacity and wishes to select an optimal investment rate. Demand towards the monopoly depends on price as well as on the sales rate of the competition. Modelling the situation as a differential game, non-cooperative (Nash and Stackelberg) and cooperative (Pareto) equilibria are determined. Owing to the special structure of the game, these solutions can be found in closed form.     

Tractable classes of nonzero-sum open-loop Nash differential games: Theory and examples

This paper identifies some classes ofN-person nonzero-sum differential games that are tractable, in the sense that open-loop Nash strategies can be determined, either explicitly or qualitatively in terms of a phase-diagram portrait. The classes are characterized by conditions imposed on the Hamiltonians. Also, the underlying game structures needed to satisfy these conditions are characterized.The authors wish to thank V. Kaitala, Helsinki University of Technology, and the referees.     

Characterization of equilibrium strategies in a class of difference games

We formulate a class of N player difference games and derive open—loop and Markov equilibria. It turns out that both types of equilibria can be characterized by a set of difference equations that describe the equilibrium dynamics. We analyze the stability properties of the difference equations that correspond to an equilibrium and find that in both the open—loop and the Markov game there is convergence towards a steady state equilibrium     

The AURORA Financial Management System: Model and Parallel Implementation Design

The AURORA financial management system under development at the University of Vienna is a modular decision support tool for portfolio and asset–liability management. It is based on a multivariate Markovian birth-and-death factor model for the economic environment, a pricing model for the financial instruments and an objective function which is flexible enough to express risk aversion.The core of the system is a large scale linear or convex program, which due to its size and structure is well suited for parallel optimization methods.As the system is still at an early stage of development, the results are preliminary in nature. Only a few types of financial instruments are handled and just two types of objectives are considered. The parallel optimization modules are still in the development phase.     

Optimal pricing in a duopoly: A noncooperative differential games solution

This paper deals with a differential games model of an oligopoly ofn profit-maximizing firms competing for the same stock of customers. For the sale dynamics, it is assumed that the customers of each firm are driven away gradually by increasing product prices. Since the state variable is absent from the Hamiltonian maximizing conditions as well as from the adjoint equations, open-loop Nash solutions can be obtained. By using phase diagram analysis, for two players the behavior of the optimal pricing strategies can be characterized qualitatively. The main importance of the paper lies in the solution technique, rather than in the economic significance of the proposed model. Under the proposed assumptions, the two-point boundary-value problem resulting from the maximum principle is reduced to a terminal-value problem. It turns out that, for special salvage values of the market shares and if the planning horizon is not too short, nonmonotonic Nash-optimal price trajectories occur.Thanks are due to S. Jørgensen, A. Mehlmann, and R. Willing for helpful suggestions.