Contractually stable networks

We consider situations where players are part of a network and belong to coalitions in a given coalition structure. We propose the concept of contractual stability to predict the networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium when the consent of coalition partners is needed for adding or deleting links. Two different decision rules for consent are analyzed: simple majority and unanimity. We characterize the coalition structures that make the strongly efficient network contractually stable under the unanimity decision rule and the coalition structures that sustain some critical network as contractually stable under the simple majority decision rule and under any decision rule requiring the consent of any proportion of coalition partners. Requiring the consent of coalition members may help to reconcile stability and efficiency in some classical models of network formation.     

A New and Diastereoselective Synthesis of Threo-Aryl-2-Piperidylmethanol Derivatives

A diastereoselective synthesis of threo-aryl-2-piperidyl- and aryl-1,2,3,6-tetrahydro-2-pyridylmethanol derivatives is described. The stereochemistry is controlled by intramolecularly assisted NaBH₄ reduction of the intermediate carbamates 3.     

An algorithm for computing the stable coalition structures in tree-graph communication games

We construct an algorithm which provides in finite steps the stable coalition structure(s) of tree-graph communication games and an allocation of the core: the restricted marginal contribution allocation. This paper has been presented at the St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics (Russian Academy of Sciences), University of Santiago de Compostela (International Workshop on Game Theory), Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, and Universidad de Sevilla. This research has been supported partially by: DGICYT PB94-1372 and UPV 035.321-HB146/96     

A simple procedure to compute the nucleolus of Γ-component additive games

Summary This paper considers the Γ-component additive games which take into account the possibilities of communications among agents located in the nodes of a tree graph Γ. Gains from cooperation are derived from agents who are directly connected in the tree. We introduce a new procedure to compute the nucleolus for these games. This procedure is quick and it does not use linear programming techniques. We finally present a numerical example of a sequencing game to illustrate the procedure. This research has been supported partially by UPV-EHU research projects: 035.321-HA 130/93 and GV research proyects: 035.321-0046/93.     

PHOTOCHEMICAL AND PHOTOBIOLOGICAL PROPERTIES OF KETOPROFEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE BENZOPHENONE CHROMOPHORE

Abstract Irradiation of ketoprofen in neutral aqueous medium gave rise to 3-ethylbenzophenone as the major photoproduct. Its formation is justified via protonation of a benzylic carbanion or hydrogen abstraction by a benzylic radical. Minor amounts of eight additional compounds were isolated. Four of them are derived from the benzylic radical: 3-(1-hydroperoxyethyl)benzophenone, 3-(1-hydroxyethyl)benzophenone, 3-acetylbenzophenone and 2,3-bis- (3-benzoylphenyl)butane. The other four products involve initial hydrogen abstraction by the excited benzophenone chromophore of ketoprofen: 1,2-bis-(3-ethylphenyl)-1,2-diphenyl-1,2-ethanediol, 2-(3-benzoylphenyl)-1-(3-ethylphenyl)-1 -phenylpropan-1 -01,α -(3-ethylphenyl)phenylmethanol, 1,2-bis-[3-(2-hydroxycarbonylethyl)phenyl]-1,2-di-phenyl-1,2-ethanediol. The latter process was found to mediate the photoperoxidation of linoleic acid through a type I mechanism, as evidenced by the inhibition produced by the radical scavengers butylated hydroxyanisole and reduced glutathione. The major photoproduct, which contains the benzophenone moiety but lacks the propionic acid side chain, also photosensitized linoleic acid peroxidation. Because lipid peroxidation is indicative of cell membrane lysis, the above findings are highly relevant to explain the photobiological properties of ketoprofen.     

Fuzzy play,matching devices and coordination failures

We revisit n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. As a novelty, we introduce fuzzy play and a matching device. By fuzzy play we mean that each player does not choose which pure strategy to play, but instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set that he submits to the matching device. The matching device is a very simple one. It randomly selects a match if possible, and it selects randomly some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each player otherwise. That is, it does not impose that the best alternatives are matched. Using the concepts of perfect Nash equilibrium and of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, we show that players coordinate directly on the Pareto optimal outcome. This implies that they neither use the option of fuzzy play, nor make use of the matching device.We thank an anonymous referee and an Associate Editor for valuable comments. Jean-Jacques Herings would like to thank the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) for financial support. Vincent Vannetelbosch is Chercheur Qualifié at the Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique. The research of Ana Mauleon has been made possible by a fellowship of the Fonds Européen du Développement Economique Régional (FEDER). Financial support from the Belgian French Communitys program Action de Recherches Concertée 99/04-235 (IRES, Université catholique de Louvain) is gratefully acknowledged.