Identification of a light-regulated protein kinase activity from seedlings of Arabidopsis thaliana

Protein kinase transduction pathways are thought to be involved in light signaling in plants, but other than the photoreceptors, no protein kinase activity has been shown to be light-regulated in vivo. Using an in-gel protein kinase assay technique with histone H III SS as an exogenous substrate, we identified a light-regulated protein kinase activity with an apparent molecular weight ca 50 kDa. The kinase activity increased transiently after irradiation of dark-grown seedlings with continuous far red light (FR) and blue light (B) and decreased after irradiation with red light (R). The maximal activation was achieved after 30 min to 1 h with FR or B. After irradiation times longer than 2 h, the kinase activity decreased to below the sensitivity level of the assay. In Arabidopsis mutants lacking either the photoreceptors phytochrome A, phytochrome B or the blue-light receptor cryptochrome 1, kinase activity was undetectable, whereas in the photomorphogenic mutants cop1 and det1 the kinase activity was also observed in the absence of light signals, though still stimulated by B and FR. Interestingly, the R inhibition of the kinase activity was lost in the mutant hy5. Pretreatment with cycloheximide blocked the kinase activity.     

A phase I, randomized study of combined IL-2 and therapeutic immunisation with antiretroviral therapy

Background  

Fully functional HIV-1-specific CD8 and CD4 effector T-cell responses are vital to the containment of viral activity and disease progression. These responses are lacking in HIV-1-infected patients with progressive disease. We attempted to augment fully functional HIV-1-specific CD8 and CD4 effector T-cell responses in patients with advanced chronic HIV-1 infection.     

A Priori knowledge contextualised and Benacerraf’s dilemma

In this article, I discuss Hawthorne’s contextualist solution to Benacerraf’s dilemma. He wants to find a satisfactory epistemology to go with realist ontology, namely with causally inaccessible mathematical and modal entities. I claim that he is unsuccessful. The contextualist theories of knowledge attributions were primarily developed as a response to the skeptical argument based on the deductive closure principle. Hawthorne uses the same strategy in his attempt to solve the epistemologist puzzle facing the proponents of mathematical and modal realism, but this problem is of a different nature than the skeptical one. The contextualist theory of knowledge attributions cannot help us with the question about the nature of mathematical and modal reality and how they can be known. I further argue that Hawthorne’s account does not say anything about a priori status of mathematical and modal knowledge. Later, Hawthorne adds to his account an implausible claim that in some contexts a gettierized belief counts as knowledge.