Titania nanoparticles synthesis in mesoporous molecular sieve MCM-41

Nanocrystalline titanium oxide (TiO(2)) is one of the most useful oxide material, because of its widespread applications in photocatalysis, solar energy conversion, sensors and optoelectronics. The control of particle size and monodispersity of TiO(2) nanoparticles is a challenging task. The use of MCM-41, an inorganic template of uniform pore size (2-10 nm), can overcome this difficulty and produce stable nanoparticles of uniform size and shape. Here, we demonstrate the synthesis of titania nanoparticles inside the pores of silica based MCM-41 forming a TiO(2)/Si-MCM composite. Composites are formed in the alcoholic medium by incipient wetness impregnation method. Titania particles of average 3 nm size are obtained. Effect of silica and titania precursors on the quality of nanoparticles has been investigated. The characterization of titania-MCM-41 composites has been carried out using a variety of techniques like UV-vis absorption spectroscopy, X-ray diffraction, FT-IR spectroscopy, X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy, transmission electron microscopy and photoluminescence spectroscopy. It has been found that the titania particles are co-ordinated with Si-MCM by SiOTi covalent bond.     

ON AVOIDANCE ACTIVITIES IN FISHERY ENFORCEMENT MODELS

Compliance and enforcement in fisheries are important issues from an economic point of view since management measures are useless without a certain level of enforcement. These conclusions come from the well‐established theoretical literature on compliance and enforcement problems within fisheries and a common result is that, it is efficient to set fines as high as possible and monitoring as low as possible, when fines are costless and offenders are risk neutral. However, this result is sensitive to the assumption that fishermen cannot engage in avoidance activities, e.g., activities to reduce the likelihood of being detected when noncomplying. The paper presents a model of fisheries that allows the fishermen to engage in avoidance activities. The conclusions from the model are that, under certain circumstances, fines are costly transfers to society since they not only have a direct positive effect on the level of deterrence, but also an indirect negative effect in the form of increased avoidance activities to reduce the probability of detection. The paper contributes to the literature on avoidance activities by introducing the externality from the illegal behavior as an endogenous effect on other offenders. For an externality, that has an exogenous effect on other actors, Malik shows that fines are only costly transfers for conditional deterrence (when one actor is deterred while another actor is not). For fisheries, we show that fines are also costly transfers under no deterrence (when no agents are deterred).