高效金属有机骨架气相色谱固定相的理性设计北大核心CSCD

金属有机骨架材料(MOFs)由金属离子或金属簇与有机配体组装而成,其中多变的金属中心和有机配体使其具有高度可调性,这为调控高效气相色谱分离性能奠定了良好的结构基础。热力学作用力是描述分析物与固定相相互作用的基本指标,保留因子、麦氏常数、焓变与熵变等热力学值可以反映热力学作用力的相对大小。在微观层面上,可以通过设计MOFs孔隙内的多元作用力以开展热力学性质的研究,如设计金属亲和性、π-π相互作用、极性、手性位点等,这些热力学作用力可为分离具有微小差异的分析物提供有利环境。在动力学方面,MOFs的孔径大小与形状、颗粒尺寸、堆积模式对分析物的动力学扩散速率有着重要的影响,从改善分析物的动力学扩散角度出发,通过选择合适的孔径尺寸与形状、降低MOFs的颗粒尺寸、调控MOFs的堆积模式等手段,均可以提高气相色谱固定相的分离性能。根据色谱动力学统一方程和范蒂姆特方程计算扩散系数、理论塔板高度等动力学值,可有效评价色谱峰峰形和色谱柱柱效。在分离过程中,分析物的热力学作用力和动力学效应是协同作用的,且缺一不可。因此,本文从热力学与动力学两个角度提出了构建高效MOFs气相色谱固定相的设计思路,希望能为相关领域的研究提供一定帮助。     

基于加性一致的直觉模糊偏好关系一致性检验与调整新方法

本文研究了基于直觉模糊偏好关系的决策问题,提出了一种新的基于加性一致的直觉模糊偏好关系决策方法。首先,基于加性一致的直觉模糊偏好关系,提出了一种新的检验指标。在此基础上,给出了直觉模糊偏好关系可接受加性一致性定义。然后,针对不满足可接受加性一致的直觉模糊偏好关系,设计了一种一致性调整新方法,并证明了方法的收敛性。最后,提出了一种基于直觉模糊偏好关系的决策方法,并通过实例分析和比较分析说明了新方法的可行性和合理性。     

Evolutionary Prisoner＇s Dilemma Game Based on Division of Work

We propose a new two-type-player prisoner＇s dilemma game based on the division of work on a square lattice, in which a fraction of the population μ are assigned type A and the rest B. In a one-shot two-player game, we let both of their original payoffs be scaled by a same multiplicative factor α 〉 1, if two neighboring players are of different types; however we leave the payoffs unchanged if they are of the same type. Then we show that combined with the two-type setup, the square lattice can assist to induce different social ranks according to players＇ abilities to collect payoffs. Simulation results show that the density of cooperation is significantly promoted for a wide range of the temptation to defection parameters and that there are optimal values for both α and μ leading to the maximal cooperation level. We reach these results by analyzing the distribution of the players in the social ranks and we also show some typical snapshots of the system.     

Accelerating Consensus by Preferential Words in the Naming Game

The naming game is a model of nonequilibrium dynamics for the self-organized emergence of a language or a communication system. We study a modified version of the minimal naming game in which the speaker selects a word from its inventory with a probability proportional to exp（Rs ＊ α）, where Rs is the success ratio of the name and α is a tunable parameter. By investigating the effects of α on the evolutionary processes for both square lattice and scale-free networks, we find that the convergence time decreases with the increasing α on both two networks, which indicates that preferential selection of successful words can accelerate the reaching of consensus. More interestingly, for α 〉 0, we find that the relation between convergence time and α exhibits a power-law form.     

Spatial Games Based on Pursuing the Highest Average Payoff

We propose a strategy updating mechanism based on pursuing the highest average payoff to investigate the prisoner＇s dilemma game and the snowdrift game. We apply the new rule to investigate cooperative behaviours on regular, small-world, scale-free networks, and find spatial structure can maintain cooperation for the prisoner＇s dilemma game. fn the snowdrift game, spatial structure can inhibit or promote cooperative behaviour which depends on payoff parameter. We further study cooperative behaviour on scale-free network in detail. Interestingly, non-monotonous behaviours observed on scale-free network with middle-degree individuals have the lowest cooperation level. We also find that large-degree individuals change their strategies more frequently for both games.     

关于硫系非晶态半导体GeTeSSb的电导机理问题

硫系非晶态半导体Ge15TE81S2Sb2材料的玻璃转变温度Tg为123—127℃[1-4].第一个晶化峰温度Tc1为196—201℃[1,2],此时材料内有Te晶体析出.第二个晶化峰温度Tc2为216℃,此时材料内有GeTe晶体析出[1].当温度超过Tg点后,材料内键链将进行调整,键角将发生偏转,从而结构将松动,故Tg点后材料的结构有较大的变化.该材料的薄膜样品之Tg,丁c1和 Tc2温度都比块状样品要低一些, 陈光华等人[5]认为扩展态电导机理的温度范围分别是162℃(块体)与182℃(薄膜)到227℃之间.此温度范围已超过了Tg,也超过了Tc2。 材料内有大量的Te,GeTe晶体析出,发生了…     

Role of Clustering Coefficient on Cooperation Dynamics in Homogeneous Networks

Based on previous works, we give further investigations on the Prisoners＇ Dilemma Game （PDG） on two different types of homogeneous networks, i.e. the homogeneous small-world network （HSWN） and the regular ring graph. We find that the so-called resonance-like character can occur on both the networks. Different from the viewpoint in previous publications, we think the small-world effect may be unnecessary to produce this character. Therefore, over these two types of networks, we suggest a common understanding in the viewpoint of clustering coefficient. Detailed simulation results can sustain our viewpoint quite well. Furthermore, we investigate the Snowdrift Game （SG） on the same networks. The difference between the outputs of the PDG and the SG can also sustain our viewpoint.     

Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game Based on Pursuing Higher Average Payoff

We investigate the prisoner＇s dilemma game based on a new rule： players will change their current strategies to opposite strategies with some probability if their neighbours＇ average payoffs are higher than theirs. Compared with the cases on regular lattices （RL） and Newman-Watts small world network （NW）, cooperation can be best enhanced on the scale-free Barabasi-Albert network （BA）. It is found that cooperators are dispersive on RL network, which is different from previously reported results that cooperators will form large clusters to resist the invasion of defectors. Cooperative behaviours on the BA network are discussed in detail. It is found that large-degree individuals have lower cooperation level and gain higher average payoffs than that of small-degree individuals. In addition, we find that small-degree individuals more frequently change strategies than do large- degree individuals.     

Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma on Newman-Watts social networks with an asymmetric payoff distribution mechanism

In this paper, we introduce an asymmetric payoff distribution mechanism into the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on Newman--Watts social networks, and study its effects on the evolution of cooperation. The asymmetric payoff distribution mechanism can be adjusted by the parameter α: if α>0, the rich will exploit the poor to get richer; if α<0, the rich are forced to offer part of their income to the poor. Numerical results show that the cooperator frequency monotonously increases with α and is remarkably promoted when α>0. The effects of updating order and self-interaction are also investigated. The co-action of random updating and self-interaction can induce the highest cooperation level. Moreover, we employ the Gini coefficient to investigate the effect of asymmetric payoff distribution on the the system's wealth distribution. This work may be helpful for understanding cooperative behaviour and wealth inequality in society.