An ESR Framework for the Study of Consciousness

I will argue that, in an interdisciplinary study of consciousness, epistemic structural realism (ESR) can offer a feasible philosophical background for the study of consciousness and its associated neurophysiological phenomena in neuroscience and cognitive science while also taking into account the mathematical structures involved in this type of research. Applying the ESR principles also to the study of the neurophysiological phenomena associated with free will (or rather conscious free choice) and with various alterations of consciousness (AOCs) generated by various pathologies such as epilepsy would add explanatory value to the matter. This interdisciplinary approach would be in tune with Quine’s well known idea that philosophy is not simple conceptual analysis but is continuous with science and actually represents an abstract branch of the empirical research. The ESR could thus resonate with scientific models of consciousness such as the global neuronal workspace model (inspired by the global workspace theory—GWT) and the integrated information theory (IIT) model. While structural realism has already been employed in physics or biology, its application as a meta-theory contextualising and relating various scientific findings on consciousness is new indeed. Out of the two variants: ontic structural realism (OSR) and epistemic structural realism (ESR), the latter can be considered more suitable for the study of consciousness and its associated neurophysiological phenomena because it removes the pressure of the still unanswered ‘What is consciousness?’ ontological question and allows us to concentrate instead on the ‘What can we know about consciousness?’ epistemological question.     

基于L系统的树木建模与仿真

基于L系统的建模方法是虚拟树木仿真的一种常用方法。针对传统L系统方法绘制的树木可交互性不强,造型呆板,绘制速度较慢的缺点,对L系统绘制流程进行改进以减少不必要的字符串重写次数和分形计算量;通过对重写规则引入概率因子来获得更好的随机性,进一步提高真实感;通过文中提出的SCA算法(Slices-Compression Algorithm)减少绘制树木分枝需要的矩形数量,提高绘制速度。实验结果表明,该方法绘制的树木具有较好的真实感,可交互性强,且绘制速度较快。     

Nature Has No Elementary Particles and Makes No Measurements or Predictions: Quantum Measurement and Quantum Theory,from Bohr to Bell and from Bell to Bohr

This article reconsiders the concept of physical reality in quantum theory and the concept of quantum measurement, following Bohr, whose analysis of quantum measurement led him to his concept of a (quantum) “phenomenon,” referring to “the observations obtained under the specified circumstances,” in the interaction between quantum objects and measuring instruments. This situation makes the terms “observation” and “measurement,” as conventionally understood, inapplicable. These terms are remnants of classical physics or still earlier history, from which classical physics inherited it. As defined here, a quantum measurement does not measure any preexisting property of the ultimate constitution of the reality responsible for quantum phenomena. An act of measurement establishes a quantum phenomenon by an interaction between the instrument and the quantum object or in the present view the ultimate constitution of the reality responsible for quantum phenomena and, at the time of measurement, also quantum objects. In the view advanced in this article, in contrast to that of Bohr, quantum objects, such as electrons or photons, are assumed to exist only at the time of measurement and not independently, a view that redefines the concept of quantum object as well. This redefinition becomes especially important in high-energy quantum regimes and quantum field theory and allows this article to define a new concept of quantum field. The article also considers, now following Bohr, the quantum measurement as the entanglement between quantum objects and measurement instruments. The argument of the article is grounded in the concept “reality without realism” (RWR), as underlying quantum measurement thus understood, and the view, the RWR view, of quantum theory defined by this concept. The RWR view places a stratum of physical reality thus designated, here the reality ultimately responsible for quantum phenomena, beyond representation or knowledge, or even conception, and defines the corresponding set of interpretations quantum mechanics or quantum field theory, such as the one assumed in this article, in which, again, not only quantum phenomena but also quantum objects are (idealizations) defined by measurement. As such, the article also offers a broadly conceived response to J. Bell’s argument “against ‘measurement’”.     

论犹太文化与现代文化的冲突在文本创作中产生的心理效用

从心理现实主义创作手法的角度分析,认为犹太文化即自我禁锢的文化传统与现代文化间的冲突会带给文本创作以独特的效用。一方面,犹太文化背景下的心理现实文本将人心灵深处的追求与传统文化利益的严酷限制进行对立,反映出犹太社会群体神秘莫测的心理性格;另一方面,犹太文学文本中采用的压抑且具负罪意识的＂自我＂解构将弗洛伊德的潜意识理论深化,形成该背景下对立＂自我＂的文本理论结构,从而在文学审美和创作领域独辟蹊径,形成当代犹太作家的文本特色。     

高晓声《钱包》赏析

《钱包》是高晓声创作的第一篇象征性小说,充满了象征的色彩和人生哲理的闪光。同时,细腻的心理刻画、丰满的人物形象、精彩的景物描写、真切的环境渲染叉使《钱包》成为一部严格的现实主义作品,《钱包》将现实性与象征性有机结合在一起,是对现实主义的进一步丰富与开拓,堪称高晓声作品中的一部上乘之作。     

重启日常生活：再论“新写实小说”的发生及意义

＂新写实＂是1990年代初期最为重要的文学思潮之一,但迄今为止,学术界对这一思潮的发生仍缺乏充分的研究。文章从当时的社会文化环境、社会心理及中国文化传统的大背景等几个因素入手,详细的阐述与论证了＂新写实＂思潮发生的合理性与必然性,并从文学影响的角度对其意义和局限性作了探讨。     

创作方法在文论教材中的变化及问题

1990年代以来,文论教材中创作方法的内容或者以文学类型出现,或者依然保持用来的语用而在具体讲述上有所调整,或者干脆不提,这都反映了编写者不同的教学理念。创作方法应该保留在教材中,而且其基本类型应该为现实主义、浪漫主义和象征主义三种。     

Some Comments on “The Mathematical Universe”

I discuss some problems related to extreme mathematical realism, focusing on a recently proposed “shut-up-and-calculate” approach to physics (Tegmark in Found. Phys. 38:101, 2008; New Sci., September 15th, 2007). I offer arguments for a moderate alternative, the essence of which lies in the acceptance that mathematics is (at least in part) a human construction, and discuss concrete consequences of this—at first sight purely philosophical—difference in point of view.     

On “Decisions and Revisions Which a Minute Will Reverse”: Consciousness,The Unconscious and Mathematical Modeling of Thinking

This article considers a partly philosophical question: What are the ontological and epistemological reasons for using quantum-like models or theories (models and theories based on the mathematical formalism of quantum theory) vs. classical-like ones (based on the mathematics of classical physics), in considering human thinking and decision making? This question is only partly philosophical because it also concerns the scientific understanding of the phenomena considered by the theories that use mathematical models of either type, just as in physics itself, where this question also arises as a physical question. This is because this question is in effect: What are the physical reasons for using, even if not requiring, these types of theories in considering quantum phenomena, which these theories predict fully in accord with the experiment? This is clearly also a physical, rather than only philosophical, question and so is, accordingly, the question of whether one needs classical-like or quantum-like theories or both (just as in physics we use both classical and quantum theories) in considering human thinking in psychology and related fields, such as decision science. It comes as no surprise that many of these reasons are parallel to those that are responsible for the use of QM and QFT in the case of quantum phenomena. Still, the corresponding situations should be understood and justified in terms of the phenomena considered, phenomena defined by human thinking, because there are important differences between these phenomena and quantum phenomena, which this article aims to address. In order to do so, this article will first consider quantum phenomena and quantum theory, before turning to human thinking and decision making, in addressing which it will also discuss two recent quantum-like approaches to human thinking, that by M. G. D’Ariano and F. Faggin and that by A. Khrennikov. Both approaches are ontological in the sense of offering representations, different in character in each approach, of human thinking by the formalism of quantum theory. Whether such a representation, as opposed to only predicting the outcomes of relevant experiments, is possible either in quantum theory or in quantum-like theories of human thinking is one of the questions addressed in this article. The philosophical position adopted in it is that it may not be possible to make this assumption, which, however, is not the same as saying that it is impossible. I designate this view as the reality-without-realism, RWR, view and in considering strictly mental processes as the ideality-without-idealism, IWI, view, in the second case in part following, but also moving beyond, I. Kant’s philosophy.     

新写实小说的日常生活叙事“转向”

新写实小说的日常生活叙事转向所带来的文学史意义，无疑是重大的。但是，评论界在强调这场转向的同时，又无意间制造了新写实主义与传统现实主义之间的对立。这无疑就割裂了文学史的发展脉络。事实上，新写实小说与传统现实主义小说的对话空间，要大于他们之间的对立空间。但也正是这种对话空间的存在，预示了新写实小说的短暂青春。