Semilinear wave models with friction and viscoelastic damping

In this paper, we study the global (in time) existence of small data solutions to the Cauchy problem for the semilinear wave equation with friction, viscoelastic damping, and a power nonlinearity. We are interested in the connection between regularity assumptions for the data and the admissible range of exponents p in the power nonlinearity.     

基于ESI和InCites的学科发展预测研究--以中国地质大学为例

基于汤姆路透公司的ESI和InCites数据库，分析了中国地质大学各学科的特征，探讨了高被引论文、热门论文、顶尖论文与学科发展的关系，并预测后续最有可能入围ESI世界前1％的学科。     

基于化学学科认知障碍突破的中考复习教学实践* ——以“二氧化碳的性质”为例

分析学生对二氧化碳的3个典型学科认知障碍,以“二氧化碳的捕捉”为情境,通过“尝试捕捉二氧化碳”“谁在捕捉二氧化碳”“捕捉背后的原理”等3个主要环节,实现对学科认知障碍的突破,展示了一种新的中考复习教学思路。     

Monte Carlo simulation of electric conductivity for pure and doping fullerene (C60)

In this paper, we have used Monte Carlo (MC) method to simulate and study the temperature and doping effects on the electric conductivity of fullerene (C60). The results show that the band gap has reduced by the doping and the charge carrier transport is facilitated from valence band to conduction band by the temperature where is touched a 300 K. In this case, the conductivity reached a value of $4\times {10}^{-7}\text{S}{\text{cm}}^{-1}$. The electric conductivity of C60 can increase by the triphenylmethane dye crystal violet (CV) alkali metal to reach $4\times {10}^{-3}\text{S}{\text{cm}}^{-1}$ at 303 K. Our results of MC simulation have a good agreement with those extracted from literature [10], [33].     

Convergence of solutions for the fractional Cahn–Hilliard system

This paper deals with the Cauchy–Dirichlet problem for the fractional Cahn–Hilliard equation. The main results consist of global (in time) existence of weak solutions, characterization of parabolic smoothing effects (implying under proper condition eventual boundedness of trajectories), and convergence of each solution to a (single) equilibrium. In particular, to prove the convergence result, a variant of the so-called ?ojasiewicz–Simon inequality is provided for the fractional Dirichlet Laplacian and (possibly) non-analytic (but $C^1$) nonlinearities.     

一种立体织机平行打纬机构的设计与优化

针对多层织物织造过程中,各层纬纱打纬力需保持一致以及需要减少钢筘与纱线之间摩擦的要求,提出八连杆平行打纬机构,并根据工艺要求对打纬机构进行优化。以打纬机构的主轴转动140°时,筘座在后心位置处的近似静止位移Δs最小为优化目标,通过Matlab软件分析确定设计变量,优化钢筘在后死心位置的近似停留时间。运动学仿真结果表明,优化后的打纬机构不仅保证了钢筘的打纬动程和其在后死心处的静止时间,而且增大了钢筘的惯性打纬力,有利于厚重织物的打纬。     

Potts models with magnetic field: Arithmetic,geometry, and computation

We give a sheaf theoretic interpretation of Potts models with external magnetic field, in terms of constructible sheaves and their Euler characteristics. We show that the polynomial countability question for the hypersurfaces defined by the vanishing of the partition function is affected by changes in the magnetic field: elementary examples suffice to see non-polynomially countable cases that become polynomially countable after a perturbation of the magnetic field. The same recursive formula for the Grothendieck classes, under edge-doubling operations, holds as in the case without magnetic field, but the closed formulae for specific examples like banana graphs differ in the presence of magnetic field. We give examples of computation of the Euler characteristic with compact support, for the set of real zeros, and find a similar exponential growth with the size of the graph. This can be viewed as a measure of topological and algorithmic complexity. We also consider the computational complexity question for evaluations of the polynomial, and show both tractable and NP-hard examples, using dynamic programming.     

The effects of resource limitation and consensual incentives on cooperation

Exploring the evolution of cooperation has been one of the most challenging topics and attracted increasing attention in various realms. Hereby, we institute an analytic model where the relationship between the common benefits and contributions is the typical saturation nonlinearity. We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation with and without consensual incentives respectively. The population always evolves to full defection when the incentives are absent. Cooperation, however, can be promoted by consensual incentives when the degree of cooperators' preferences for incentives is great. There exists an intermediate amount of resources at which the positive effect of consensual incentives on cooperation is minimized. Furthermore, there is a U-shape relationship between the degree of cooperators' preference for an incentive and the evolution of cooperation. A greater basin of full cooperation can be induced when the cooperators' preference for reward is more pronounced than that for punishment.