曲棍球赛场技战术的计算机分析系统

介绍在ＩＢＭ－ＰＣ／ＸＴ计算机上实现的曲棍球赛场统计系统的研制过程、设计思想、采用的方法、软件设计与功能、技术指标操作步骤以及使用效果。     

An Informational Approach to the Sinusoidal Law of Photon Polarization

The photon polarization law po ＝ sin2θ is derived from a simple informational consideration by twomethods: The first is via an intuitive principle of mininum Fisher information, the second is via a symmetry andinvariance argument. The results demonstrate that in photon polarization, Nature has a tendency to hide herselfas deepas possible while obeying some regular conditions.     

Server-Agents-Users通信系统的Stackelberg模型

在多媒体通信系统中引入代理服务器，使其成为Server—Agents—Users系统，并用对策论的Stackelberg理论研究该系统．针对Server、Agents和Users地位不平等的情况，建立了该系统的Stackelberg策略模型，得到一个三层规划模型．     

共同治理结构下企业所有权配置的进化博弈分析

本文运用进化博弈论的方法,对有限理性的利益相关者在共同治理结构下参与企业所有权配置并达到纳什均衡的进化博弈过程进行分析,并通过算例说明了这是一个各方相互沟通和反复博弈的动态过程,逐步实现一致性的企业所有权配置的纳什均衡.     

On a dynamic fractional game

Consider a two-person zero-sum game constructed by a dynamic fractional form. We establish the upper value as well as the lower value of a dynamic fractional game, and prove that the dual gap is equal to zero under certain conditions. It is also established that the saddle point function exists in the fractional game system under certain conditions so that the equilibrium point exists in this game system.     

Analysis of a Duopoly Supply Chain and its Application in Electricity Spot Markets

This paper studies a supply chain consisting of two suppliers and one retailer in a spot market, where the retailer uses the newsvendor solution as its purchase policy, and suppliers compete for the retailer’s purchase. Since each supplier’s bidding strategy affects the other’s profit, a game theory approach is used to identify optimal bidding strategies. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a Nash solution. It is also shown that the competition between the supplier leads to a lower market clearing price, and as a result, the retailer benefits from it. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of the obtained results by deriving optimal bidding strategies for power generator plants in the deregulated California energy market. Supported in part by RGC (Hong Kong) Competitive Earmarked Research Grants (CUHK4167/04E and CUHK4239/03E), a Distinguished Young Investigator Grant from the National Natural Sciences Foundation of China, and a grant from Hundred Talents Program of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.     

最小费用k度限制树对策

本在Glover—Klingman算法及最小费用支撑树对策的基础上，讨论了最小费用k度限制树对策问题．利用威胁、旁支付理论制订了两种规则，并利用优超、策略等价理论分别给出了在这两种规则下最小费用k度限制树对策核心中的解，从而证明了在这两种规则下其核心非空．     

Noninferior Nash Strategies for Multi-Team Systems

This paper is concerned with the optimization of systems that are controlled by several teams of decision makers. The decision makers within each team cooperate for the benefit of their team. On the other hand, the teams compete among themselves in order to achieve an objective that relates to the overall performance of the system. An approach that merges concepts from team theory and game theory for dealing with such systems and a solution called the noninferior Nash strategy are introduced. This multi-team solution provides a new framework for analyzing hierarchically controlled systems so as to address complicated coordination problems among the decision makers. The properties of the noninferior Nash solution in static multi-team systems are investigated and necessary conditions for its existence are derived. Analytical expressions for the noninferior Nash strategies are derived for a class of linear-quadratic static multi-team games. In order to deal with the issue of nonuniqueness of the solution, the concept of a noninferior Nash strategy with a team leader is introduced. Several examples are presented to illustrate the results.     

A Relationship Among Gentzen's Proof-Reduction,Kirby-Paris' Hydra Game and Buchholz's Hydra Game

We first note that Gentzen's proof-reduction for his consistency proof of PA can be directly interpreted as moves of Kirby-Paris' Hydra Game, which implies a direct independence proof of the game (Section 1 and Appendix). Buchholz's Hydra Game for labeled hydras is known to be much stronger than PA. However, we show that the one-dimensional version of Buchholz's Game can be exactly identified to Kirby-Paris' Game (which is two-dimensional but without labels), by a simple and natural interpretation (Section 2). Jervell proposed another type of a combinatorial game, by abstracting Gentzen's proof-reductions and showed that his game is independent of PA. We show (Section 3) that this Jervell's game is actually much stronger than PA, by showing that the critical ordinal of Jervell's game is φ_ω (0) (while that of PA or of Kirby-Paris' Game is φ₁ (0) = ?₀) in the Veblen hierarchy of ordinals.