工程监理管理工作中的一些体会和建议

结合引黄工程的监理管理工作,阐述了监理工程师的任务、权力等方面的问题,总结了实施监理过程中的一些体会,提出了有关监理工程师如何执行合同的若干建议.     

Manufacturer’s revenue-sharing contract and retail competition

This paper investigates a revenue-sharing contract for coordinating a supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, offers a revenue-sharing contract to two competing retailers who face stochastic demand before the selling season. Under the offered contract terms, the competing retailers are to determine the quantities to be ordered from the manufacturer, prior to the season, and the retail price at which to sell the items during the season. The process of pricing and ordering is expected to result in an equilibrium as in the Bayesian Nash game. On the basis of anticipated responses and actions of the retailers, the manufacturer designs the revenue-sharing contract. Adopting the classic newsvendor problem model framework and using numerical methods, the study finds that the provision of revenue-sharing in the contract can obtain better performance than a price-only contract. However, the benefits earned under the revenue-sharing contract by different supply chain partners differ because of the impact of demand variability and price-sensitivity factors. The paper also analyses the impact of demand variability on decisions about optimal retail price, order quantity and profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailers. Lastly, it investigates how the competition (between retailers) factor influences the decision-making of supply chain members in response to uncertain demand and profit variability.     

Three-level warranty service contract among manufacturer,agent and customer: A game-theoretical approach

A warranty is a service contract between a manufacturer and a customer which plays a vital role in many businesses and legal transactions. In this paper, various three-level service contracts will be presented among the following three participants; a manufacturer, an agent, and a customer. In order to obtain a better result, the interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and semi-cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost or repair cost for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter. Several numerical examples and managerial insights are presented and used to illustrate the models presented in this paper.     

Reciprocal supply chain with intention

The traditional hypothesis of “rationality” is far from perfect. Models of fairness solely based on consequence cannot explain why the same consequence of an action is perceived and reciprocated differently. A reciprocity model which accounts for both consequence and its underlying intention is presented in this paper to illustrate the effect of intention in a traditional dyadic channel where one supplier plays a Stackelberg-like game with one retailer. This research aims to investigate how reciprocity may affect the members’ decisions and the channel’s coordination. In this study, two scenarios are discussed: (1) the retailer has a preference for reciprocity while the supplier does not and (2) both the retailer and the supplier have a preference for reciprocity. Results for acrimonious supply chain (γμ>1$\gamma \mu >1$) and harmonious supply chain (γμ?1$\gamma \mu ?1$) are analyzed. Furthermore, we derive equilibria under the two scenarios and prove the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibria. The results show that intention plays an important role in decision making of the supply chain and will significantly change the equilibria. Moreover, an acrimonious supply chain can be coordinated with a simple wholesale-price contract under certain conditions, which can never happen in a traditional channel. A harmonious supply chain, however, cannot be coordinated in any way.     

基于提前期压缩的两阶段供应链的契约协调

研究了基于提前期压缩的信息对称和信息不对称两种情况下的供应链协调问题,重点解决了在信息不对称时采用线性转移支付策略解决供应链的不协调问题.当压缩提前期时,制造商的成本增加,成本的增加值信息对销售商有对称和不对称两种情况.在信息对称时采用收益共享契约可以实现供应链的协调;在信息不对称,采用收益共享契约时,为了激励制造商,销售商不得不对制造商生产成本的不确定性付出成本,导致利润下降,而制造商由于拥有私有信息而使得利润增加,所以整个供应链并没有达到集中决策时的水平,只得到了帕累托改善的次优结果.创新点在于采用线性转移支付策略实现了供应链的协调,达到了帕累托最优,解决了收益共享契约不能实现供应链协调的问题.最后通过算例进行了说明.     

Sharing risk through concession contracts

In this paper we model concession contracts between a public and a private party, under dynamic uncertainty arising both from the volatility of the cash flow generated by the project and by the strategic behaviour of the two parties. Under these conditions we derive three notions of equilibrium price and apply the model to a case study for one of the most important concession contracts in Italy.     

浅议存量房交易网上签约备案

为规范存量房交易市场行为,提高存量房交易的透明度,提高行政服务管理水平和办事效率,探讨了存量房买卖合同网上签约备案的具体实施方案,具有一定的借鉴意义。     

Manufacturer-buyer coordination for newsvendor-type-products with two ordering opportunities and partial backorders

In a recent paper [Weng, Z.K., 2004. Coordinating order quantities between the manufacturer and the buyer: A generalized newsvendor model. European Journal of Operational Research 156, 148–161], a newsvendor-type coordination model was developed for a single-manufacturer single-buyer channel with two ordering opportunities. This paper further extends the model to the case where the excess demand after the first order is partially backlogged and both parties share the manufacturing setup cost of the second order (if happened). We show that the decentralized system would perform best if the manufacturer covers utterly the second production setup cost, which is opposite to that obtained in Weng (2004). Another extension in the present paper is that in the centralized system, the second order decision is made by the buyer based on the channel’s benefit rather than based on the buyer’s benefit as in Weng (2004). It is proved that the expected profit of the system in our paper is always larger than that in Weng (2004). In order to maximize the expected profit of the channel, two coordinated policies are proposed to achieve perfect coordination: a two-part-tariff policy for the special case that the buyer pays all the manufacturing setup cost, and a revised revenue-sharing contract for the case that two parties share the manufacturing setup cost.     

契约伦理的价值理念

契约伦理是生态文明的重要应用伦理形态、实体伦理规律"现象"。契约伦理理念主要有理性、公平与自由。理性对"自然状态"展开伦理反省,选择契约作为避免"狼—狼状态"、走向"和平"相与之道的善的路径;公平要求契约制度设定权利义务对等原则并确定主客观衡平标准,它是经验世界的"希望"和"追求";自由表现为契约行为的自我主导性,以"人"为目的,属于"相对自由"。契约伦理理念能够引导契约实践,使行为主体在"契约生活态势"中坚守道德光明之路,促进社会和谐发展与中国伦理梦的实现。     

古希腊千古迷案“半费之讼”的法律探讨

古希腊著名的思想家和哲学家普罗泰哥拉向学生欧提勒士传授辩论技巧,教他替人打官司并约定,剩下的另一半学费则在他毕业后第一次替人打官司赢了之后再交.欧提勒士毕业后,总不去代理别人打官司,普罗泰戈拉只好到法院起诉学生欧提勒士.师生两人均运用诡辩技巧各执一词,据说成千古“迷案”.其实,无论是根据当时的古希腊自然法,还是根据古罗马的诚实信用原则或附生效条件契约,均可裁决学生支付另外一半学费.逻辑推理在法律思维中有局限性,更不可被诡辩误导.在实践中要善于破解诡辩.