A note on the nucleolus and the kernel of the assignment game

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer–seller exact representative.I am grateful to C. Rafels and to the referees for their comments. Institutional support from research grants BEC 2002-00642 and SGR2001–0029 is also acknowledged.     

基于模糊方法的多人合作对策的研究

多人合作对策模型中联盟的收入和总体的收入常常出现相互矛盾的情况 ,此时核是空集 .由于不存在核 ,无法用 Nash-Harsanyi谈判模型求解 .采用模糊数学方法 ,调整模型中线性约束的右端系数 ,使核在一定程度上是非空集合 ,得到模糊意义下的 Nash平衡解 .该方法一定程度上解决了各联盟收入与总体收入的矛盾 .最后通过一个算例说明该方法的可行性 .     

产需不确定下面向资金约束供应商的供应链融资策略研究

以包含一个供应商和一个分销商的供应链为研究对象,其中分销商面临市场需求不确定性,供应商存在资金约束且面临产出不确定性。 提出期望利率的概念,研究银行贷款期望利率一定的情况下,供应链银行融资最优策略。 构建了供应链预付款融资机制,在此基础上研究预付款模式下供应链的融资与生产订购的最优策略,并讨论了预付款期望利率的可行范围。 研究表明,预付款融资模式下,分销商愿意以低于银行贷款利率的期望利率向供应商提供预付款; 存在预付款期望利率可行区间,实现预付款协调模式下供应链系统的帕累托改进。     

Search games with immobile hider

In this paper we discuss a type of search game with immobile hider on a graph. If the graph is weakly cyclic (i.e. no edge lies on two different cycles) we determine the value of the game and give an easy way to compute optimal strategies for the players. The value is half the length of a quasi-Euler path, i.e. a closed path of minimal length that visits all points of the network.     

Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness

In both dictator and impunity games, one player, the dictator, divides a fixed amount of money between himself and one other, the recipient. Recent lab studies of these games have produced seemingly inconsistent results, reporting substantially divergent amounts of dictator giving. Also, one prominent explanation for some of these differences, the impact of experimenter observation, displayed weak explanatory power in a different but related lab game. Data from the new experiment reported here offers some explanations. We find that dictators determine how much they will give on the basis of the total money available for the entire experimental session, not on the basis of what is available per game. This explains the reported differences between impunity and dictator studies. When distributing a gift among several recipients, individual dictators show little tendency towards equal treatment. Also, we find no evidence for the experimenter observation effect. Comparison with earlier experiments suggests that differences in the context of the game, affected by differences in written directions and independent of experimenter observation, account for differences across dictator studies. We propose a hypothetical decision procedure, based on the notion that dictator giving originates with personal and social rules that effectively constrain self-interested behavior. The procedure provides a link between dictator behavior and a broader class of laboratory phenomena. Received August 1993/Final version April 1994     

自然灾害恢复重建的联盟博弈分析

自然灾害恢复重建的关键之一,是救济基金的筹集.论文基于联盟博弈的理论分析了国家财政拨款、地方财政拨款、红十字会等社会机构募捐三条途径,对国家财政、地方财政、社会募捐机构三方, 应筹集救济基金的比例进行了论证.使全社会对恢复重建救济基金筹集的满意度最大.     

博弈论在通信对抗态势预测中的应用

本文首先提出了基于博弈论预测电磁态势演变的基本构想,设置了通信对抗的场景并构建了相应的数学模型.其次,分析了通信对抗电磁态势生成流程,最后结合一定的作战背景进行了仿真实验,基于双方博弈的原则预测了通信对抗态势的演变.仿真结果与理论分析相符,该研究成果已在多个作战仿真系统中得到了成功应用.