基于供应商视角的提前订货协调研究

本文针对一个供应商和零售商组成的供应链系统,主要研究零售商如何设计提前订货折扣来吸引顾客提前订货;而供应商如何根据市场需求的不确定性,设计零售商提前订货资金的付款时间等问题。在供应商-Stackelberg框架下,以期望利润为目标,建立了相应的决策模型。通过对模型的分析求解,给出了不同市场环境下供应商要求零售商支付提前订货资金的策略。最后,用算例验证了模型和理论分析的可行性。     

Analysis of a Duopoly Supply Chain and its Application in Electricity Spot Markets

This paper studies a supply chain consisting of two suppliers and one retailer in a spot market, where the retailer uses the newsvendor solution as its purchase policy, and suppliers compete for the retailer’s purchase. Since each supplier’s bidding strategy affects the other’s profit, a game theory approach is used to identify optimal bidding strategies. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a Nash solution. It is also shown that the competition between the supplier leads to a lower market clearing price, and as a result, the retailer benefits from it. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of the obtained results by deriving optimal bidding strategies for power generator plants in the deregulated California energy market. Supported in part by RGC (Hong Kong) Competitive Earmarked Research Grants (CUHK4167/04E and CUHK4239/03E), a Distinguished Young Investigator Grant from the National Natural Sciences Foundation of China, and a grant from Hundred Talents Program of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.     

Surplus division and investment incentives in supply chains: A biform-game analysis

In this paper, we use a biform-game approach for analyzing the impact of surplus division in supply chains on investment incentives. In the first stage of the game, firms decide non-cooperatively on investments. In the second stage, the surplus is shared according to the Shapley value. We find that all firms have inefficiently low investment incentives which, however, depend on their position in the supply chain. Cross-subsidies for investment costs can mitigate, but not eliminate the underinvestment problem. Vertical integration between at least some firms.yields efficient investments, but may nevertheless reduce the aggregated payoff of the firms. We show how the size of our effects depends on the structure of the supply chain and the efficiency of the investment technology. Various extensions demonstrate that our results are qualitatively robust.     

Strategic bidding in continuous electricity auctions: an application to the Spanish electricity market

In this paper we introduce an asymmetric model of continuous electricity auctions with limited production capacity and bounded supply functions. The strategic bidding is studied with this model by means of an electricity market game. We prove that for every electricity market game with continuous cost functions a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium always exists. In particular, we focus on the behavior of producers in the Spanish electricity market. We consider a very simple form for the Spanish electricity market: an oligopoly consisting just of independent hydro-electric power production units in a single wet period. We show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the Spanish electricity market game always exists.     

Alliances, partnerships and the Banzhaf semivalue

The coordination of strategies in a cooperative game, when some players decide to act together, is the basis of the partnership notion. Nevertheless, in some situations, it may be more convenient to form an effective coalition or alliance. In this work, we consider the Banzhaf semivalue and use it to discuss the convenience to form either partnerships or alliances, especially in simple games. Throughout the paper, some mathematical properties of the Banzhaf semivalue, in relation with the partnership formation, are derived.     

Coordination mechanisms for inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems

This paper is concerned with the coordination of inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems under decentralized control. All installations in these supply chains track echelon inventories. Under decentralized control the installations will decide upon base stock levels that minimize their own inventory costs. In general these levels do not coincide with the optimal base stock levels in the global optimum of the chain under centralized control. Hence, the total cost under decentralized control is larger than under centralized control. To remove this cost inefficiency, two simple coordination mechanisms are presented: one for serial systems and one for distribution systems. Both mechanisms are initiated by the most downstream installation(s). The upstream installation increases its base stock level while the downstream installation compensates the upstream one for the increase of costs and provides it with a part of its gain from coordination. It is shown that both coordination mechanisms result in the global optimum of the chain being the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Furthermore, all installations agree upon the use of these mechanisms because they result in lower costs per installation. The practical implementation of these mechanisms is discussed.     

An algorithm of evolutionarily stable strategies for the single-population evolutionary game

In this paper, we study the single-population evolutionary game and construct an algorithm to find evolutionarily stable strategies. Finally, by an example, we illuminate the computing process of algorithm.     

供应链协作创新模式比较与协调

从供应链中居于核心地位的供应商出发,基于下游制造商对上游创新的影响,在需求对价格敏感情况下考虑了供应商、制造商、第三方研发机构协作创新的博弈过程,对供应链创新协作的三种模式进行了建模分析。研究结果发现在创新能力相当的情况下,无论从创新力度、各方期望利润,还是从满足需求量等来看,供应商与供应链上关系紧密的下游协作创新的模式不仅可以降低自己创新的投资和创新风险,而且提高了整个供应链创新力度和水平,又可以在收益上双赢,其优于不进行协作创新和委托第三方研发机构的协作创新模式。最后进一步提出了供应链协调策略。     

双重委托-代理理论在税收流失中的应用

本文研究了我国国税局和地税局在税收征管上的合作问题。首次应用双重委托一代理理论对该问题进行了经济分析。研究发现,国税局和地税局在税收征收和税收监管上完全合作时,相对而言,能最大化它们的总效用;而当国税局和地税局只在税收监管上合作时,税收征收上的“正外部性”将导致相对“过剩”的监管;最后,如果国税局和地税局完全不合作时,监管上的“搭便车”效应是影响博弈结果的主导因素。研究结果有一定的现实意义。     

一类组合优化函数的若干研究

本文研究了一个组合优化问题.利用组合数论的理论,给出了计算优化函数的一个新方法,并确定了4≤4m≤120时优化函数g(4m,6)的准确值,以及相心的优化向量.