Scheme for Implementation of Quantum Game in Cavity QED

We propose an experimentally feasible scheme to implement two-player quantum game in cavity quantum electrodynamics （QED）. During the process, the cavity is only virtually excited, thus our scheme is insensitive to the cavity field states and cavity decay. The scheme can be realized in the range of current cavity QED techniques.     

整治非法煤矿的博弈论分析

通过建立博弈模型,分析事故频发的原因,并提出相应对策．指出设立举报奖金,消除矿工举报的后顾之忧,降低监督成本从而增加监督频率,加大惩罚力度是减少事故的关键．     

On the strategic origin of Brownian motion in finance

This paper is concerned with the strategic use of a private information on the stock market. A repeated auction model is used to analyze the evolution of the price system on a market with asymmetric information.  The model turns out to be a zero-sum repeated game with one-sided information, as introduced by Aumann and Maschler.  The stochastic evolution of the price system can be explicitly computed in the n times repeated case. As n grows to ∞, this process tends to a continuous time martingale related to a Brownian Motion.  This paper provides in this way an endogenous justification for the appearance of Brownian Motion in Finance theory. Received: February 2002     

On Quantum Team Games

Recently Liu and Simaan (2004) convex static multi-team classical games have been introduced. Here they are generalized to both nonconvex, dynamic and quantum games. Puu's incomplete information dynamical systems are modified and applied to Cournot team game. The replicator dynamics of the quantum prisoner's dilemma game is also studied.     

Emergence of cooperation in spatial public goods game with conditional participation

Conditional interactions are common in both human and animal societies. To understand the impacts of this feature on the evolution of cooperation, we propose a modified public goods game combined with conditional interactions in terms of the aspiration payoffs. Through simulations, we find that the function of the fraction of cooperators and the synergy factor is non-monotonic. This indicates that a large synergy factor is not always in favor of the promotion of cooperation. In addition, for a high aspiration, the typical coexistence state of cooperators and defectors could disappear, and the system demonstrates a sharp transition from the complete defection state to the complete cooperation state as the synergy factor increases. Furthermore, an interesting critical phenomenon is found in a finite system, i.e., the system can randomly evolve into a complete defection state or a complete cooperation state. An explanation of these evolutionary outcomes is provided in this paper, which is in agreement with the simulation results.     

基于生命期模型的无线传感器网络信道分配博弈算法

针对无线传感器网络中节点因干扰过大导致重传能耗增加, 进而节点过早失效、网络生命期缩短的问题, 根据网络拓扑信息和路由信息设计节点的负载模型, 从而构建了节点的生命期模型. 然后利用博弈论将路径增益、交叉干扰和节点生命期等性能参数融入到效益函数中, 构建信道分配博弈模型. 理论分析证明该博弈模型存在纳什均衡. 进而运用最佳回应策略, 在所构建的信道分配博弈模型的基础上, 设计了一种优化网络生命期的抗干扰信道分配算法. 该算法使节点在选择信道时避免与网络中交叉干扰较大的节点和生命期较小的节点使用相同信道, 实现干扰小、能耗低且均衡的信道选择. 理论分析与仿真结果证明该算法最终能够快速地收敛到纳什均衡, 且具有较小的信息复杂度, 从而减小算法本身的通信能耗. 同时, 该算法具有良好的抗干扰性和信道均衡性, 能够有效地延长网络生命期.     

Transition from coherence to bistability in a model of financial markets

We present a model describing the competition between information transmission and decision making in financial markets. The solution of this simple model is recalled, and possible variations discussed. It is shown numerically that despite its simplicity, it can mimic a size effect comparable to a crash localized in time. Two extensions of this model are presented that allow to simulate the demand process. One of these extensions has a coherent stable equilibrium and is self-organized, while the other has a bistable equilibrium, with a spontaneous segregation of the population of agents. A new model is introduced to generate a transition between those two equilibriums. We show that the coherent state is dominant up to an equal mixing of the two extensions. We focus our attention on the microscopic structure of the investment rate, which is the main parameter of the original model. A constant investment rate seems to be a very good approximation. Received 7 August 2000 and Received in final form 10 September 2000     

Integrating neighborhoods in the evaluation of fitness promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

A fundamental question of human society is the evolution of cooperation. Many previous studies explored this question via setting spatial background, where players obtain their payoffs by playing game with their nearest neighbors. Another undoubted fact is that the environment plays an important role in the individual development. Inspired by these phenomena, we reconsider the definition of individual fitness which integrates the environment, denoted by the average payoff of all individual neighbors, with the traditional individual payoffs by introducing a selection parameter u. Tuning u equal to zero returns the traditional version, while increasing u bears the influence of environment. We find that considering the environment, i.e., integrating neighborhoods in the evaluation of fitness, promotes cooperation. If we enhance the value of u, the invasion of defection could be resisted better. We also provide quantitative explanations and complete phase diagrams presenting the influence of the environment on the evolution of cooperation. Finally, the universality of this mechanism is testified for different neighborhood sizes, different topology structures and different game models. Our work may shed light on the emergence and persistence of cooperation in our life.     

Evolution of cooperation among mobile agents

We study the effects of mobility on the evolution of cooperation among mobile players, which imitate collective motion of biological flocks and interact with neighbors within a prescribed radius R. Adopting the the prisoner’s dilemma game and the snowdrift game as metaphors, we find that cooperation can be maintained and even enhanced for low velocities and small payoff parameters, when compared with the case that all agents do not move. But such enhancement of cooperation is largely determined by the value of R, and for modest values of R, there is an optimal value of velocity to induce the maximum cooperation level. Besides, we find that intermediate values of R or initial population densities are most favorable for cooperation, when the velocity is fixed. Depending on the payoff parameters, the system can reach an absorbing state of cooperation when the snowdrift game is played. Our findings may help understanding the relations between individual mobility and cooperative behavior in social systems.     

Maximum Shannon Entropy, Minimum Fisher Information, and an Elementary Game

We formulate an elementary statistical game which captures the essence of some fundamental quantum experiments such as photon polarization and spin measurement. We explore and compare the significance of the principle of maximum Shannon entropy and the principle of minimum Fisher information in solving such a game. The solution based on the principle of minimum Fisher information coincides with the solution based on an invariance principle, and provides an informational explanation of Malus' law for photon polarization. There is no solution based on the principle of maximum Shannon entropy. The result demonstrates the merits of Fisher information, and the demerits of Shannon entropy, in treating some fundamental quantum problems. It also provides a quantitative example in support of a general philosophy: Nature intends to hide Fisher information, while obeying some simple rules.