Equilibrium in two-player non-zero-sum Dynkin games in continuous time

We prove that every two-player non-zero-sum Dynkin game in continuous time admits an ?-equilibrium in randomized stopping times. We provide a condition that ensures the existence of an ?-equilibrium in non-randomized stopping times.     

On Efficiency Conditions for Nonsmooth Vector Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints

In this article, necessary conditions of Fritz John type for weak efficient solutions of a nonsmooth vector equilibrium problem involving equilibrium constraints (VEPEC) in terms of the Clarke subdifferentials are established. Under constraint qualifications which are suitable for (VEPEC), necessary conditions of Kuhn-Tucker type for efficiency are derived. Under assumptions on generalized convexity of data, sufficient conditions for efficiency are developed. Some applications to vector variational inequalities and vector optimization problems with equilibrium constraints are also given.     

Hölder Continuity of Solutions to Parametric Vector Equilibrium Problems with Nonlinear Scalarization

In this article, using the nonlinear scalarization approach by virtue of the nonlinear scalarization function, commonly known as the Gerstewitz function in the theory of vector optimization, Hölder continuity of solution mappings for both set-valued and single-valued cases to parametric vector equilibrium problems is studied. The nonlinear scalarization function is a powerful tool that plays a key role in the proofs, and its main properties (such as sublinearity, continuity, convexity) are fully employed. Especially, its locally and globally Lipschitz properties are provided and the Lipschitz property is first exploited to investigate the Hölder continuity of solutions.     

Game Options Analysis of the Information Role of Call Policies in Convertible Bonds

Abstract

In debt financing, existence of information asymmetry on the firm quality between the firm management and bond investors may lead to significant adverse selection costs. We develop the two-stage sequential dynamic two-person game option models to analyse the market signalling role of the callable feature in convertible bonds. We show that firms with positive private information on earning potential may signal their type to investors via the callable feature in a convertible bond. We present the variational inequalities formulation with respect to various equilibrium strategies in the two-person game option models via characterization of the optimal stopping rules adopted by the bond issuer and bondholders. The bondholders’ belief system on the firm quality may be revealed with the passage of time when the issuer follows his optimal strategy of declaring call or bankruptcy. Under separating equilibrium, the quality status of the firm is revealed so the information asymmetry game becomes a new game under complete information. To analyse pooling equilibrium, the corresponding incentive compatibility constraint is derived. We manage to deduce the sufficient conditions for the existence of signalling equilibrium of our game option model under information asymmetry. We analyse how the callable feature may lower the adverse selection costs in convertible bond financing. We show how a low-quality firm may benefit from information asymmetry and vice versa, underpricing of the value of debt issued by a high-quality firm.     

基于网络均衡的电力市场排污权交易政策研究

本文构建了电力供应链网络均衡模型,网络中包含三级决策主体,分别是:发电厂、电力服务商和用电市场.在分析各级决策者行为的基础上,得到了基于变分不等式的均衡条件,研究了针对发电厂的排污权交易政策设计问题.研究发现:排污交易政策实施后,总排污量不会超过给定的排污权总量;发电厂清洁生产能力的差异对排污权交易政策影响显著.     

电子商务与传统商务发展趋势的博弈分析

在消费者对商品价格与供货时间的偏好假设下,建立一个厂商关于电子商务与传统商务交易方式选择的完全信息静态博弈模型,其纳什均衡表明了电子商务与传统商务潜在的发展趋势,特别是两者可能的市场剖分关系.确切而言,若市场满足既定假设,均衡条件下的电子商务交易方式表现为较长的供货时间及低于传统商务约40%的市场交易价格,将获得三分之一的市场份额.     

混合策略纳什均衡的新教法

理解博弈论中的最优混合策略对本科生而言具有一定困难,而目前教材中对此内容的讲述又过于抽象.提出一个简单而有效地讲授混合策略纳什均衡的方法.首先利用猜硬币游戏引入并介绍混合策略的基本该念.再通过将混合策略加入到支付矩阵中构造拓展支付矩阵,使学生可以清晰地看到采用混合策略的结果,实现从纯策略到混合策略的自然过渡.然后引导学生思考博弈参与者采用混合策略的各种动机,并在拓展支付矩阵中检验其是否达成均衡.最后介绍最优混合策略计算的一般方法,并分析其与参与者行为动机之间的一致性.课堂实践证明,方法可以有效提高学生对混合策略纳什均衡的综合理解,学生不仅能够更好地掌握求解技术,而且能更深入地理解其经济学含义.