论方方笔下的女性生存困厄

作为已经获得初步解放的女性,方方笔下的女性超越了简单的生存需要,开始寻找精神和情感的自我满足,但这种寻找无一例外地走向了幻灭。幻灭源自外界环境的挤压,也来自女性自身的迷失。方方通过这些女性的寻找和失落,展示了当下社会环境中女性的生存困厄,并对女性的解放之路提出了自己的思考。     

农业产业型科研院所现状探析

为增强科技实力,我国政府近年来发布了多项旨在提高科研发展的政策措施,在目前我国社会主义市场经济条件下,产业型科研院所如何改进现有的科研管理模式,主动适应社会主义市场经济发展的需要,把自身的科技潜力发挥出来,为实施创新驱动发展战略服务,是当前产业型科研院院所发展所面临的重要课题.该文根据国家深化科技体制改革加快国家创新体系建议的要求,探析了我国农业产业型科研院所在科研成果评价、科研成果转化和科研管理体制的现状与存在问题,旨在对我国农业产业型科研院所的发展模式提出建议与措施.     

电流引线迫流冷却传热分析

如何降低电流引线向低温环境的漏热,是超导电力技术领域的一项重要课题.文中概述了电流引线研究进展,建立了电流引线迫流冷却传热模型,并分析了氮气迫流冷却作用,推导了电流引线温度分布和最优长度-横截面积比(ORLA)函数式.自然蒸发迫流冷却对最优长度-横截面积比(ORLA)影响较小.     

Tunnelling current in Schottky diodes containing InAs quantum dots

Current transport mechanism in Schottky diode containing InAs quantum dots (QDs) is investigated using temperature-varying current-voltage characteristics. We found that the tunnelling emission has obvious effects on the I-V characteristics. The I-V-T measurements revealed clear effects of QDs on the overall current flow. Field emission (FE, pure tunnelling effect) was observed at low temperature and low voltages bias region. The zero-bias barrier height decreases and the ideality factor increases with decreasing temperature, and the ideality factor was found to follow the T₀-effect. When the reverse bias is varied, the ideality factors of Schottky barriers exhibit oscillations due to the tunnelling of electrons through discrete levels in quantum dots. The traps distributed within InAlAs layer can also act as a transition step for reverse bias defect-assisted tunnelling current which can phenomenologically explain the decrease of the effective barrier height with measurement temperature.     

Evolution of cooperation among mobile agents

We study the effects of mobility on the evolution of cooperation among mobile players, which imitate collective motion of biological flocks and interact with neighbors within a prescribed radius R. Adopting the the prisoner’s dilemma game and the snowdrift game as metaphors, we find that cooperation can be maintained and even enhanced for low velocities and small payoff parameters, when compared with the case that all agents do not move. But such enhancement of cooperation is largely determined by the value of R, and for modest values of R, there is an optimal value of velocity to induce the maximum cooperation level. Besides, we find that intermediate values of R or initial population densities are most favorable for cooperation, when the velocity is fixed. Depending on the payoff parameters, the system can reach an absorbing state of cooperation when the snowdrift game is played. Our findings may help understanding the relations between individual mobility and cooperative behavior in social systems.     

Integrating neighborhoods in the evaluation of fitness promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

A fundamental question of human society is the evolution of cooperation. Many previous studies explored this question via setting spatial background, where players obtain their payoffs by playing game with their nearest neighbors. Another undoubted fact is that the environment plays an important role in the individual development. Inspired by these phenomena, we reconsider the definition of individual fitness which integrates the environment, denoted by the average payoff of all individual neighbors, with the traditional individual payoffs by introducing a selection parameter u. Tuning u equal to zero returns the traditional version, while increasing u bears the influence of environment. We find that considering the environment, i.e., integrating neighborhoods in the evaluation of fitness, promotes cooperation. If we enhance the value of u, the invasion of defection could be resisted better. We also provide quantitative explanations and complete phase diagrams presenting the influence of the environment on the evolution of cooperation. Finally, the universality of this mechanism is testified for different neighborhood sizes, different topology structures and different game models. Our work may shed light on the emergence and persistence of cooperation in our life.     

q-Strategy spatial prisoner?s dilemma game

We generalize the usual two-strategy prisoner?s dilemma game to a multi-strategy game, in which the strategy variable s is allowed to take q different fractional values lying between 0 and 1. The fractional-valued strategies signify that individuals are not absolutely cooperative or defective, instead they can adopt intermediate strategies. Simulation results on 1D and 2D lattices show that, compared with the binary strategy game, the multi-strategy game can sustain cooperation in more stringent defective environments. We give a comprehensive analysis of the distributions of the survived strategies and we compare pairwise the relative strength and weakness of different strategies. It turns out that some intermediate strategies survive the pure defection because they can reduce being exploited and at the same time benefit from the spatial reciprocity effect. Our work may shed some light on the intermediate behaviors in human society.     

Evolution of cooperation among mobile agents with heterogenous view radii

In this paper, we study cooperative behavior among mobile agents; the agents have heterogenous view radii and they play the prisoner’s dilemma game with those being within their vision fields. It is found that the cooperation level is remarkably promoted when the heterogeneity of view radii is considered, and the degree distribution of the system is investigated to explain this interesting phenomenon. Moreover, we report that the cooperative behavior is best favored by low density, moderate view radius, and small moving speed. Our findings may be helpful in understanding cooperative behavior in natural and social systems consisting of mobile agents.     

Procedurally Rational Volunteers

The mixed-strategy equilibrium applied to the volunteer's dilemma (Diekmann, 1985 Diekmann , A. ( 1985 ). Volunteer's dilemma . Journal of Conflict Resolution , 29 , 605 – 610 .[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) predicts that the probability that at least 1 bystander volunteers decreases, if the number of bystander increases. I argue that this prediction lacks empirical support and demonstrate that an alternative solution concept from the literature on bounded rationality, the procedurally rational equilibrium (Osborne &; Rubinstein, 1998 Osborne , M. J. &; Rubinstein , A. ( 1998 ). Games with procedurally rational players . American Economic Review , 88 , 834 – 847 .[Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), yields alternative predictions. I supply some empirical evidence that the alternative solution concept fares better in explaining observed behavior in the volunteer's dilemma.