重庆汽车产业配置与地域类型

运用产业经济学和区域经济地理学的原理、结合地理学的分析方法,着重探讨了重庆汽车产业配置地域运动过程和促使其演变的原因.划分重庆汽车产业分布为四种地域类型:“嘉陵江东岸与长江北岸型”;“长江南岸型”;“嘉陵江西岸型”;“飞地型”.对重庆汽车产业配置特点,存在问题作了深入地剖析与揭示,并对今后调整作了初步的设想.     

城市土地规划的优化方法研究

以多目标决策理论、组合优化理论以及预测科学技术为依据 ,首先建立了土地功能配置模型 ,帮助规划师对各种不同功能土地的片面布置进行分析 ,从而找到最合理的城市土地布局 ;然后以遗传算法作为优化工具 ,对建立的模型进行了优化。     

Approximation algorithms for dynamic resource allocation

We consider a problem of allocating limited quantities of M types of resources among N independent activities that evolve over T epochs. In each epoch, we assign to each activity a task which consumes resources, generates utility, and determines the subsequent state of the activity. We study the complexity of, and approximation algorithms for, maximizing average utility.     

Heuristic Solution Methods for the Multilevel Generalized Assignment Problem

The multilevel generalized assignment problem is a problem of assigning agents to tasks where the agents can perform tasks at more than one efficiency level. A profit is associated with each assignment and the objective of the problem is profit maximization. Two heuristic solution methods are presented for the problem. The heuristics are developed from solution methods for the generalized assignment problem. One method uses a regret minimization approach whilst the other method uses a repair approach on a relaxation of the problem. The heuristics are able to solve moderately large instances of the problem rapidly and effectively. Procedures for deriving an upper bound on the solution of the problem are also described. On larger and harder instances of the problem one heuristic is particularly effective.     

Regular population monotonic allocation schemes

The paper introduces a refinement of the notion of population monotonic allocation scheme, called regular population monotonic allocation scheme (regularpmas). This refinement is based on economic situations in which players may have to select new partners from a set of potential players and in which there exist certain capacity constraints. A sufficient condition for the existence of a regularpmas is given. For the class of games with regularpmas, we prove that the core coincides with the Davis and Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets.     

Allocating electricity transmission costs through tracing: a game-theoretic rationale

Tracing is a method of assigning flows in an electricity network to particular generators and loads, assuming perfect mixing at each node. It can be used to assign costs to transmission users. We show that the resulting allocation is equal to the Shapley value of an equivalent co-operative game.     

Illustrations with Real Examples of Using Ecological Regulation Strategies Against Crop Pests in China

In this paper, a series of examples from China, including those using ecological regulation strategies successfully to keep crop pests under control and those making more damages of crop pests caused by wrong cropping systems, crop distributions or extensive cultivation, were given and analyzed. From these, two pieces of experience were enlightened as follows： the first, the refoms of cropping systems and crop distributions must be beneficial to pest control or at least not increase the damage of crop pests; the second, we should further clarify the relationship between population dynamics of pests and cropping system/crop distribution, the basis for correctly laying down the ecological regulation systems.     

Compensatory transfers in two-player decision problems

This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of a family of solutions to two-player quasi-linear social choice problems. In these problems the players select a single action from a set available to them. They may also transfer money between themselves.The solutions form a one-parameter family, where the parameter is a non-negative number, t.The solutions can be interpreted as follows: Any efficient action can be selected. Based on this action, compute for each player a “best claim for compensation”. A claim for compensation is the difference between the value of an alternative action and the selected efficient action, minus a penalty proportional to the extent to which the alternative action is inefficient. The coefficient of proportionality of this penalty is t. The best claim for compensation for a player is the maximum of this computed claim over all possible alternative actions. The solution, at the parameter value t, is to implement the chosen efficient action and make a monetary transfer equal to the average of these two best claims. The characterization relies on three main axioms. The paper presents and justifies these axioms and compares them to related conditions used in other bargaining contexts. In Nash Bargaining Theory, the axioms analogous to these three are in conflict with each other. In contrast, in the quasi-linear social choice setting of this paper, all three conditions can be satisfied simultaneously.This work was supported by the Division of Research at the Harvard Business School. Thanks are due to the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University for its kind hospitality during the Spring of 2002. I have received helpful advice and comments from Youngsub Chun, Ehud Kalai, Herve Moulin, Al Roth, Ilya Segal, Adam Szeidl, Richard Zeckhauser, and other members of the Theory Seminars at Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Rice and Northwestern.     

基于MPEG-4的视频流式传输系统及动态带宽分配方法

提出了一个基于MPEG 4精细可分级编码技术的视频流式传输系统。介绍了系统中主要模块的作用,并重点研究了速率控制模块。速率控制模块采用了适合视频流式传输的动态带宽分配方法。它可以根据实时的网络通道波动状况来动态调整滑动参数,以适应网络波动和高效地利用网络的有限资源。实验结果表明,动态带宽分配方法在动态带宽波动条件下不仅可以使相邻帧间的视频质量更加平滑,而且可以大大提高解码视频图像的总体质量,也就是说可同时改善解码视频的主客观性能。     

Balanced contributions for TU games with awards and applications

Calleja et al. [Calleja, P., Borm, P., Hendrickx, R., 2005. Multi-issue allocation situations. European Journal of Operational Research 164, 730–747] introduced multi-issue allocation situations with awards. In this paper, we extend the classical model of cooperative games with transferable utility to the cooperative games with transferable utility and awards. We define a run-to-the-bank rule for cooperative games with transferable utility and awards and characterise it in terms of a property of balanced contributions. We apply our main result to bankruptcy problems and multi-issue allocation situations with awards.