具有分布时滞和非局部空间效应的合作模型的行波解

考虑并研究了一类具有分布时滞和非局部空间效应影响的合作系统的反应扩散模型.利用Wang,Li和Ruan建立的非局部时滞反应扩散方程组波前解存在性的理论,证明了连接零平衡解和正平衡解的行波解的存在性.     

COSEARCH: A Parallel Cooperative Metaheuristic

In order to design a well-balanced metaheuristic for robustness, we propose the COSEARCH approach which manages the cooperation of complementary heuristic methods via an adaptive memory which contains a history of the search already done. In this paper, we present the idiosyncrasies of the COSEARCH approach and its application for solving large scale instances of the quadratic assignment problem (QAP). We propose an original design of the adaptive memory in order to focus on high quality regions of the search and avoid attractive but deceptive areas. For the QAP, we have hybridized three heuristic agents of complementary behaviours: a Tabu Search is used as the main search algorithm, a Genetic Algorithm is in charge of the diversification and a Kick Operator is applied to intensify the search. The evaluations have been executed on large scale network of workstations via a parallel environment which supports fault tolerance and adaptive dynamic scheduling of tasks.     

带有限反馈下层的二层规划问题的部分合作模型

对下层最优反馈为离散有限多个的二层规划问题的部分合作模型进行探讨. 当下层的合作程度依赖于上层的决策变量时, 给出一个确定合作系数函数的一般方法, 进而得到一个新的部分合作模型. 在适当地假设下, 可保证所给的部分合作模型一定可以找到比悲观解要好的解, 并结合新的部分合作模型对原不适定问题进行分析, 得到了一些有益的结论. 最后以实际算例说明了所给部分合作模型的可行性.     

基于进化博弈视角的水源地与下游生态补偿合作演化分析

水源地与下游地方政府之间的协议合作可以协调流域上下游之间的矛盾和利益,是一种可实现流域生态保护良性循环的生态补偿尝试。本文应用进化博弈的双种群博弈理论,研究了水源地和下游地方政府之间博弈演化过程及影响因素。研究表明,流域上下游地方政府合作的演化方向主要受水源地不保护及下游不补偿受到的惩罚、下游对水源地的补偿额度、水源地和下游合作的初始成本、水源地生态保护的成本及收益等八个因素的影响。降低水源地的保护成本及水源地和下游合作的初始成本,提高水源地因保护而获得的综合效益、提高水源地不保护及下游不补偿受到的惩罚额度、合理确定下游对水源地的补偿额度将有利于水源地生态补偿机制向合作方向演进。     

基于利益相关者合作博弈的决策优化与收益分配

企业剩余既是利益相关合作的成果也是争夺的对象。本首先用TOPSIS方法描述利益相关参与企业群体决策，并对决策群体给出的多种方案进行优化的过程。然后运用Shapley值，计算优化方案中不同利益相关合作的影响指数，再通过评估获得不同利益相关的分配收益。     

动态需求背景下两阶段供应链博弈分析

在两阶段供应链中,市场营销也会导致需求的变动.引入营销费用与零售价格共同影响市场需求,并假设卖方决定订货批量,分别从非合作博弈和合作博弈两个角度对两阶段供应链管理问题进行分析.非合作博弈分析的是卖方或买方分别作为领导者时的Stackelberg模型;合作博弈是把卖方和买方的利润函数加权后作为目标函数,求出了帕累托最优解.结果证明,在合作博弈中存在帕累托有效解,与非合作博弈相比,合作博弈的订货批量更小,零售价格更低,市场营销费用更少.并列举案例,对模型中主要参数进行敏感性分析.     

Optimal Control of a Ship for Collision Avoidance Maneuvers

We consider a ship subject to kinematic, dynamic, and moment equations and steered via rudder under the assumptions that the rudder angle and rudder angle time rate are subject to upper and lower bounds. We formulate and solve four Chebyshev problems of optimal control, the optimization criterion being the maximization with respect to the state and control history of the minimum value with respect to time of the distance between two identical ships, one maneuvering and one moving in a predetermined way.Problems P1 and P2 deal with collision avoidance maneuvers without cooperation, while Problems P3 and P4 deal with collision avoidance maneuvers with cooperation. In Problems P1 and P3, the maneuvering ship must reach the final point with a given lateral distance, zero yaw angle, and zero yaw angle time rate. In Problems P2 and P4, the additional requirement of quasi-steady state is imposed at the final point.The above Chebyshev problems, transformed into Bolza problems via suitable transformations, are solved via the sequential gradient-restoration algorithm in conjunction with a new singularity avoiding transformation which accounts automatically for the bounds on rudder angle and rudder angle time rate.The optimal control histories involve multiple subarcs along which either the rudder angle is kept at one of the extreme positions or the rudder angle time rate is held at one of the extreme values. In problems where quasi-steady state is imposed at the final point, there is a higher number of subarcs than in problems where quasi-steady state is not imposed; the higher number of subarcs is due to the additional requirement that the lateral velocity and rudder angle vanish at the final point.     

基于电子商务的集群式供应链跨链库存控制

以电子商务环境下集群式供应链库存控制为对象,建立了时变需求下跨链合作的交叉库存模型,并用H∞控制中抑制外部干扰的对策理论来寻求最优订货策略,以减小库存、订货波动和提高供需网快速响应市场的能力.文中采用对比分析方法分别针对供应链间有合作与无合作情形对模型做了仿真实验,仿真表明,实施H∞控制和交叉紧急库存补充策略可以有效避免货物积压或缺货现象,提高供应链及集群的竞争力.     

Social Motives and Expectations in One-Shot Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemmas

We propose a formal-behavioral framework with 3 components: nonselfish motives, expectations about others' nonselfish motives, and a game-theoretic component. For nonselfish motives, 3 nonstandard utility models representing altruism, inequality aversion, and norms are considered. Expectations are modeled as certain versus uncertain expectations. The game-theoretic component predicts behavior of actors and actors' expectations about behaviors of others. This framework is applied to asymmetric one-shot prisoner's dilemmas; predictions are tested experimentally. Formal analyses show that asymmetry provides new predictions through which nonstandard utility-expectation models can be distinguished. Empirical tests show that the inequality aversion model does considerably worse than altruistic and normative variants. Statistical tests for own motives, expected motives, and the association between the two are provided, while accounting for decision noise.     

创新网络合作密度影响因素及其仿真分析

合作创新模式使得创新主体之间构成具有拓扑结构特性的创新网络,创新主体合作行为会影响创新网络的可持续发展。为探究不同影响因素作用下创新网络合作密度的变化,基于演化博弈理论和BA无标度网络理论,运用仿真方法,分析了网络规模、聚类系数、偏好性仿真、利益分配对创新网络合作密度的影响。结果表明:小规模的创新网络具有较低的聚类系数有利于网络合作密度的提升,大规模的创新网络具有较高的聚类系数有利于网络合作密度的提升;无论是大规模还是小规模创新网络,适度的偏好性模仿均能促进网络合作密度的提升;对于利益分配而言,无论是大规模还是小规模的创新网络,按劳分配是提升网络合作密度的最佳利益分配形式。