On the Convenience to Form Coalitions or Partnerships in Simple Games

A partnership in a cooperative game is a coalition that possesses an internal structure and, simultaneously, behaves as an individual member. Forming partnerships leads to a modification of the original game which differs from the quotient game that arises when one or more coalitions are actually formed. In this paper, the Shapley value is used to discuss the convenience to form either coalitions or partnerships. To this end, the difference between the additive Shapley value of the partnership in the partnership game and the Shapley alliance value of the coalition, and also between the corresponding value of the internal and external players, are analysed. Simple games are especially considered. Research partially supported by Grant BFM 2003-01314 of the Science and Technology Spanish Ministry and the European Regional Development Fund.     

逆（反）对策问题与“奇门遁甲”预测理论（术）

本文首先提出逆（反）对策这一新问题，给出了数学模型；探讨了“奇门遁甲”预测理论（术）中的数学问题；通过系统分析“专门遁甲”预测过程，可知它的预测过程隐含着一个特殊的逆（反）对策问题；最后指出逆（反）对策问题的广泛存在并给出案例分析．     

Selection Principles and Sierpinski Sets

We show that a set of real numbers is a Sierpinski set if, and only if, it satisfies a selection property similar to the familiar Menger property.     

Action learning versus strategy learning

This article seeks to ascertain whether the strategy‐learning model of Hanaki, Sethi, Erev, and Peterhansl (2003) better accounts for observed behavior than do the various action‐learning models. It does so by measuring the goodness‐of‐fit of the models' predictions against published experimental results for such games as Coordination, Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chicken. The fit is measured via the mean squared deviation (MSD) between the observed behavior and the one predicted by the model. The results show that, for Chicken, the strategy‐learning model fits the observed data much better than do the action‐learning models. The best action‐learning model, on the other hand, fits the observed data well in Coordination. Overall, the strength of the strategy‐learning model is best shown in games where alternations between the two stage‐game Nash equilibria are often observed in the laboratory experiments. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 9: 41–50, 2004     

小型企业规模的有效性分析

在当代企业纷纷追求规模的不断扩大的同时，统计数据却显示企业平均规模不断下降的事实趋势。论根据数学、经济学与博弈论的有关理论对企业规模小型化的内在要求进行了探讨，分析的结论一致证明：粘型化规模在当代经济环境中是充分有效的。     

基于演化博弈的武器装备研制合同定价模型研究

针对合同的动态性，提出利用基于演化博弈建立定价模型。考虑到决策群体中个体的认识误差，对所建立的定价模型进行修正，建立带偏离的定价模型并分析了偏离对均衡解的影响。最后将以上模型应用实例进行比较分析。     

Sufficient optimality conditions and duality in vector optimization with invex-convexlike functions

We prove the Kuhn-Tucker sufficient optimality condition, the Wolfe duality, and a modified Mond-Weir duality for vector optimization problems involving various types of invex-convexlike functions. The class of such functins contains many known generalized convex functions. As applications, we demonstrate that, under invex-convexlikeness assumptions, the Pontryagin maximum principle is a sufficient optimality condition for cooperative differential games. The Wolfe duality is established for these games.The author is indebted to the referees and Professor W. Stadler for valuable remarks and comments, which have been used to revise considerably the paper.     

Strong,large distance impurity dipole interaction in KNbO3 single crystals

It is found that the unrelaxed impurity dipoles can arrange themselves linearly in the structure joining each other end-to-end in pseudocubic [110] direction at the tetragonal to the orthorhombic phase transition. It is shown that this alignment precedes the domain formation at the phase transition, which implies quick movements of the dipoles in the structure, and a strong dipolar interaction. The experiments with the application of dc fields to the crystals showed that the dipolar interaction becomes stronger with the field. The dipoles can see each other across the existing domain walls implying the large distance nature of the interaction. The observation of impurity clusters arranged in pseudocubic [110] direction confirmed the large distance nature of the interaction. It is concluded that this strong, large distance interaction is very interesting in as much as such an interaction of dipoles forms the basis of ferroelectricity.     

基于模糊方法的多人合作对策的研究

多人合作对策模型中联盟的收入和总体的收入常常出现相互矛盾的情况 ,此时核是空集 .由于不存在核 ,无法用 Nash-Harsanyi谈判模型求解 .采用模糊数学方法 ,调整模型中线性约束的右端系数 ,使核在一定程度上是非空集合 ,得到模糊意义下的 Nash平衡解 .该方法一定程度上解决了各联盟收入与总体收入的矛盾 .最后通过一个算例说明该方法的可行性 .