Advertising coordination games of a manufacturer and a retailer while introducing a new product

Two kinds of vertical cooperative advertising program are considered in a distribution channel constituted by a manufacturer and a retailer, where the manufacturer pays part of the retailer’s advertising costs. In the first participation scheme, the manufacturer chooses his/her advertising participation rate in the retailer’s advertising effort and then each player determines the advertising effort that maximizes his/her profit. In the second scheme, the retailer chooses the manufacturer’s participation rate and then the manufacturer determines the advertising efforts of both players with the objective of maximizing the manufacturer’s profit. Each participation scheme corresponds to a special Stackelberg game: the manufacturer is the leader of the first, while the retailer is the leader of the second. The Stackelberg equilibrium advertising efforts and participation rate in both games are provided. Then the equilibrium strategies of the two players in the analyzed scenarios are compared with the Nash equilibrium in the competitive framework. Finally, the conditions which suggest a special kind of agreement to a player are analyzed. This work was supported by the Italian Ministry of University and Research and the University of Padua.     

Effect of Deborah number and phase difference on peristaltic transport of a third-order fluid in an asymmetric channel

The effect of a third-order fluid on the peristaltic transport in an asymmetric channel is studied. The wavelength of the peristaltic waves is assumed to be large compared to the varying channel width, whereas the wave amplitudes need not be small compared to the varying channel width. The channel asymmetry is produced by choosing the peristaltic wave train on the walls to have different amplitudes and phase. The flow is investigated in a wave frame of reference moving with velocity of the wave. The effects of Deborah number, phase difference, varying channel width and wave amplitudes on the pumping characteristics, streamline pattern and trapping phenomena are investigated. It is observed that the trapping regions increase as the channel becomes more and more symmetric and the trapped bolus volume decreases for increasing Deborah number, phase difference and varying channel width whereas it increases for increasing flow rate and wave amplitudes. Furthermore, the obtained results could also have applications to a range of peristaltic flows for a variety of non-Newtonian fluids such as aqueous solutions of high-molecular weight polyethylene oxide and polyacrylamide.     

考虑品牌差异的双渠道供应链减排与低碳宣传策略

针对双渠道供应链低碳减排、低碳宣传与品牌策略问题,构建微分博弈模型,运用汉密尔顿-雅可比-贝尔曼方程分别求得集中决策和Stackelberg博弈下的低碳减排投入、低碳宣传投入和低碳宣传分担率。研究发现:集中决策情形下产品的减排量始终高于Stackelberg博弈情形下的减排量;产品品牌差异化程度与制造商所承担零售商低碳宣传成本的比例呈正相关;供应链成员的最优低碳宣传策略除了与品牌差异程度相关,还取决于供应链成员在不同渠道边际利润的相对大小;存在一个低碳宣传成本分担率能够实现制造商和零售商协调。并用数值算例验证了本文的相关结论。     

企业社会责任下碳减排优化策略与协调机制研究

基于企业社会责任(CSR)的视角,本文研究由生产低碳产品的制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链的最优策略及供应链协调问题。通过构造供应链成员具有社会责任感的效用函数,分析了CSR对各成员的利润和环境的影响。研究发现:制造商和零售商都是通过降低碳排放水平来体现社会责任感;无论制造商有社会责任感还是零售商有社会责任感,供应链的利润都增大;在收益共享-成本分摊合同(RC合同)下协调,可以使制造商和零售商实现双赢(帕累托最优);零售商应该承担更多的社会责任,降低碳排放水平。     

相位阻尼信道条件下量子斗鸡博弈模型均衡解分析

利用量子博弈的相关理论,以噪音强度和记忆强度为参量,建立了相位阻尼信道条件下的量子斗鸡博弈模型,求出了模型的量子纳什均衡解,讨论了两参量对均衡解稳定性的影响,得出在无记忆相位阻尼信道条件下,当噪音强度小于阈值0.24时,纳什均衡仍然为帕累托最优解,当噪音强度大于0.24时,均衡解演变为另2个均衡解,不再是帕累托最优;在有记忆相位阻尼信道条件下,当噪音强度小于0.24,且记忆强度大于0.5时,均衡解是稳定的.特殊地,当信道是完全记忆时,均衡解的稳定性与噪音强度无关.     

Elliptic Apostol sums and their reciprocity laws

We introduce an elliptic analogue of the Apostol sums, which we call elliptic Apostol sums. These sums are defined by means of certain elliptic functions with a complex parameter having positive imaginary part. When , these elliptic Apostol sums represent the well-known Apostol generalized Dedekind sums. Also these elliptic Apostol sums are modular forms in the variable . We obtain a reciprocity law for these sums, which gives rise to new relations between certain modular forms (of one variable).

     

基于风险厌恶零售商的双渠道闭环供应链运作策略

在对称信息框架下,针对零售商存在风险厌恶特性的双渠道闭环供应链,基于Stackelberg博弈理论探讨了不同的回收再制造模式下(制造商不回收再制造、制造商独立回收再制造、制造商依托零售商回收再制造)供应链各主体的运作决策。研究发现,在不同回收再制造模式下,制造商与风险厌恶的零售商合作能够获得更多收益。市场波动的增大对供应链各主体并非始终是有害的,随着市场波动的增大,带有风险厌恶的零售商收益不断减小,而风险中性的双渠道制造商收益逐步增大,零售商风险厌恶特性为制造商带来了更多的收益。制造商独立回收再制造以及通过零售商进行回收再制造时,双渠道产品定价均低于不进行任何回收再制造模式下的定价,双渠道需求和利润均高于不进行任何回收再制造模式下的渠道需求和利润,即回收再制造模式不仅为下游顾客带来了更多的消费实惠,同时也为供应链各主体带来了更多的收益。     

展厅现象下电子零售商与传统零售商的价格竞争

针对双渠道中存在消费者先通过实体店体验产品,而转移电子渠道购买的展厅现象,运用消费者效用理论,建立不同购买方式下电子零售商和传统零售商的定价决策模型,通过对不同情形下最优决策的比较分析,进一步研究展厅现象如何影响电子零售商和传统零售商的定价和利润。研究表明:三种购买方式同时存在时,展厅现象将加剧传统零售商与电子零售商的价格竞争,导致双方利润受损,但当电子渠道接受度较高或是较低且实体店体验对电子渠道接受度的影响较大时,电子零售商可以利用展厅现象提高其销售价格并获利。     

基于无线Mesh网络的一种信道分配算法及路由协议

提出了在多信道环境下的无线Mesh网络中的一种混合型路由协议TOIRP(tree-based and on-de-mand integrated routing protocol)以及一种分布式的信道分配算法CLBCA(channel load based channel assign-ment).TOIRP协议采用HWMP(hybrid wireless mesh protocol)所提出的混合路由技术,将基于树的路由与传统的AODV(ad hoc on-demand distance vector)路由相结合,减少路由发现的时延,同时采用了一种新的路由判据CETTI(cumulative expected transmission time with interference).该路由判据充分考虑多信道的特性,设计了一种量化通信干扰的方法,将干扰分为外部数据流对路径的干扰以及路径内部数据流的干扰两个方面,并综合考虑了跳数、时延等因素,提高了网络的吞吐量.信道分配算法分为收发器与邻居节点绑定和收发器与信道绑定两个部分,将信道的负载作为选择信道的标准,避免了多信道中常见的信道依赖所造成的影响,并且提高了信道的利用率.模拟结果表明,采用新的路由判据后,网络的吞吐量最优情况下得到提升.