The survival of inefficient and efficient norms: Equilibria with and without meta-norms in a repeated norm enforcing game

ABSTRACT

Although meta-norms have been considered as the key to sustaining cooperation norms, this study argues that the meta-norms also facilitate the survival of inefficient norms. The opportunistic norm violation strategy is proposed as an alternative mechanism to motivate costly punishments. A repeated norm enforcing game, in which the externality of the normative action can be negative or positive, is analyzed. This game is equivalent to a social dilemma if the externality is large enough. The ranges of externalities that support tit-for-tat, meta-norm, and opportunism equilibria are compared. The meta-norm equilibrium has the highest stability; however, it can persist in negative externalities. Finally, the opportunism equilibrium is more stable than the tit-for-tat equilibrium, but it breaks down when the externality is small.     

保险动态惩罚机制对网约车平台监督作用的演化博弈研究

采用演化博弈方法,研究保险公司与网约车平台之间的博弈演化过程,分析了在保险公司监督下,网约车平台策略选择的影响因素,并比较了静态惩罚机制和动态惩罚机制下网约车平台与保险公司博弈的均衡策略。研究发现,保险公司的惩罚性保费可以促使网约车平台的策略选择发生改变。在静态惩罚机制下,网约车平台和保险公司的策略选择呈周期波动模式,不能收敛;在动态惩罚机制下,网约车平台和保险公司的博弈呈现螺旋收敛的演化轨迹,且收敛的均衡点不随策略选择的初始概率不同而改变。研究结论明确了保险在网约车行业管理中的社会监督职能,并为保险公司保费的制定提供理论参考。     

Maintenance of cooperation induced by punishment in public goods games

In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.     

基于模糊集合的评审决策信息融合

同行评议是评价、评审和评估等活动的重要实施方式,尤其对于科学基金项目的评审,同行评议是保证项目质量的有效措施。同行评议过程中固有的模糊属性,会导致评审结果在一定程度上偏离被评价对象的内在价值。本文针对同行评议的模糊属性,提出一种评审决策信息融合的方法,通过对专家评分进行关联分析和自适应调整,实现评审结果围绕被评价对象的内在价值等关键指标达成共识,助力科学基金的评审机制改革和评审决策的智能化。     

Dynamic peer-to-peer competition

The dynamic behavior of a multiagent system in which the agent size s_i is variable it is studied along a Lotka-Volterra approach. The agent size has hereby the meaning of the fraction of a given market that an agent is able to capture (market share). A Lotka-Volterra system of equations for prey-predator problems is considered, the competition factor being related to the difference in size between the agents in a one-on-one competition. This mechanism introduces a natural self-organized dynamic competition among agents. In the competition factor, a parameter σ is introduced for scaling the intensity of agent size similarity, which varies in each iteration cycle. The fixed points of this system are analytically found and their stability analyzed for small systems (with n=5 agents). We have found that different scenarios are possible, from chaotic to non-chaotic motion with cluster formation as function of the σ parameter and depending on the initial conditions imposed to the system. The present contribution aim is to show how a realistic though minimalist nonlinear dynamics model can be used to describe the market competition (companies, brokers, decision makers) among other opinion maker communities.     

浅析基金评审的模糊属性

同行评议是科学基金项目评审的重要环节。高质量的同行评议是实现基金精准资助的前提和保障。本文以国家自然科学基金通讯评审为例,针对同行评议中出现的评审偏差,探讨了基金评审的模糊属性,提出了通过构建评审结果的模糊集合及一致性函数来解决该问题的可能性,为进一步优化评审结果、实现基金精准资助指出了新方向。     

On the derivation of explicit two-step peer methods

The so-called two-step peer methods for the numerical solution of Initial Value Problems (IVP) in differential systems were introduced by R. Weiner, B.A. Schmitt and coworkers as a tool to solve different types of IVPs either in sequential or parallel computers. These methods combine the advantages of Runge-Kutta (RK) and multistep methods to obtain high stage order and therefore provide in a natural way a dense output. In particular, several explicit peer methods have been proved to be competitive with standard RK methods in a wide selection of non-stiff test problems.The aim of this paper is to propose an alternative procedure to construct families of explicit two step peer methods in which the available parameters appear in a transparent way. This allows us to obtain families of fixed stepsize s stage methods with stage order 2s−1, which provide dense output without extra cost, depending on some free parameters that can be selected taking into account the stability properties and leading error terms. A study of the extension of these methods to variable stepsize is also carried out. Optimal s stage methods with s=2,3 are derived.     

Standing on each other’s shoulders: A case of coalescence between geometric discourses in peer interaction

In this paper we draw on the commognitive theory to examine novice students’ transition from familiar mathematics meta-rules to less familiar ones during peer interaction. To pursue this goal, we focused on a relatively symmetric interaction between two middle-school students given a geometric task. During their dyadic problem-solving, the students transitioned from configural procedures to deductive ones. We found that this transition included an interactive coalescence pattern in which one student “borrowed” her partner’s configural sub-procedures and built on them to develop a new deductive procedure. Furthermore, we found that during their peer interaction, the students oscillated between configural, coalesced and deductive procedures. Several patterns in the students’ interpretation of the task-situation contributed to these oscillations. We discuss the contribution of our findings to commognitive research, to geometry learning research and to peer learning research.     

An evolutionary game theoretic perspective on e-collaboration: The collaboration effort and media relativeness

Studies of e-collaboration from a game-theoretical perspective are practically nonexistent. This article contributes to filling this gap by focusing on the strategic interaction between players as they decide whether and how much to collaborate with each other. We use evolutionary game theory to make predictions about a two-person e-collaboration game. More specifically, we extend the traditional Prisoners’ Dilemma and Snowdrift game theory notions to discrete-strategy e-collaboration games, by explicitly including social punishments into the players’ payoff functions. We also introduce continuous-strategy e-collaboration games with both complete and incomplete information. Finally, we provide two generic dynamic programming models for e-collaboration games with media selection.     

基于环境审计的节能减排规制模型

为考察环境审计在节能减排中的规制效果,本文设计了两个参与人三种情境下的博弈模型,(1)监管者介入公司环境审计报告、无条件处罚,(2)监管者不介入公司环境审计报告、无条件处罚,(3)监管者介入公司环境审计报告,有条件处罚。研究结果表明,审计报告的介入权为公司开展环境审计提供了正向激励;公司因努力改善环境而减轻处罚的有条件处罚机制增加了公司环境审计的倾向性。本文的研究发现为环境审计制度设计提供了理论基础。