Weighted variational inequalities in normed spaces

In this article, we consider weighted variational inequalities over a product of sets and a system of weighted variational inequalities in normed spaces. We extend most results established in Ansari, Q.H., Khan, Z. and Siddiqi, A.H., (Weighted variational inequalities, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 127(2005), pp. 263–283), from Euclidean spaces ordered by their respective non-negative orthants to normed spaces ordered by their respective non-trivial closed convex cones with non-empty interiors.     

Advertising coordination games of a manufacturer and a retailer while introducing a new product

Two kinds of vertical cooperative advertising program are considered in a distribution channel constituted by a manufacturer and a retailer, where the manufacturer pays part of the retailer’s advertising costs. In the first participation scheme, the manufacturer chooses his/her advertising participation rate in the retailer’s advertising effort and then each player determines the advertising effort that maximizes his/her profit. In the second scheme, the retailer chooses the manufacturer’s participation rate and then the manufacturer determines the advertising efforts of both players with the objective of maximizing the manufacturer’s profit. Each participation scheme corresponds to a special Stackelberg game: the manufacturer is the leader of the first, while the retailer is the leader of the second. The Stackelberg equilibrium advertising efforts and participation rate in both games are provided. Then the equilibrium strategies of the two players in the analyzed scenarios are compared with the Nash equilibrium in the competitive framework. Finally, the conditions which suggest a special kind of agreement to a player are analyzed. This work was supported by the Italian Ministry of University and Research and the University of Padua.     

朱家尖潮间带底栖海藻分布特征

2008年5月至2009年2月对浙江舟山朱家尖情人岛潮间带的大型海藻进行了调查,初步查明该潮间带大型海藻的组成、分布和温度属性,并利用相似性指数（Sc）分析了调查海域潮间带大型海藻相似性值.结果表明：采集到的34种海藻隶属3门23属,其中绿藻门（Chlorophyta）7属8种,红藻门（Rhodophyta）14属20种,褐藻门（Phaeophyta）6属6种.春季主要优势种为铁钉菜（Ishige okamura）、孔石莼（Ulva pertusa）、小杉藻（Gigartina intermedia）;夏季为铁钉菜、羊栖菜（Sargassum fusiforme）、小石花菜（Gelidium divaricatum）等;秋、冬季节为铁钉菜.红藻门种类在调查海域的出现频率为58.8%,为优势门类;绿藻门种类在该海域的总体水平分布呈均匀状态.70.6%的调查种类分布在低潮带,其中包括一些中潮带延伸种类,中、低潮带的海藻组成相似性值为0.36,并且中、低潮带的生境趋同效果大于高、中潮带.朱家尖潮间带大型海藻具有明显的垂直分带现象,温水性种类占绝对优势,优势种多为暖温性种.     

On the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution

In this note we provide a characterization of a subclass of bargaining problems for which the Nash solution has the property of disagreement point monotonicity. While the original d-monotonicity axiom and its stronger notion, strong d-monotonicity, were introduced and discussed by Thomson (J Econ Theory, 42: 50–58, 1987), this paper introduces local strong d-monotonicity and derives a necessary and sufficient condition for the Nash solution to be locally strongly d-monotonic. This characterization is given by using the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution w.r.t. the disagreement point d. Moverover, we present a sufficient condition for the Nash solution to be strong d-monotonic.     

Structural stability and robustness to bounded rationality for non-compact cases

We study the model M consisting of “general games” with noncompact action space, together with an associated abstract rationality function. We prove that M is structurally stable and robust to ϵ-equilibria for “almost all” parameters. As applications, we investigate structural stability and robustness to bounded rationality for noncooperative games, multiobjective optimizations and fixed point problems satisfying existence and some continuity conditions. Specifically, we introduce concrete rationality functions for such three kinds of problems with both payoffs and strategy sets, objective functions and domain spaces, and correspondence and domain spaces as parameters, respectively, and show the generic structural stability and robustness to bounded rationality for the corresponding model Ms.     

Nash equilibria in all-optical networks

We consider the problem of routing a number of communication requests in WDM (wavelength division multiplexing) all-optical networks from the standpoint of game theory. If we view each routing request (pair of source-target nodes) as a player, then a strategy consists of a path from the source to the target and a frequency (color). To reflect the restriction that two requests must not use the same frequency on the same edge, conflicting strategies are assigned a prohibitively high cost.Under this formulation, we consider several natural cost functions, each one reflecting a different aspect of restriction in the available bandwidth. For each cost function we examine the problem of the existence of pure Nash equilibria, the complexity of recognizing and computing them and finally, the problem in which we are given a Nash equilibrium and we are asked to find a better one in the sense that the total bandwidth used is less. As it turns out some of these problems are tractable and others are NP-hard.     

The Study of Minimax Inequalities, Abstract Economics and Applications to Variational Inequalities and Nash Equilibria

In this survey, a new minimax inequality and one equivalent geometricform are proved. Next, a theorem concerning the existence of maximalelements for an LC-majorized correspondence is obtained.By the maximal element theorem, existence theorems of equilibrium point fora noncompact one-person game and for a noncompact qualitative game withLC-majorized correspondences are given. Using the lastresult and employing 'approximation approach', we prove theexistence of equilibria for abstract economies in which the constraintcorrespondence is lower (upper) semicontinuous instead of having lower(upper) open sections or open graphs in infinite-dimensional topologicalspaces. Then, as the applications, the existence theorems of solutions forthe quasi-variational inequalities and generalized quasi-variationalinequalities for noncompact cases are also proven. Finally, with theapplications of quasi-variational inequalities, the existence theorems ofNash equilibrium of constrained games with noncompact are given. Our resultsinclude many results in the literature as special cases.     

Dual-Role Based Pricing in a Dynamic and Competitive Environment

The dual role of price, as a product attribute signaling quality and as a measure of sacrifice, serving as a benchmark for comparing the utility gains from superior product quality, is now well established in the marketing and economic literature. However, knowledge about their long-run impact and the influence of competition on these effects still remains very sparse. In the current paper, with reference to a dynamic and competitive framework, an analytical model is proposed to help determining optimal decision rules for price incorporating both roles. The main results are as follows: (i) The optimal pricing policy is determined as a Nash equilibrium strategy. (ii) The resulting equilibrium price is higher than an equilibrium that disregards the carryover price effects. (iii) For a symmetric competition, we provide normative rules on how firms should set prices as a function of the perceived quality; particularly, how the price should be set initially, when there is little product familiarity and the perceived quality is low, and how this price should vary as the perceived quality increases. (iv) At steady state, we find that the level of equilibrium margin, in percentage terms, decreases with the elasticity of demand with respect to the brand price, but this decrease is moderated by the elasticity of demand with respect to the brand perceived quality, the cross elasticity of demand with respect to the competitor’s perceived quality and the effect of the competitor’s current price on the firm’s perceived quality deterioration. The author thanks Konstantin Kogan for helpful discussions and comments.     

Constrained cost-coupled stochastic games with independent state processes

We study non-cooperative constrained stochastic games in which each player controls its own Markov chain based on its own state and actions. Interactions between players occur through their costs and constraints which depend on the state and actions of all players. We provide an example from wireless communications.