On the feedback solutions of differential oligopoly games with hyperbolic demand curve and capacity accumulation

To safeguard analytical tractability and the concavity of objective functions, the vast majority of models belonging to oligopoly theory relies on the restrictive assumption of linear demand functions. Here we lay out the analytical solution of a differential Cournot game with hyperbolic inverse demand, where firms accumulate capacity over time à la Ramsey. The subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized via the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations solved in closed form both on infinite and on finite horizon setups. To illustrate the applicability of our model and its implications, we analyze the feasibility of horizontal mergers in both static and dynamic settings, and find appropriate conditions for their profitability under both circumstances. Static profitability of a merger implies dynamic profitability of the same merger. It appears that such a demand structure makes mergers more likely to occur than they would on the basis of the standard linear inverse demand.     

A dynamic free-entry oligopoly with sluggish entry and exit adjustments

We study a dynamic free-entry oligopoly with sluggish entry and exit of firms under general demand and cost functions. We show that the number of firms in a steady-state open-loop solution for a dynamic free-entry oligopoly is smaller than that at static equilibrium and that the number of firms in a steady-state memoryless closed-loop solution is larger than that in an open-loop solution.     

On subgame perfect equilibria in quantum Stackelberg duopoly with incomplete information

The Li–Du–Massar quantum duopoly model is one of the generally accepted quantum game schemes. It has applications in a wide range of duopoly problems. Our purpose is to study Stackelberg's duopoly with incomplete information in the quantum domain. The result of Lo and Kiang has shown that the correlation of players' quantities caused by the quantum entanglement enhances the first-mover advantage in the game. Our work demonstrates that there is no first-mover advantage if the players' actions are maximally correlated. Furthermore, we proved that the second mover gains a higher equilibrium payoff than the first one.     

在划分系统下集合对策值的结构

A set game, in which the worth of a coalition is expressed by a set instead of areal number, is a new type of cooperative game.A F-restricted set game is a set game restricted by partition system.The main theorems show the structures of IM-value,OIM-value,SCM-value and ICM-value respectively,and the equivalency of IM-value and the OIM-value for monotonicset games restricted by partition system as well.     

考虑时滞效应与均值-方差效用的非零和投资与再保险博弈

在考虑时滞效应的影响下研究了非零和随机微分投资与再保险博弈问题.以最大化终端绝对财富和相对财富的均值-方差效用为目标,构建了两个相互竞争的保险公司之间的非零和投资与再保险博弈模型,分别在经典风险模型和近似扩散风险模型下探讨了博弈的Nash均衡策略.借助随机控制理论以及相应的广义Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellm...     

任意非亏损矩阵特征灵敏度分析的模态展开法

把特征向量的各阶导数表示成所有模态的线性组合，并利用左模态与右模态间的双正交性，首先导出了任意非亏损矩阵的重特征值的一阶导数所满足的特征值问题，然后根据此特征值问题无、看重根的情况，再导出了异导重特征值和等导重特征值对应的可微特征向量、特征值和特征向量各阶导数的一般计算公式。算例显示了方法的正确性。     

计算重根特征向量导数的消元法

本文提出了重根特征向量导数计算的消无法，它分为若干直接算法和一种迭代算法。这种方法概念简单、实施容易、精度良好。该方法可经简单移值用于非重根情况。