Reputation-based network selection mechanism using game theory

Current and future wireless environments are based on the coexistence of multiple networks supported by various access technologies deployed by different operators. As wireless network deployments increase, their usage is also experiencing a significant growth. In this heterogeneous multi-technology multi-application multi-terminal multi-user environment users will be able to freely connect to any of the available access technologies. Network selection mechanisms will be required in order to keep mobile users “always best connected” anywhere and anytime. In such a heterogeneous environment, game theory techniques can be adopted in order to understand and model competitive or cooperative scenarios between rational decision makers. In this work we propose a theoretical framework for combining reputation-based systems, game theory and network selection mechanism. We define a network reputation factor which reflects the network’s previous behaviour in assuring service guarantees to the user. Using the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, we model the user–network interaction as a cooperative game and we show that by defining incentives for cooperation and disincentives against defecting on service guarantees, repeated interaction sustains cooperation.     

”Illusion of control” in Time-Horizon Minority and Parrondo Games

Human beings like to believe they are in control of their destiny. This ubiquitous trait seems to increase motivation and persistence, and is probably evolutionarily adaptive [J.D. Taylor, S.E. Brown, Psych. Bull. 103, 193 (1988); A. Bandura, Self-efficacy: the exercise of control (WH Freeman, New York, 1997)]. But how good really is our ability to control? How successful is our track record in these areas? There is little understanding of when and under what circumstances we may over-estimate [E. Langer, J. Pers. Soc. Psych. 7, 185 (1975)] or even lose our ability to control and optimize outcomes, especially when they are the result of aggregations of individual optimization processes. Here, we demonstrate analytically using the theory of Markov Chains and by numerical simulations in two classes of games, the Time-Horizon Minority Game [M.L. Hart, P. Jefferies, N.F. Johnson, Phys. A 311, 275 (2002)] and the Parrondo Game [J.M.R. Parrondo, G.P. Harmer, D. Abbott, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 5226 (2000); J.M.R. Parrondo, How to cheat a bad mathematician (ISI, Italy, 1996)], that agents who optimize their strategy based on past information may actually perform worse than non-optimizing agents. In other words, low-entropy (more informative) strategies under-perform high-entropy (or random) strategies. This provides a precise definition of the “illusion of control” in certain set-ups a priori defined to emphasize the importance of optimization. An erratum to this article is available at .     

Quantum game interpretation for a special case of Parrondo’s paradox

By using the discrete Markov chain method, Parrondo’s paradox is studied by means of theoretical analysis and computer simulation, built on the case of game AB played in alternation with modulus M=4. We find that such a case does not have a definite stationary probability distribution and that payoffs of the game depend on the parity of the initial capital. Besides, this paper reveals the phenomenon that “processing in order produces non-deterministic results, while a random process produces deterministic results”. The quantum game method is used in a further study. The results show that the explanation of the game corresponding to a stationary probability distribution is that the probability of the initial capital has reached parity.     

Evolutionary game on a stochastic growth network

In some real complex systems the structures are difficult to map or changing over time. To explore the evolution of strategies on these complex systems, it is not realistic enough to specify their structures or topological properties in advance. In this paper, we address the evolutionary game on a stochastic growth network adopting the prisoner’s dilemma game. We introduce a growing rate q$q$ to control the ratio of network growth to strategy evolution. A large q$q$ denotes that the network grows faster than strategy evolution. Simulation results show that a fast growing rate is helpful to promote the average payoffs of both cooperators and defectors. Moreover, this parameter also significantly influences the cooperation frequency on the resulting networks. The coexisting mechanisms in this paper may provide a beneficial insight for understanding the emergence of complex topological structures and game behaviors in numerous real systems.     

The $-game

We propose a payoff function extending Minority Games (MG) that captures the competition between agents to make money. In contrast with previous MG, the best strategies are not always targeting the minority but are shifting opportunistically between the minority and the majority. The emergent properties of the price dynamics and of the wealth of agents are strikingly different from those found in MG. As the memory of agents is increased, we find a phase transition between a self-sustained speculative phase in which a “stubborn majority” of agents effectively collaborate to arbitrage a market-maker for their mutual benefit and a phase where the market-maker always arbitrages the agents. A subset of agents exhibit a sustained non-equilibrium risk-return profile. Received 5 June 2002 / Received in final form 21 November 2002 Published online 27 January 2003 RID="a" ID="a"e-mail: sornette@unice.fr RID="b" ID="b"CNRS UMR7536 RID="c" ID="c"CNRS UMR6622     

Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on heterogeneous Newman-Watts small-world network

We focus on the heterogeneity of social networks and its role to the emergence of prevailing cooperators and sustainable cooperation. The social networks are representative of the interaction relationships between players and their encounters in each round of games. We study an evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game on a variant of Newman-Watts small-world network, whose heterogeneity can be tuned by a parameter. It is found that optimal cooperation level exists at some intermediate topological heterogeneity for different temptations to defect. That is, frequency of cooperators peaks at a certain specific value of degree heterogeneity — neither the most heterogeneous case nor the most homogeneous one would favor the cooperators. Besides, the average degree of networks and the adopted update rule also affect the cooperation level.     

Weak Coupling and Continuous Limits for Repeated Quantum Interactions

We consider a quantum system in contact with a heat bath consisting in an infinite chain of identical sub-systems at thermal equilibrium at inverse temperature β. The time evolution is discrete and such that over each time step of duration τ, the reference system is coupled to one new element of the chain only, by means of an interaction of strength λ. We consider three asymptotic regimes of the parameters λ and τ for which the effective evolution of observables on the small system becomes continuous over suitable macroscopic time scales T and whose generator can be computed: the weak coupling limit regime λ → 0, τ = 1, the regime τ → 0, λ²τ → 0 and the critical case λ²τ = 1, τ → 0. The first two regimes are perturbative in nature and the effective generators they determine is such that a non-trivial invariant sub-algebra of observables naturally emerges. The third asymptotic regime goes beyond the perturbative regime and provides an effective dynamics governed by a general Lindblad generator naturally constructed from the interaction Hamiltonian. Conversely, this result shows that one can attach to any Lindblad generator a repeated quantum interactions model whose asymptotic effective evolution is generated by this Lindblad operator.     

On subgame perfect equilibria in quantum Stackelberg duopoly with incomplete information

The Li–Du–Massar quantum duopoly model is one of the generally accepted quantum game schemes. It has applications in a wide range of duopoly problems. Our purpose is to study Stackelberg's duopoly with incomplete information in the quantum domain. The result of Lo and Kiang has shown that the correlation of players' quantities caused by the quantum entanglement enhances the first-mover advantage in the game. Our work demonstrates that there is no first-mover advantage if the players' actions are maximally correlated. Furthermore, we proved that the second mover gains a higher equilibrium payoff than the first one.     

Theoretical analysis of quantum game in cavity QED

Recent years, several ways of implementing quantum games in different physical systems have been presented. In this paper, we perform a theoretical analysis of an experimentally feasible way to implement a two player quantum game in cavity quantum electrodynamic(QED). In the scheme, the atoms interact simultaneously with a highly detuned cavity mode with the assistance of a classical field. So the scheme is insensitive to the influence from the cavity decay and the thermal field, and it does not require the cavity to remain in the vacuum state throughout the procedure.     

Integrating neighborhoods in the evaluation of fitness promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

A fundamental question of human society is the evolution of cooperation. Many previous studies explored this question via setting spatial background, where players obtain their payoffs by playing game with their nearest neighbors. Another undoubted fact is that the environment plays an important role in the individual development. Inspired by these phenomena, we reconsider the definition of individual fitness which integrates the environment, denoted by the average payoff of all individual neighbors, with the traditional individual payoffs by introducing a selection parameter u. Tuning u equal to zero returns the traditional version, while increasing u bears the influence of environment. We find that considering the environment, i.e., integrating neighborhoods in the evaluation of fitness, promotes cooperation. If we enhance the value of u, the invasion of defection could be resisted better. We also provide quantitative explanations and complete phase diagrams presenting the influence of the environment on the evolution of cooperation. Finally, the universality of this mechanism is testified for different neighborhood sizes, different topology structures and different game models. Our work may shed light on the emergence and persistence of cooperation in our life.