Winning controllers and regions in competitive nonlinear dynamic games with two qualitative objectives and uncertain information

The Liapunov technique has been introduced in differential games in a sequence of works over the last decade. We discuss application of this technique to the interface between two competitive semi-games, each with different qualitative objective. The feedback information for controllers is provided from designed, analytically integrable state predictors with reduced dynamics, which considerably shortens the computing time. The case is illustrated on the scenario of target reaching before being intercepted, and intercepting before target is reached.Deceased.     

An Informational Approach to the Sinusoidal Law of Photon Polarization

The photon polarization law po ＝ sin2θ is derived from a simple informational consideration by twomethods: The first is via an intuitive principle of mininum Fisher information, the second is via a symmetry andinvariance argument. The results demonstrate that in photon polarization, Nature has a tendency to hide herselfas deepas possible while obeying some regular conditions.     

On a dynamic fractional game

Consider a two-person zero-sum game constructed by a dynamic fractional form. We establish the upper value as well as the lower value of a dynamic fractional game, and prove that the dual gap is equal to zero under certain conditions. It is also established that the saddle point function exists in the fractional game system under certain conditions so that the equilibrium point exists in this game system.     

Analysis of a Duopoly Supply Chain and its Application in Electricity Spot Markets

This paper studies a supply chain consisting of two suppliers and one retailer in a spot market, where the retailer uses the newsvendor solution as its purchase policy, and suppliers compete for the retailer’s purchase. Since each supplier’s bidding strategy affects the other’s profit, a game theory approach is used to identify optimal bidding strategies. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a Nash solution. It is also shown that the competition between the supplier leads to a lower market clearing price, and as a result, the retailer benefits from it. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of the obtained results by deriving optimal bidding strategies for power generator plants in the deregulated California energy market. Supported in part by RGC (Hong Kong) Competitive Earmarked Research Grants (CUHK4167/04E and CUHK4239/03E), a Distinguished Young Investigator Grant from the National Natural Sciences Foundation of China, and a grant from Hundred Talents Program of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.     

最小费用k度限制树对策

本在Glover—Klingman算法及最小费用支撑树对策的基础上，讨论了最小费用k度限制树对策问题．利用威胁、旁支付理论制订了两种规则，并利用优超、策略等价理论分别给出了在这两种规则下最小费用k度限制树对策核心中的解，从而证明了在这两种规则下其核心非空．     

Noninferior Nash Strategies for Multi-Team Systems

This paper is concerned with the optimization of systems that are controlled by several teams of decision makers. The decision makers within each team cooperate for the benefit of their team. On the other hand, the teams compete among themselves in order to achieve an objective that relates to the overall performance of the system. An approach that merges concepts from team theory and game theory for dealing with such systems and a solution called the noninferior Nash strategy are introduced. This multi-team solution provides a new framework for analyzing hierarchically controlled systems so as to address complicated coordination problems among the decision makers. The properties of the noninferior Nash solution in static multi-team systems are investigated and necessary conditions for its existence are derived. Analytical expressions for the noninferior Nash strategies are derived for a class of linear-quadratic static multi-team games. In order to deal with the issue of nonuniqueness of the solution, the concept of a noninferior Nash strategy with a team leader is introduced. Several examples are presented to illustrate the results.     

A Relationship Among Gentzen's Proof-Reduction,Kirby-Paris' Hydra Game and Buchholz's Hydra Game

We first note that Gentzen's proof-reduction for his consistency proof of PA can be directly interpreted as moves of Kirby-Paris' Hydra Game, which implies a direct independence proof of the game (Section 1 and Appendix). Buchholz's Hydra Game for labeled hydras is known to be much stronger than PA. However, we show that the one-dimensional version of Buchholz's Game can be exactly identified to Kirby-Paris' Game (which is two-dimensional but without labels), by a simple and natural interpretation (Section 2). Jervell proposed another type of a combinatorial game, by abstracting Gentzen's proof-reductions and showed that his game is independent of PA. We show (Section 3) that this Jervell's game is actually much stronger than PA, by showing that the critical ordinal of Jervell's game is φ_ω (0) (while that of PA or of Kirby-Paris' Game is φ₁ (0) = ?₀) in the Veblen hierarchy of ordinals.     

Recent developments in the statistical processing of textual data

Statisticians are accustomed to processing numerical, ordinal or nominal data. In many circumstances, such as socio-economic, epidemiologic sample surveys and documentary data bases, this data is juxtaposed with textual data (for example, responses to open questions in surveys). This article presents a series of language-independent procedures based upon applying multivariate techniques (such as correspondence analysis and clustering) to sets of generalized lexical profiles. The generalized lexical profile of a text is a vector whose components are the frequencies of each word (graphical form) or ‘repeated segment’ (sequence of words appearing with a significant frequency in the text). The processing of such large (and often sparse) vectors and matrices requires special algorithms. The main outputs are the following: (1) printouts of the characteristic words and characteristic responses for each category of respondent (these categories are generally derived from available nominal variables); (2) graphical displays of the proximities between words or segments and categories of respondents; (3) when analysing a combination of several texts: graphical displays of proximities between words or segments and each text, or between words or segments and groupings of texts. The systematic use of ‘repeated segments’ provides a valuable help in interpreting the results from a semantic point of view.     

Perfect information two-person zero-sum markov games with imprecise transition probabilities

Based on an extension of the controlled Markov set-chain model by Kurano et al. (in J Appl Prob 35:293–302, 1998) into competitive two-player game setting, we provide a model of perfect information two-person zero-sum Markov games with imprecise transition probabilities. We define an equilibrium value for the games formulated with the model in terms of a partial order and then establish the existence of an equilibrium policy pair that achieves the equilibrium value. We further analyze finite-approximation error bounds obtained from a value iteration-type algorithm and discuss some applications of the model.