Allocating electricity transmission costs through tracing: a game-theoretic rationale

Tracing is a method of assigning flows in an electricity network to particular generators and loads, assuming perfect mixing at each node. It can be used to assign costs to transmission users. We show that the resulting allocation is equal to the Shapley value of an equivalent co-operative game.     

Piecewise Deterministic Markov Control Processes with Feedback Controls and Unbounded Costs

The control of piecewise-deterministic processes is studied where only local boundedness of the data is assumed. Moreover the discount rate may be zero. The value function is shown to be solution to the Bellman equation in a weak sense; however the solution concept is strong enough to generate optimal policies. Continuity and compactness conditions are given for the existence of nonrelaxed optimal feedback controls.     

剖析博彩弹子机的赢钱原理

介绍了博彩弹子机 ,运用数学建模法剖析了它的赢钱原理 ,强调了一般博彩业主永远是赢家的道理     

美式期权定价中非局部问题的有限元方法

在本文中 ,我们关心的是美式期权的有限元方法 .首先 ,根据 [4 ]我们对所讨论的问题引进一个新奇的实用的方法 ,它涉及到对原问题重新形成准确的数学公式 ,使得数值解的计算可以在非常小的区域上进行 ,从而该算法计算速度快精度高 .进而 ,我们利用超逼近分析技术得到了有限元解关于 L2 -模的最优估计 .     

NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR OPTIMAL CONTROLS OF SEMILINEAR ELLIPTIC VARIATIONAL INEQUALITIES INVOLVING STATE CONSTRAINT

This paper deals with maximum principle for some optimal control problem governed by some elliptic variational inequalities. Some state constraints are discussed. The basic techniques used here are based on those in [1] and a new penalty functional defined in this paper.     

On a Generalized Cochrane Sum and Its Hybrid Mean Value Formula

The main purpose of this paper is to use a mean value theorem of Dirichlet L-functions to study the asymptotic property of a hybrid mean value of a generalized Cochrane sum, and give an interesting mean value formula.2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary—11F20; Secondary—11F99     

反对称正交对称矩阵反问题

本文讨论一类反对称正交对称矩阵反问题及其最佳逼近．研究了这类矩阵的一些性质，利用这些性质给出了反问题解存在的一些条件和解的一般表达式，不仅证明了最佳逼近解的存在唯一性，而且给出了此解的具体表达式．     

On the Convenience to Form Coalitions or Partnerships in Simple Games

A partnership in a cooperative game is a coalition that possesses an internal structure and, simultaneously, behaves as an individual member. Forming partnerships leads to a modification of the original game which differs from the quotient game that arises when one or more coalitions are actually formed. In this paper, the Shapley value is used to discuss the convenience to form either coalitions or partnerships. To this end, the difference between the additive Shapley value of the partnership in the partnership game and the Shapley alliance value of the coalition, and also between the corresponding value of the internal and external players, are analysed. Simple games are especially considered. Research partially supported by Grant BFM 2003-01314 of the Science and Technology Spanish Ministry and the European Regional Development Fund.     

基于改进遗传算法的布局优化子问题

本针对子问题，构造了布局子问题(关于同构布局等价类)的改进遗传算法。将该算法应用于二维布局优化子问题，数值实验表明该算法能够在很好地保持图元的邻接关系的前提下找到子问题的最优解。由于布局优化问题可分解为有限个子问题，所以利用该算法可以找到整个布局优化问题的全局最优解。