变质量Chetaev型非完整系统Appell方程的Mei对称性和Mei守恒量

研究变质量Chetaev型非完整系统Appell方程的Mei对称性和Mei守恒量.建立变质量Chetaev型非完整系统的Appell方程和系统的运动微分方程; 给出函数沿系统运动轨道曲线对时间t全导数的表示式,并在群的无限小变换下,给出变质量Chetaev型非完整系统Appell方程Mei对称性的定义和判据;得到用Appell函数表示的Mei对称性的结构方程和Mei守恒量的表达式,并举例说明结果的应用. 关键词： 变质量 非完整系统 Appell方程 Mei守恒量     

相对运动动力学系统Appell方程Mei对称性导致的Mei守恒量

研究相对运动动力学系统Appell方程的Mei对称性及其直接导致的Mei守恒量.在群的无限小变换下,给出相对运动动力学系统Appell方程Mei对称性的定义和判据;得到相对运动动力学系统Appell方程Mei对称性的结构方程以及Mei对称性直接导致的Mei守恒量的表达式.举例说明结果的应用. 关键词： 相对运动动力学 Appell方程 Mei对称性 Mei守恒量     

Supply chain analysis under a price-discount incentive scheme for electric vehicles

We investigate an automobile supply chain where a manufacturer and a retailer serve heterogeneous consumers with electric vehicles (EVs) under a government’s price-discount incentive scheme that involves a price discount rate and a subsidy ceiling. We show that the subsidy ceiling is more effective in influencing the optimal wholesale pricing decision of the manufacturer with a higher unit production cost. However, the discount rate is more effective for the manufacturer with a lower unit production cost. Moreover, the expected sales are increasing in the discount rate but may be decreasing in the subsidy ceiling. Analytic results indicate that an effective incentive scheme should include both a discount rate and a subsidy ceiling. We also derive the necessary condition for the most effective discount rate and subsidy ceiling that maximize the expected sales of EVs, and obtain a unique discount rate and subsidy ceiling that most effectively improve the manufacturer’s incentive for EV production.     

Polynomial cases of the economic lot sizing problem with cost discounts

In this paper we study the economic lot sizing problem with cost discounts. In the economic lot sizing problem a facility faces known demands over a discrete finite horizon. At each period, the ordering cost function and the holding cost function are given and they can be different from period to period. There are no constraints on the quantity ordered in each period and backlogging is not allowed. The objective is to decide when and how much to order so as to minimize the total ordering and holding costs over the finite horizon without any shortages. We study two different cost discount functions. The modified all-unit discount cost function alternates increasing and flat sections, starting with a flat section that indicates a minimum charge for small quantities. While in general the economic lot sizing problem with modified all-unit discount cost function is known to be NP-hard, we assume that the cost functions do not vary from period to period and identify a polynomial case. Then we study the incremental discount cost function which is an increasing piecewise linear function with no flat sections. The efficiency of the solution algorithms follows from properties of the optimal solution. We computationally test the polynomial algorithms against the use of CPLEX.     

Three-level warranty service contract among manufacturer,agent and customer: A game-theoretical approach

A warranty is a service contract between a manufacturer and a customer which plays a vital role in many businesses and legal transactions. In this paper, various three-level service contracts will be presented among the following three participants; a manufacturer, an agent, and a customer. In order to obtain a better result, the interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and semi-cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost or repair cost for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter. Several numerical examples and managerial insights are presented and used to illustrate the models presented in this paper.     

Reciprocal supply chain with intention

The traditional hypothesis of “rationality” is far from perfect. Models of fairness solely based on consequence cannot explain why the same consequence of an action is perceived and reciprocated differently. A reciprocity model which accounts for both consequence and its underlying intention is presented in this paper to illustrate the effect of intention in a traditional dyadic channel where one supplier plays a Stackelberg-like game with one retailer. This research aims to investigate how reciprocity may affect the members’ decisions and the channel’s coordination. In this study, two scenarios are discussed: (1) the retailer has a preference for reciprocity while the supplier does not and (2) both the retailer and the supplier have a preference for reciprocity. Results for acrimonious supply chain (γμ>1$\gamma \mu >1$) and harmonious supply chain (γμ?1$\gamma \mu ?1$) are analyzed. Furthermore, we derive equilibria under the two scenarios and prove the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibria. The results show that intention plays an important role in decision making of the supply chain and will significantly change the equilibria. Moreover, an acrimonious supply chain can be coordinated with a simple wholesale-price contract under certain conditions, which can never happen in a traditional channel. A harmonious supply chain, however, cannot be coordinated in any way.     

Persistent centers of complex systems

On the basis of some works on persistent centers and weakly persistent centers, in this paper we discuss a generalized version of persistent center and weakly persistent center for complex planar differential systems, in which conjugacy of variables may not be required. We give some complex systems which have a persistent center or weakly persistent center at the origin. Then, we find all conditions of persistent center for cubic systems and all conditions of weakly persistent center for complex cubic Lotka–Volterra system. Relations between complex systems and real ones are given concerning persistent centers and weakly persistent centers.     

基于提前期压缩的两阶段供应链的契约协调

研究了基于提前期压缩的信息对称和信息不对称两种情况下的供应链协调问题,重点解决了在信息不对称时采用线性转移支付策略解决供应链的不协调问题.当压缩提前期时,制造商的成本增加,成本的增加值信息对销售商有对称和不对称两种情况.在信息对称时采用收益共享契约可以实现供应链的协调;在信息不对称,采用收益共享契约时,为了激励制造商,销售商不得不对制造商生产成本的不确定性付出成本,导致利润下降,而制造商由于拥有私有信息而使得利润增加,所以整个供应链并没有达到集中决策时的水平,只得到了帕累托改善的次优结果.创新点在于采用线性转移支付策略实现了供应链的协调,达到了帕累托最优,解决了收益共享契约不能实现供应链协调的问题.最后通过算例进行了说明.     

多货栈及变质情形下两种可替代物品的经济订货批量模型

研究了多货栈及变质情形下两种可替代物品的经济订货批量问题.在计划期内,若某一种易变质物品发生缺货,则可以被另一种易变质物品以一定的替代率代替补充,不同物品有不同的变质率,且要决定租用货栈的数量.以库存系统的总费用最小为目标函数,分别对货栈容量无限与有限的情形建立模型,证明了最优策略存在的唯一性,并分别给出了求解最优订购策略的算法,最后通过一个算例验证了算法的最优性.     

基于CVaR准则的折扣回购策略双层风险决策

首先,引入条件风险值(CVaR)准则,作为风险厌恶型的供应商和零售商的决策准则,建立了基于条件风险值(CVaR)准则的折扣回购策略双层风险决策模型.然后,导出了零售商在批发价格下的最优订购公式,证明了订购量随着折扣增大而增大,随着批发价格增大而减小,数值实验表明供应商可以通过折扣和批发价来分担零售商的风险损失,来使供应链达到协调.