On the neutron flux flattening problem

In this paper, we present the critical neutron flux flattening problem governed by the critical transport equation in a nonuniform slab with periodic boundary conditions. Existence and uniqueness theorem of the optimal solution is shown in continuous function space.     

Optimal control for distributed linear systems subjected to null-controllability

In this article, we apply the notion of hierarchic control on a distributed system in which the state is governed by a parabolic equation. This notion assumes that we have two controls where one will be the Leader and the other, the Follower. The first control is of controllability type subjected to a constraint, while the second expresses that the state does not move too far from a given state. The results are achieved by means of an observability inequality of the Carleman type, which is ‘adapted’ to the constraint.     

No-gap optimality conditions for an optimal control problem with pointwise control-state constraints

An optimal control problem with pointwise mixed constraints of the instationary three-dimensional Navier–Stokes–Voigt equations is considered. We derive second-order optimality conditions and show that there is no gap between second-order necessary optimality conditions and second-order sufficient optimality conditions. In addition, the second-order sufficient optimality conditions for the problem where the objective functional does not contain a Tikhonov regularization term are also discussed.     

Optimal control of age-structured population dynamics for spread of universally fatal diseases II

In our preceding paper [Sun B, Wu MX. Appl. Anal. 2013;92:901–921], we investigated an optimal control problem of age-structured population dynamics for spread of universally fatal diseases and derived the necessary optimality condition for the problem in fixed final horizon case. As a follow-up, in this paper, under weaker additional conditions, we address ourselves to the investigation of the foregoing system in free final horizon case and present further new results of current interests.     

Freshman rules in calculus

In this note we present a class of functions (f, g) that satisfy ‘freshman rules’ in calculus.     

Bionomic exploitation of a ratio-dependent predator–prey system

The present article deals with the problem of combined harvesting of a Michaelis–Menten-type ratio-dependent predator–prey system. The problem of determining the optimal harvest policy is solved by invoking Pontryagin's Maximum Principle. Dynamic optimization of the harvest policy is studied by taking the combined harvest effort as a dynamic variable. Computer simulations are carried out to illustrate our analytical findings. Biological and bioeconomical interpretations of the results are explained critically.     

Mathematics in chemistry: indeterminate forms and their meaning

The mathematical language and its tools are complementary to the formalism in chemistry, in particular at an advanced level. It is thus crucial, for its understanding, that students acquire a solid knowledge in Calculus and that they know how to apply it. The frequent occurrence of indeterminate forms in multiple areas, particularly in Physical Chemistry, justifies the need to properly understand the limiting process in such cases. This article emphasizes the importance of the L’Hôpital's rule as a practical tool, although often neglected, to obtain the more common indeterminate limits, through the use of some specific examples as the radioactive decay, spectrophotometric error, Planck's radiation law, second-order kinetics, or consecutive reactions.     

Strategic control and interests,its effects on decision outcomes

Application of the model to artificial data shows that actors with strong preferences in the center have more possibilities to realize good outcomes than other actors. On the basis of an empirical application it is shown that a Nash equilibrium does not always arise after a large number of iterations unless actors have learning capabilities or are severely restricted in their strategic behavior.

In political systems and large organizations, ultimate decision makers are usually just a small subset of all actors in the social system. To arrive at acceptable decisions, decision makers have to take into account the preferences of other actors in the system. Typically preferences of more interested and more powerful actors are weighted heavier than those of less interested and powerful actors. This implies that the total leverage of an actor on the decision is determined by the combination of his power (his potential) and his interest (his willingness to mobilize his power). As the exact level of an actor's leverage is difficult to estimate for the other actors in the system, an actor is able to optimize his effects on outcomes of decisions by providing strategic informatioa

In this paper, first an analytic solution is presented for the optimization of strategic leverage in collective decision making by one single actor. In this solution, the actor makes assumptions about the leverage other actors will show in decision making. Subsequently, the actor optimizes the outcomes of decisions by manipulating the distribution of his leverage over a set of issues.

The analytic solution can be theoretically interpreted by decomposing the solution into three terms, the expected external leverage of the other actors on the issue, the evaluation of the deviance of the expected from the preferred outcome of the issue, and the restrictions on the distribution of leverage over the issues. The higher the expectation of the leverages the other actors will allocate to the issue, the less an actor is inclined to allocate leverage to the issue. The higher the evaluation of the deviance, the more an actor is inclined to allocate leverage to the issue. This is restricted, however, by the required distribution of leverages over the issues. The researcher is able to manipulate these restrictions to investigate its consequences for the outcomes.

In the next step, we investigate whether we can find a Nash equilibrium if all actors optimize their leverage simultaneously. Under certain conditions, a Nash equilibrium can be found by an iterative process in which actors update their estimates oh each other's leverages on the basis of what the other actors have shown in previous iterations.     

A combinatorial theory of minimal social situations

A minimal social situation is a game‐like situation in which there are two actors, each of them has two possible actions, and both evaluate the outcomes of their joint actions in terms of two categories (say, ‘success’ and ‘failure'). By fixing actors and actions and varying ‘payoffs’ the set of 256 ‘configurations’ is obtained. This set decomposes into 43 ‘structural forms’, or equivalence classes with respect to the relation of isomorphism defined on it. This main theorem and other results concerning related configurations (minimal decision situations) are derived in this paper by means of certain tools of group theory. Some extensions to larger structures are proved in the Appendix. In the introductory section after a brief explanation of the meaning given to the terms ‘structure’ and ‘isomorphism’ in mathematics (Bourbaki) it is shown how these terms can be used to formalize the concept of ‘social form’.