Dynamic Plots in Virtual Negotiations

Advanced information and communications technology provides the basis for continuous monitoring of, and rapid data exchange about, crucial operations. Of special interest are those conflict situations where organizations continuously readjust mutually affecting decisions, considering the competitors' choices, but without communicating verbally. An example refers to trucking companies who base their decisions, which trucks to assign to different routes, on the competitors' assignments. To support the decision process for these types of virtual negotiation settings, a new dynamic plot approach is proposed. Dynamic plots can be used to visualize the decision topology of all parties and the impact of making a decision on all parties. Of special interest in this paper are dynamic plots with an individual stability equilibrium, where competitors do not revise their decisions unless a change in the market occurs. Dynamic plots for 2 × 2 conflict situations are discussed first, followed by a discussion of 3 × 3 conflict situations. The paper closes with a discussion of a computer implementation and empirical evidence of virtual negotiations with dynamic plots. The results of these virtual negotiations suggest that dynamic plots stimulate virtual negotiations and support efficiency, equity, and system optimum for these types of real-time negotiations.     

On the application of TRIMAP to problems with multiple decision makers

In this paper the potentialities of TRIMAP to provide decision support in multiobjective problems with multiple decision makers are exploited. TRIMAP is an interactive three-objective linear programming package which enables a progressive and selective learning of the nondominated solution set. The aim is to aid the opposing parties in exploring their own preferences and to explore the dynamic nature of the negotiation process.     

灰色规划在技术转让谈判中的应用

本文以技术转让中的价格谈判为背景，建立了一类谈判问题的灰色规划模型，给出了该模型的求解步骤的方法，并通过实例说明了有关模型的应用。     

Nondominated Schedules for a Job-Shop with Two Competing Users

We consider the scenario where two users compete to perform their respective jobs on a common set of resources. The job for each user has a due-date and the cost function associated with the due-date is quasi-convex (i.e., it has a single local minimum). We characterize the set of nondominated schedules over which the users may negotiate and develop a polynomial algorithm to find this nondominated set.     

On the existence and efficiency of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a n-player prisoners' dilemma

We show that there exist von Neumann-Morgenstern (vN-M) stable sets in a n-player version of the prisoners' dilemma game with preplay negotiations in which every player can deviate unilaterally from the currently proposed combination of actions but can not do so jointly with other players, and that every vN-M stable set includes at least one Pareto-efficient outcome. The negotiation among the players is formulated as the “individual contingent threats situation” within the framework of the theory of social situations due to Greenberg (1990). The method of proving the existence also provides us with a step-by-step method of constructing the vN-M stable set. Final version June 2001     

供应商竞争下的供应链多边谈判

探讨了单买方多供应商基于供应链利润分配的多边谈判,其中的供应商具有不同讨价还价力.多边谈判程序为买方与单个供应商轮流进行双边谈判.此种情形下,供应商参与双边谈判的顺序影响供应商所获谈判利润,同时基于讨价还价力供应商通过向买方支付排位费用竞争双边谈判位置.结果给出了供应商竞争下多边谈判的唯一均衡,以及均衡状态下各方所获利润.本文构建了供应商讨价还价力不同情形下供应链多边谈判分析框架,并指出讨价还价力的不同使能力强的供应商通过竞争双边谈判位置而获利.