Noncooperative exchange using money and broker-dealers

This paper presents a model of exchange where a single commodity serves as a means of payment and trade must pass through designated brokers. Broker buy and sell prices, trader allocations, and broker profits depend on the buy and sell decisions of all the market participants, and the exchange problem is described as a noncooperative game. The existence of an equilibrium is established and bounds are placed on the price spread on each commodity. Finally, the properties of the noncooperative equilibria under replication are examined.     

Spanning network games

We study fundamental properties of monotone network enterprises which contain public vertices and have positive and negative costs on edges and vertices. Among the properties studied are the nonemptiness of the core, characterization of nonredundant core constraints, ease of computation of the core and the nucleolus, and cases of decomposition of the core and the nucleolus. Received December 1994/Final version March 1998     

Optimal control of systems with multiple criteria when disturbances are present

Optimal control problems with a vector performance index and uncertainty in the state equations are investigated. Nature chooses the uncertainty, subject to magnitude bounds. For these problems, a definition of optimality is presented. This definition reduces to that of a minimax control in the case of a scalar cost and to Pareto optimality when there is no uncertainty or disturbance present. Sufficient conditions for a control to satisfy this definition of optimality are derived. These conditions are in terms of a related two-player zero-sum differential game and suggest a technique for determining the optimal control. The results are illustrated with an example.This research was supported by AFOSR under Grant No. 76-2923.     

Linear-quadratic two-person zero-sum differential games,necessary and sufficient conditions: Comment

We give a simpler, easier-to-check, version of the theorem of the paper referred to, i.e., a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a saddle point to the linear-quadratic two-person zero-sum perfect information differential game.     

Density estimation using game theory

In this note we show that the mathematical tools of cooperative game theory allow a successful approach to the statistical problem of estimating a density function. Specifically, any random sample of an absolutely continuous random variable determines a transferable utility game, the Shapley value of which proves to be an estimator of the density function of binned kernel and WARPing types, with good computational and statistical properties.Authors acknowledge the financial support of Spanish Ministry for Science and Technology and FEDER through projects BFM2002-03213 and BEC2002-04102-C02-02 and of Xunta de Galicia through projects PGIDT00PXI20104PR and PGIDT03PXIC20701PN. They also thank the comments of two anonymous referees.     

Weighted allocation rules for standard fixed tree games

In this paper we consider standard fixed tree games, for which each vertex unequal to the root is inhabited by exactly one player. We present two weighted allocation rules, the weighted down-home allocation and the weighted neighbour-home allocation, both inspired by the painting story in Maschler et al. (1995) . We show, in a constructive way, that the core equals both the set of weighted down-home allocations and the set of weighted neighbour allocations. Since every weighted down-home allocation specifies a weighted Shapley value (Kalai and Samet (1988)) in a natural way, and vice versa, our results provide an alternative proof of the fact that the core of a standard fixed tree game equals the set of weighted Shapley values. The class of weighted neighbour allocations is a generalization of the nucleolus, in the sense that the latter is in this class as the special member where players have all equal weights.     

Trading by Quantum Rules: Quantum Anthropic Principle

This is a short review of the background and recent development in quantum game theory and its possible application in economics and finance. The intersection of science and society is discussed and Quantum Anthropic Principle is put forward. The review is addressed to nonspecialists.     

The first self-assembled trimetallic lanthanide helicates driven by positive cooperativity

The segmental tris-tridentate ligand L7 reacts with stoichiometric quantities of Ln(III) (Ln=La-Lu) in acetonitrile to give the complexes [Ln(2)(L7)(3)](6+) and [Ln(3)(L7)(3)](9+). Formation constants point to negligible size-discriminating effects along the lanthanide series, but Scatchard plots suggest that the self-assembly of the trimetallic triple-stranded helicates [Ln(3)(L7)(3)](9+) is driven to completion by positive cooperativity, despite strong intermetallic electrostatic repulsions. Crystallization provides quantitatively [Ln(3)(L7)(3)](CF(3)SO(3))(9) (Ln=La, Eu, Gd, Tb, Lu) and the X-ray crystal structure of [Eu(3)(L7)(3)](CF(3)SO(3))(9).(CH(3)CN)(9).(H(2)O)(2) (Eu(3)C(216)H(226)N(48)O(35)F(27)S(9), triclinic, P1, Z=2) shows the three ligand strands wrapped around a pseudo-threefold axis defined by the three metal ions rigidly held at about 9 A. Each metal ion is coordinated by nine donor atoms in a pseudo-trigonal prismatic arrangement, but the existence of terminal carboxamide units in the ligand strands differentiates the electronic properties of the terminal and the central metallic sites. Photophysical data confirm that the three coordination sites possess comparable pseudo-trigonal symmetries in the solid state and in solution. High-resolution luminescence analyses evidence a low-lying LMCT state affecting the central EuN(9) site, so that multi-metal-centered luminescence is essentially dominated by the emission from the two terminal EuN(6)O(3) sites in [Eu(3)(L7)(3)](9+). New multicenter equations have been developed for investigating the solution structure of [Ln(3)(L7)(3)](9+) by paramagnetic NMR spectroscopy and linear correlations for Ln=Ce-Tb imply isostructurality for these larger lanthanides. NMR spectra point to the triple helical structure being maintained in solution, but an inversion of the magnitude of the second-rank crystal-field parameters, obtained by LIS analysis, for the LnN(6)O(3) and LnN(9) sites with respect to the parameters extracted for Eu(III) from luminescence data, suggests that the geometry of the central LnN(9) site is somewhat relaxed in solution.     

Consistent values and the core in continuum market games with two types of players

The consistent value is an extension of the Shapley value to the class of games with non-transferable utility.? In this paper, the consistent value will be characterized for market games with a continuum of players of two types. We will show that for such games the consistent value need not belong to the core, and provide conditions under which there is equivalence between the two concepts. Received: October 1998 RID="*" ID="*"  This thesis was completed under the supervision of Professor Sergiu Hart, The Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Department of Mathematics, Department of Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I would like to thank Professor Hart for introducing me to this area of research, for his help and guidance, and, especially, for all his patience.? I would also like to thank Michael Borns for improving the style, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.