A dynamic Cournot–Nash game: a representation of a finitely repeated feedback game

This paper studies market outcome equivalence of two dynamic production-capital investment games under uncertainty. One is played under complete information, while the other, feedback (FB) game, is played under incomplete information about the opponents’ costs and market demand. The FB game structure may be observed in some newly initiated industries, in which a homogeneous good is exchanged via an auction mechanism. In that case, the FB game setting may predict the complete information equilibrium market outcomes.      

助学信贷博弈模型及其均衡分析

本文运用信息经济学中的土地租佃理论,主要分析了具有完全信息和具有道德风险两种情形下的助学信贷博弈问题,并分别建立了信贷博弈模型,求出了借贷均衡解。     

Fragments of Martin's Maximum in generic extensions

We show that large fragments of MM, e. g. the tree property and stationary reflection, are preserved by strongly (ω₁ + 1)‐game‐closed forcings. PFA can be destroyed by a strongly (ω₁ + 1)‐game‐closed forcing but not by an ω₂‐closed. (© 2004 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)     

Nonsingularity of some classes of matrices, and minimal solutions of Silverman''s game on discrete sets

We establish the irreducibility of each game in four infinite three-parameter families of even order Silverman games, and the major step in doing so is to prove that certain matrices A, related in a simple way to the payoff matrices, are nonsingular for all relevant values of the parameters. This nonsingularity is established by, in effect, producing a matrix D such that AD is known to be nonsingular. The elements of D are polynomials from six interrelated sequences of polynomials closely related to the Chebyshev polynomials of the second kind. Each of these sequences satisfies a second order recursion, and consequently has many Fibonacci-like properties, which play an essential role in proving that the product AD is what we claim it is. The matrices D were found experimentally, by discovering patterns in low order cases worked out with the help of some computer algebra systems. The corresponding results for four families of odd order games were reported in an earlier paper.     

On a square haystack game

A haystack game is a hider-seeker zero-sum game of locating a needle in a haystack. Baston and Bostock have obtained partial solutions to this game for the case of a square haystack. This paper supplements their results, thus confirming their belief that a complete solution is difficult.The author would like to thank a referee for his helpful comments, in particular for suggesting Lemma 2.1 which has led to a more concise and transparent treatment of Section 2.     

对我国金融监管运行机制的博弈分析

本文介绍了我国金融监管运行机制的现状,建立了金融监管的分析模型,依据模型对金融监管运行机制进行了博弈分析。在此基础上,提出了完善我国金融监管制度的三点政策建议。     

一种n人静态博弈纯策略纳什均衡存在性判别法

本首先给出了n人静态博弈纯策略纳什均衡存在的充要条件。然后给出n人静态博弈纯策略纳什均衡存在性的一种判别方法。最后在判别纯策略纳什均衡存在的条件下，给出判定该静态博弈存在多少纯策略纳什均衡以及哪些纯策略组合是纯策略纳什均衡(解)的方法。     

优质猪肉供应链中养猪场的行为选择机理及其优化策略研究

实施供应链管理是优质猪肉生产的有效途径,养猪场行为是决定猪肉产品质量安全的关键.本文依据博弈理论和方法,分析了优质猪肉供应链中养猪场和公司行为选择的机理,导出了双方行为选择的混合战略纳什均衡点.研究表明:降低风险偏好、监督成本和违约超常收益,增加违约惩罚、违约潜在损失、违约信用损失、供应链内外收益差和合作期限,是优化养猪场行为选择的有效途径,据此从强制性和诱致性两种作用入手提出了6种基本优化策略.     

Two-target game model of an air combat with fire-and-forget all-aspect missiles

An air combat duel between similar aggressive fighter aircraft, both equipped with the same type of guided missiles, is formulated as a two-target differential game using the dynamic model of the game of two identical cars. Each of the identical target sets represents the effective firing envelope of an all-aspect fire-and-forget air-to-air missile. The firing range limits depend on the target aspect angle and are approximated by analytical functions. The maximum range, computed by taking into account the optimal missile avoidance maneuver of the target, determines the no-escape firing envelope. The solution consists of the decomposition of the game space into four regions: the respective winning zones of the two opponents, the draw zone, and the region where the game terminates by a mutual kill. The solution provides a new insight for future air combat analysis.This paper is based on the first author's D.Sc. Thesis. The research was supported by NASA Cooperative Agreement NCCW-4.     

Allocation processes in cooperative games

This paper deals with a temporal aspect of cooperative games. A solution of the game is reached through an allocation process. At each stage of the allocation process of a cooperative game a budget of fixed size is distributed among the players. In the first part of this paper we study a type of process that, at any stage, endows the budget to a player whose contribution to the total welfare, according to some measurements, is maximal. It is shown that the empirical distribution of the budget induced by each process of the family converges to a least square value of the game, one such value being the Shapley value. Other allocation processes presented here converge to the core or to the least core. Received: January 2001/Revised: July 2002 I am grateful to the Associate Editor and to the two anonymous referees of International Journal of Game Theory. This research was partially supported by the Israel Science Foundation, grant no. 178/99