An equilibrium model for urban transit assignment based on game theory

The urban public transport system is portrayed as a special commodity market where passenger is consumer, transit operator is producer and the special goods is the service for passenger’s trip. The generalized Nash equilibrium game is applied to describe how passengers adjust their route choices and trip modes. We present a market equilibrium model for urban public transport system as a series of mathematical programmings and equations, which is to describe both the competitions among different transit operators and the interactive influences among passengers. The proposed model can simultaneously predict how passengers choose their optimal routes and trip modes. An algorithm is designed to obtain the equilibrium solution. Finally, a simple numerical example is given and some conclusions are drawn.     

需求不确定的供应链两阶段订货模型

销售商如何在不确定需求的市场环境下根据制造商提供的订货条件进行合理订货是供应链管理的一个核心问题。本文利用信号博弈的原理从销售商的角度研究在不确定需求且传统需求预测方法失效的情况下，允许调整订货量的短生命周期产品两阶段订货模型，得到了在两次订货条件下销售商应该采取的最优订货量与调整策略以及制造商对契约灵活性限制的成本函数。     

中国-东盟贸易自由化博弈分析

在经济全球化和区域经济一体化的背景下,中国-东盟自由贸易区的全面启动将对世界经济格局产生深远的影响.但在实施自由化贸易的过程中,当事双方的共同利益和本位利益既有协同也有冲突.因此,尝试从博弈论的角度来分析中国-东盟贸易自由化的利益机制和推动贸易自由化的条件.通过对双方的利益博弈分析,指出贸易双方应该逐步看淡本位利益,为推动贸易自由化进程而应更多地考虑共同利益和长远利益;其次,双方在制定贸易政策和进行谈判时,虽然不能忽略本位利益,但只有通过满足他方的利益才能使本位利益得到实现;因此,满足贸易双方“利己”和“利他”的唯一均衡解就是同步实施关税减让.在整个博弈过程中,中国作为一个负责任的大国,可以通过首先放弃部分局部利益来换取东盟各国的信任,从而确立中国在贸易战略中的市场领导者地位.这正是确保区域贸易自由化实现的基本要件.     

The position value is the Myerson value,in a sense

We characterize the position value for TU games with a cooperation structure in terms of the Myerson value of some natural modification of the original game—the link agent form. This construction is extended to TU games with a conference structure.      

L-凸空间中的L_S优化映象的广义博弈均衡存在定理

在L-凸空间中,证明了定性博弈和广义博弈的均衡存在定理.     

A project game for PERT networks

An important topic in PERT networks is how to allocate the total expedition (or delay) for situations in which the project is not executed as planned. In order to do that we define a TU project game that satisfies some desirable properties from the management project and game theory point of view.     

Educational effects in an experiment with the management game SINTO-Market

This paper examines how the educational background influences the performance of managers’ strategies. The research is based on data collected by an experiment with the management game SINTO-Market. This management game puts the players in a competitive situation in the branded food product sector, within which the subjects take over the role of the managers who have to find out the most successful strategy. From experimental research with this management game we will draw some interesting conclusions about human behavior in complex economic decision-making situations. To investigate educational effects the management game SINTO-Market was performed with students of different educational levels 17 times. The results show some significant differences between graduates and undergraduates.     

A dynamic Cournot–Nash game: a representation of a finitely repeated feedback game

This paper studies market outcome equivalence of two dynamic production-capital investment games under uncertainty. One is played under complete information, while the other, feedback (FB) game, is played under incomplete information about the opponents’ costs and market demand. The FB game structure may be observed in some newly initiated industries, in which a homogeneous good is exchanged via an auction mechanism. In that case, the FB game setting may predict the complete information equilibrium market outcomes.      

助学信贷博弈模型及其均衡分析

本文运用信息经济学中的土地租佃理论,主要分析了具有完全信息和具有道德风险两种情形下的助学信贷博弈问题,并分别建立了信贷博弈模型,求出了借贷均衡解。     

Fragments of Martin's Maximum in generic extensions

We show that large fragments of MM, e. g. the tree property and stationary reflection, are preserved by strongly (ω₁ + 1)‐game‐closed forcings. PFA can be destroyed by a strongly (ω₁ + 1)‐game‐closed forcing but not by an ω₂‐closed. (© 2004 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)