A variation of the Minority Game has been applied to study the timing of promotional actions at retailers in the fast moving consumer goods market. The underlying hypotheses for this work are that price promotions are more effective when fewer than average competitors do a promotion, and that a promotion strategy can be based on past sales data. The first assumption has been checked by analysing 1467 promotional actions for three products on the Dutch market (ketchup, mayonnaise and curry sauce) over a 120-week period, both on an aggregated level and on retailer chain level.
The second assumption was tested by analysing past sales data with the Minority Game. This revealed that high or low competitor promotional pressure for actual ketchup, mayonnaise, curry sauce and barbecue sauce markets is to some extent predictable up to a forecast of some 10 weeks. Whereas a random guess would be right 50% of the time, a single-agent game can predict the market with a success rate of 56% for a 6–9 week forecast. This number is the same for all four mentioned fast moving consumer markets. For a multi-agent game a larger variability in the success rate is obtained, but predictability can be as high as 65%.
Contrary to expectation, the actual market does the opposite of what game theory would predict. This points at a systematic oscillation in the market. Even though this result is not fully understood, merely observing that this trend is present in the data could lead to exploitable trading benefits. As a check, random history strings were generated from which the statistical variation in the game prediction was studied. This shows that the odds are 1:1,000,000 that the observed pattern in the market is based on coincidence. 相似文献
In this paper, we study the optimal reinsurance policies as the result of a two-person cooperative game. We assume that both the insurer and the reinsurer are risk averse and expected-utility maximizers. In addition, we assume that they “agree to disagree” on the distribution of the underlying losses in the contract negotiation.In our analysis, we consider two scenarios. In the first one, the reinsurance premium is fully negotiable, whereas in the second one, the premium is determined by the reinsurer using the expected value premium principle. For both scenarios, we first derive the set of Pareto-optimal reinsurance contracts and then identify the reinsurance contract corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution as well as that corresponding to the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution. 相似文献
This paper investigates a class of reinsurance game problems between two insurance companies under the framework of non-zero-sum stochastic differential games. Both insurers can purchase proportional reinsurance contracts from reinsurance markets and have the option of conducting capital injections. We assume the reinsurance premium is calculated under the generalized variance premium principle. The objective of each insurer is to maximize the expected value that synthesizes the discounted utility of his surplus relative to a reference point, the penalties caused by his own capital injection interventions, and the gains brought by capital injections of his competitor. We prove the verification theorem and derive explicit expressions of the Nash equilibrium strategy by solving the corresponding quasi-variational inequalities. Numerical examples are also conducted to illustrate our results. 相似文献