Transfer pricing in a dynamic marketing-operations interface

A transfer price mechanism is proposed to coordinate the strategies of the marketing and operations functional areas operating in a dynamic interface environment in a decentralized firm. Marketing and operations are strategic decision-makers in a differential game, in which marketing has price and advertising and operations has production as control variables, and advertising goodwill and production backlog are state variables. A constant transfer price is entered into the objective functionals for marketing and operations, and subgame perfect feedback strategies are derived for price, advertising, and production as functions of the state variables. The feedback strategies allow a solution for the dynamic system involving goodwill and backlog, and the total payoff to the firm, the sum of the payoffs to marketing and operations, is determined as a function of the transfer price. Finally, for certain parameter conditions an interior maximum of the payoff function is achieved, and the optimal transfer price is identified.     

The chaos game revisited: Yet another, but a trivial proof of the algorithm’s correctness

The aim of this work is to explain why the most popular algorithm for approximating IFS fractals, the chaos game, works. Although there are a few proofs of the algorithm’s correctness in the relevant literature, the majority of them utilize notions and theorems of measure and ergodic theories. As a result, paradoxically, although the rules of the chaos game are very simple, the logic underlying the algorithm seems to be hard to comprehend for non-mathematicians. In contrast, the proof presented in this work uses only fundamentals of probability and can be understood by anyone interested in fractals.     

多目标大博弈中弱Pareto-Berge均衡的存在性

研究了具有任意多个局中人的非合作多目标博弈(多目标大博弈).基于一般非合作博弈中的Berge均衡概念,定义多目标大博弈中的弱Pareto-Berge均衡.进一步推广了截口定理,得到新的截口定理,并且利用这个新的截口定理证明多目标大博弈中弱Pareto-Berge均衡的存在性.多目标大博弈中弱Pareto-Nash均衡的存在性结论可作为弱Pareto-Berge均衡存在性的特例给出.     

不确定条件下双目标组批生产的交货期设置研究

交货期是调度方法的函数,因而具有不确定性.研究变批量、变批次、变生产能力下,单阶段、双目标有条件相容组批的交货期设置问题,将它转化为订单投放策略和调度模式研究.建立了一个基于目标的双目标订单投放策略数学模型.采用目标序列优先方法进行双目标求解,用两种调度模式求出区间值,进行最优交货期逼近.模式1:松弛掉产品加工约束条件,基于负荷考虑、给出离散生产模式下订单完工率最大的订单排序算法,算法综合考虑了任务紧急程度、可调度性、重要度和流程时间最短四个方面,得到区间的一个端点.模式2是有条件相容的启发式组批调度算法,即通过聚类计算将订单安排问题转化为多队列调度问题,将新来订单的投放转化为某个队列的插单和批量分割问题,不同队列中批的投产顺序由批中优先级最高的订单决定,并在能力约束下进行批量分割计算,得到区间的另一个端点,结合流程可靠性求出区间.实例证明,模式2的交货期设置小,订单完工率和生产率高.     

三角形分布的双方叫价拍卖模型在电力交易中的应用

在完全开放的双边电力市场下,大用户直接购电问题已成为我国电力改革的重大课题.研究发电公司和大用户如何建立有效的报价策略具有十分重要的理论和实践价值.将发电公司看成卖方,将买电代理看成买方,针对卖方的成本和买方的估计是私有信息,并服从区间(0,1)上的三角形分布,建立了基于三角形分布的双方叫价拍卖的贝叶斯博弈模型,并得到了预期的均衡结果.通过一个数值例子与基于均匀分布的经典双方叫价拍卖模型进行比较.结果表明:建立的双方叫价拍卖模型在电力交易拍卖中的应用,能够提供更为准确的理论预期结果,具有更为现实的指导意义.     

基于深度和广度的博弈学习模型

信息和理性在博弈学习中具有重要作用.博弈历史反映了博弈参与者的策略选择倾向,在一定程度上预示了博弈主体的行动规律.从主题、事件类型以及事件概率三个方面来描述历史的概念.由于博弈主体是有限理性人,他不能掌握全部的历史,也不能掌握全部博弈主体的博弈信息.深度就是指在时间轴上的纵向研究尺度.广度是指在每一期的博弈中,博弈者所能学习的对象的范围.由于博弈学习者的理性差异,他们在学习中往往采用不同的学习深度和广度.同样,也正是由于学习差异性的存在,才使得整个群体社会得以多样发展、共同繁荣.     

供应链协作创新模式比较与协调契约

基于协作创新和现代商务模式,以供应商为供应链核心企业,考虑了在需求对价格敏感情况下供应商、制造商、第三方研发机构协作创新的博弈,对供应链创新协作的三种模式进行了建模分析.研究结果发现在创新能力相当的情况下,无论从创新力度、各方期望利润,还是从需求来看,供应商与供应链上关系紧密的下游协作创新的模式不仅可以降低自己创新的投资和风险,而且提高了整个供应链创新力度和水平,在收益上达到双赢,其优于不进行协作创新和委托第三方研发机构的协作创新模式.最后提出了供应链协调契约.     

随机环境下再制造产品的定价策略研究

再制造产品的定价是逆向供应链中重要的决策问题之一。依据目前我国废旧品回收和再制造的运作机制,在随机环境下建立了以传统生产厂为主导、再制造工厂为从属的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了新产品与再制造产品的差异定价策略,结合数值算例给出了最优的定价结果。并进一步将模型进行扩展,考虑了二者形成垂直纳什均衡以及存在集成厂商时的情形。研究表明:集成厂商对两种产品的定价最高,系统收益也最大,Stack-elberg情形次之,纳什均衡时最低。     

基于演化博弈视角的政府预算博弈模型设计及分析

针对政府预算体系,由于部门采取的行为策略是基于有限理性而做出的,所以博弈双方的策略选择实际上是不断调整的,并且是根据对方策略的变化而不断变化的。因此,运用演化博弈工具来研究政政府预算体系更符合现实情况。基于此,从演化博弈理论的研究视角探讨了预算审批部门、预算申报部门和财政支出部门决策的演化过程,建立了预算审批部门和预算申报部门以及财政支出部门之间的演化博弈模型。分析了审批部门、申报部门和支出部门的行为特征,根据复制者动态方程得到了参与者的行为演化规律和行为演化稳定策略。最后,文章通过数值算例对结论进行了论证。     

Structural heterogeneity mediates the effect of community structure on cooperation

Emergence of cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game strongly depends on the topology of underlying interaction network. We explore this dependence using community networks with different levels of structural heterogeneity, which are generated by a tunable upper‐bound on the total number of links that any vertex can have. We study the effect of community structure on cooperation by analyzing a finite population analogue of the evolutionary replicator dynamics. We find that structural heterogeneity mediates the effect of community structure on cooperation. In the community networks with low level of structural heterogeneity, community structure has negative effect on cooperation. However, the positive effect of community structure on cooperation appears and enhances with increasing structural heterogeneity. Our work may be helpful for understanding the complexity of cooperative behaviors in social networks. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity, 2012