Short-term and long-term competition between providers of shrink-wrap software and software as a service

Software as a service (SaaS) has moved quickly from a peripheral idea to a mainstream phenomenon. By bundling a software product with delivery and maintenance service, SaaS providers can effectively differentiate their products with traditional shrink-wrap software (SWS). This research uses a game theoretical approach to examine short- and long-term competition between SaaS and SWS providers. We analyze the factors that affect equilibrium outcomes, including user implementation costs, SaaS provider’s operation efficiency, and quality improvement over time. Bundling software with service lowers software implementation cost for users, and our results suggest that it increases equilibrium prices. In providing software services, SaaS providers have to incur significant operation cost. In the long run, service operation cost may significantly affect SaaS firm’s ability to improve its software quality.     

对原并购企业有损害的企业并购时机与条件

假设并购失败对并购者原企业的资产有损害,或产生负协同效应,利用实物期权博弈论方法,研究随机市场下企业并购条件和时机.研究表明,目标企业保证金至少受四种因素影响:一是目标企业本身的特征;二是产业的特征,三是并购者的期望,以及并购失败对并购者原企业资产的损害评估.该损害可能性越大,目标企业要求的最优保证金越低,最优并购触发时间越长.给出两阶段数值模拟例子.模型可用于国有企业产权转让的定价,通过公开拍卖是国企产权转让的最佳选择.     

进化博弈决策机制设计综述

进化博弈论是一门交叉性强的综合性理论,在国内外已得到广泛研究和应用.本文系统论述了进化博弈的决策机制及其特点,指出了进化博弈研究的趋势,进化博弈论可作为中国科技工作者学习、研究和应用的有力工具.     

安全生产监管的博弈论分析

分析了国家、地方管理部门和企业三者的相互关系,建立博弈数学模型,并分析了如何保证企业安全生产和如何防止地方管理部门与企业合谋.     

BOT项目运营外包时的各参与方决策分析

在BOT项目采用运营外包模式的前提下,通过建立政府、项目公司和运营商这三个参与方之间的三方博弈模型,求得了博弈的均衡解,在此基础上对他们的决策行为,以及这些行为之间的相互影响进行了探讨.另外,还分析了需求对项目产品性能的敏感性和运营商努力对项目产品性能的边际贡献率这两个因素对他们决策行为的影响.     

A note on channel performance under consignment contract with revenue sharing

Wang et al. [Y. Wang, L. Jiang, Z.J. Shen, Channel performance under consignment contract with revenue sharing. Management Science 50 (2004), 34–47] indicate that a decentralized supply chain cannot be perfectly coordinated. This note provides a cooperative game model that implements profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer to achieve their cooperation. When the manufacturer and the retailer are assumed to be risk-neutral, under a very mild restriction on the demand distribution function, the cooperative game model can achieve its unique equilibrium solution in iso-price-elastic or linear demand case. Under the revenue sharing agreement attached with the equilibrium payment scheme, the decentralized supply chain can be perfectly coordinated.     

Biham–Middleton–Levine model in consideration of cooperative willingness

In this paper, the Biham-Middleton-Levine （BML） model with consideration of cooperative willingness has been proposed to study the traffic flow in urban networks. An evolutionary game with a cooperative willingness profile is intro-duced to deal with conflicts between disturbing neighbors. Simulation results suggest that imitating cooperative willingness can ease the effect of premature seizure on traffic flow due to the introduction of evolutionary games. Phase diagrams with a strategy profile and cooperative willingness profile have been investigated in detail. Our findings also prove that by imitating the more successful, cooperative willingness instead of simply the more successful strategies, the evolution of cooperation is significantly promoted, hence improving the order of cooperation and relieving the pressure of traffic networks.     

Several extensions of the Abian–Brown Fixed Point Theorem and their applications to extended and generalized Nash equilibria on chain-complete posets

In this paper, we provide several extensions of the Abian–Brown Fixed Point Theorem from single-valued mappings to set-valued mappings on chain-complete posets. Then we examine some non-monetized, non-cooperative games where both the collections of the strategies and the ranges of the utilities for the players are posets. By applying the extensions of the Abian–Brown Fixed Point Theorem and by applying the order-preserving property of mappings, we prove some existence theorems of extended and generalized Nash equilibria for non-monetized, non-cooperative games on chain-complete posets.     

Determination of Stackelberg–Nash equilibria using a sensitivity based approach

A sensitivity based approach is presented to determine Nash solution(s) in multiobjective problems modeled as a non-cooperative game. The proposed approach provides an approximation to the rational reaction set (RRS) for each player. An intersection of these sets yields the Nash solution for the game. An alternate approach for generating the RRS based on design of experiments (DOE) combined with response surface methodology (RSM) is also explored. The two approaches for generating the RRS are compared on three example problems to find Nash and Stackelberg solutions. For the examples presented, it is seen that the proposed sensitivity based approach (i) requires less computational effort than a RSM-DOE approach, (ii) is less prone to numerical errors than the RSM-DOE approach, (iii) has the ability to find multiple Nash solutions when the Nash solution is not a singleton, (iv) is able to approximate nonlinear RRS, and (v) on one example problem, found a Nash solution better than the one reported in the literature.     

Joint optimization of product family configuration and scaling design by Stackelberg game

Product family design is generally characterized by two types of approaches: module-based and scale-based. While the former aims to enable product variety based on module configuration, the latter is to variegate product design by scaling up or down certain design parameters. The prevailing practice is to treat module configuration and scaling design as separate decisions or aggregate two design problems as a single-level, all-in-one optimization problem. In practice, optimization of scaling variables is always enacted within a specific modular platform; and meanwhile an optimal module configuration depends on how design parameters are to be scaled. The key challenge is how to deal with explicitly the coupling of these two design optimization problems.