基于演化博弈的工程项目施工安全管理分析

为降低工程项目施工过程中安全事故发生频率,减少人员伤亡和投资者损失,本文运用演化博弈构建施工方和监理方博弈模型,探讨二者策略选取的影响因素及演化均衡,分析参数变化对演化稳定策略的影响,并通过数值模拟验证不同初始值下的演化路径。结果表明:工程项目安全稳定与事故发生的经济惩罚力度、声誉损失、事故发生概率、监理督促整改费以及施工方违规节约成本和支付给监理的费用等因素相关,并提出对应措施来保障项目的安全实施。     

基于“进场费+收益共享”契约的供应链协调策略研究

在超市等自助零售环境下,影响产品需求的往往是产品的感知质量,而产品感知质量不仅取决于产品质量水平,还受货架空间展示量的影响。本文基于价格和感知质量依赖的需求函数,分别建立了一体化供应链集中决策模型以及考虑是否存在进场费的寄售契约下零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了制造商和零售商的产品定价和货架空间展示策略,并给出了进场费+收益共享的供应链协调策略。研究结果表明分散供应链环境下产品的最优零售价格并不总高于集中决策下产品的最优定价,也就是说提升感知质量在一定程度上可以缓解双重边际效应。另外,收取进场费的收益共享模式可以实现供应链的完美协调,这在理论上说明了进场费模式在一定的市场环境下是合理的。     

PREFERENCE AND EVOLUTION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER''S DILEMMA

Game theory is extensively used to study strategy-making and actions of play-ers. The authors proposed an analysis method for study the evolutionary outcome and behaviors of players with preference in iterated prisoner's dilemma. In this article, a pref-erence parameter k was introduced in the payoff matrix, wherein the value of k denotes the player's degree of egoism and altruism (preference). Then, a game-theoretic dynamical model was formulated using Birth-and-Death process. The authors studied how prefer-ence influences the evolutionary equilibrium and behaviors of players. The authors get the general results: egoism leads to defection, and altruism can make players build trust and maintain cooperation, and so, the hope of the Pareto optimal solution. In the end, the simulation experiments proved the efficiency of the method.     

Short-term and long-term competition between providers of shrink-wrap software and software as a service

Software as a service (SaaS) has moved quickly from a peripheral idea to a mainstream phenomenon. By bundling a software product with delivery and maintenance service, SaaS providers can effectively differentiate their products with traditional shrink-wrap software (SWS). This research uses a game theoretical approach to examine short- and long-term competition between SaaS and SWS providers. We analyze the factors that affect equilibrium outcomes, including user implementation costs, SaaS provider’s operation efficiency, and quality improvement over time. Bundling software with service lowers software implementation cost for users, and our results suggest that it increases equilibrium prices. In providing software services, SaaS providers have to incur significant operation cost. In the long run, service operation cost may significantly affect SaaS firm’s ability to improve its software quality.     

对原并购企业有损害的企业并购时机与条件

假设并购失败对并购者原企业的资产有损害,或产生负协同效应,利用实物期权博弈论方法,研究随机市场下企业并购条件和时机.研究表明,目标企业保证金至少受四种因素影响:一是目标企业本身的特征;二是产业的特征,三是并购者的期望,以及并购失败对并购者原企业资产的损害评估.该损害可能性越大,目标企业要求的最优保证金越低,最优并购触发时间越长.给出两阶段数值模拟例子.模型可用于国有企业产权转让的定价,通过公开拍卖是国企产权转让的最佳选择.     

进化博弈决策机制设计综述

进化博弈论是一门交叉性强的综合性理论,在国内外已得到广泛研究和应用.本文系统论述了进化博弈的决策机制及其特点,指出了进化博弈研究的趋势,进化博弈论可作为中国科技工作者学习、研究和应用的有力工具.     

安全生产监管的博弈论分析

分析了国家、地方管理部门和企业三者的相互关系,建立博弈数学模型,并分析了如何保证企业安全生产和如何防止地方管理部门与企业合谋.     

BOT项目运营外包时的各参与方决策分析

在BOT项目采用运营外包模式的前提下,通过建立政府、项目公司和运营商这三个参与方之间的三方博弈模型,求得了博弈的均衡解,在此基础上对他们的决策行为,以及这些行为之间的相互影响进行了探讨.另外,还分析了需求对项目产品性能的敏感性和运营商努力对项目产品性能的边际贡献率这两个因素对他们决策行为的影响.     

A note on channel performance under consignment contract with revenue sharing

Wang et al. [Y. Wang, L. Jiang, Z.J. Shen, Channel performance under consignment contract with revenue sharing. Management Science 50 (2004), 34–47] indicate that a decentralized supply chain cannot be perfectly coordinated. This note provides a cooperative game model that implements profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer to achieve their cooperation. When the manufacturer and the retailer are assumed to be risk-neutral, under a very mild restriction on the demand distribution function, the cooperative game model can achieve its unique equilibrium solution in iso-price-elastic or linear demand case. Under the revenue sharing agreement attached with the equilibrium payment scheme, the decentralized supply chain can be perfectly coordinated.     

Biham–Middleton–Levine model in consideration of cooperative willingness

In this paper, the Biham-Middleton-Levine （BML） model with consideration of cooperative willingness has been proposed to study the traffic flow in urban networks. An evolutionary game with a cooperative willingness profile is intro-duced to deal with conflicts between disturbing neighbors. Simulation results suggest that imitating cooperative willingness can ease the effect of premature seizure on traffic flow due to the introduction of evolutionary games. Phase diagrams with a strategy profile and cooperative willingness profile have been investigated in detail. Our findings also prove that by imitating the more successful, cooperative willingness instead of simply the more successful strategies, the evolution of cooperation is significantly promoted, hence improving the order of cooperation and relieving the pressure of traffic networks.