考虑不同商业目标和公平关切的动态博弈模型及复杂性研究

建立双寡头零售商具有不同商业目标和公平关切的动态价格博弈模型,着重分析了基于零售商考虑不同商业目标和公平关切下的价格博弈模型的复杂性。数值模拟了不同参数数值组合条件下的价格动态博弈过程,通过系统稳定域,分岔,李雅普诺夫指数,混沌吸引子等对模型进行了复杂性分析,发现零售商考虑公平关切会使自身稳定域减小;公平关切的水平越高,系统越容易进入混沌状态。同时研究了价格调整速度对零售商利润的影响,结果发现当价格调整速度过大时,系统会进入混沌状态,利润值波动剧烈且平均利润随着价格调整速度的增大而减小。最后选择控制因子对系统混沌进行了控制,该研究对零售商价格决策有着很好的借鉴意义。     

Domination game and minimal edge cuts

In this paper a relationship is established between the domination game and minimal edge cuts. It is proved that the game domination number of a connected graph can be bounded above in terms of the size of minimal edge cuts. In particular, if $C$ a minimum edge cut of a connected graph $G$, then ${\gamma }_g\left(G\right)\le {\gamma }_g(G?C)+2{\kappa }^{\prime }\left(G\right)$. Double-Staller graphs are introduced in order to show that this upper bound can be attained for graphs with a bridge. The obtained results are used to extend the family of known traceable graphs whose game domination numbers are at most one-half their order. Along the way two technical lemmas, which seem to be generally applicable for the study of the domination game, are proved.     

Misère quotients for impartial games

We announce misère-play solutions to several previously-unsolved combinatorial games. The solutions are described in terms of misère quotients—commutative monoids that encode the additive structure of specific misère-play games. We also introduce several advances in the structure theory of misère quotients, including a connection between the combinatorial structure of normal and misère play.     

HOW RAPID SHOULD EMISSION REDUCTION BE? A GAME‐THEORETIC APPROACH

Abstract In this paper, we search for multistage realization of international environmental agreements. To analyze countries' incentives and the results of their interactions, we mathematically represent players' strategic preferences and apply a game‐theoretic approach to make predictions about their outcomes. The initial decision on emissions reduction is determined by the Stackelberg equilibrium concept. We generalize Barrett's static “emission” model to a dynamic framework and answer the question “how rapid should the emission reduction be?” It appears that sharper abatement is desirable in the early term, which is similar to the conclusion of the Stern review. Numerical example demonstrates that abatement dynamics of the coalition and the free‐rider differ when discounting of the future payoffs increases. We show that without incentives from external organizations or governments, such pollution reduction path can actually lead to a decline in the agreement's membership size.     

A selection of open problems

This is a collection of open problems which touch on Neil Hindman's mathematics and were collected in conjunction with the Conference on Ramsey Theory and Topological Algebra in his honor.     

Weighted search games

In this paper we shall deal with search games in which the strategic situation is developed on a lattice. The main characteristic of these games is that the points in each column of the lattice have a specific associated weight which directly affects the payoff function. Thus, the points in different columns represent points of different strategic value. We solve three different types of games. The first involves search, ambush and mixed situations, the second is a search and inspection game and the last is related to the accumulative games.     

基于演化博弈的工程项目施工安全管理分析

为降低工程项目施工过程中安全事故发生频率,减少人员伤亡和投资者损失,本文运用演化博弈构建施工方和监理方博弈模型,探讨二者策略选取的影响因素及演化均衡,分析参数变化对演化稳定策略的影响,并通过数值模拟验证不同初始值下的演化路径。结果表明:工程项目安全稳定与事故发生的经济惩罚力度、声誉损失、事故发生概率、监理督促整改费以及施工方违规节约成本和支付给监理的费用等因素相关,并提出对应措施来保障项目的安全实施。     

基于“进场费+收益共享”契约的供应链协调策略研究

在超市等自助零售环境下,影响产品需求的往往是产品的感知质量,而产品感知质量不仅取决于产品质量水平,还受货架空间展示量的影响。本文基于价格和感知质量依赖的需求函数,分别建立了一体化供应链集中决策模型以及考虑是否存在进场费的寄售契约下零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了制造商和零售商的产品定价和货架空间展示策略,并给出了进场费+收益共享的供应链协调策略。研究结果表明分散供应链环境下产品的最优零售价格并不总高于集中决策下产品的最优定价,也就是说提升感知质量在一定程度上可以缓解双重边际效应。另外,收取进场费的收益共享模式可以实现供应链的完美协调,这在理论上说明了进场费模式在一定的市场环境下是合理的。     

PREFERENCE AND EVOLUTION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER''S DILEMMA

Game theory is extensively used to study strategy-making and actions of play-ers. The authors proposed an analysis method for study the evolutionary outcome and behaviors of players with preference in iterated prisoner's dilemma. In this article, a pref-erence parameter k was introduced in the payoff matrix, wherein the value of k denotes the player's degree of egoism and altruism (preference). Then, a game-theoretic dynamical model was formulated using Birth-and-Death process. The authors studied how prefer-ence influences the evolutionary equilibrium and behaviors of players. The authors get the general results: egoism leads to defection, and altruism can make players build trust and maintain cooperation, and so, the hope of the Pareto optimal solution. In the end, the simulation experiments proved the efficiency of the method.     

Short-term and long-term competition between providers of shrink-wrap software and software as a service

Software as a service (SaaS) has moved quickly from a peripheral idea to a mainstream phenomenon. By bundling a software product with delivery and maintenance service, SaaS providers can effectively differentiate their products with traditional shrink-wrap software (SWS). This research uses a game theoretical approach to examine short- and long-term competition between SaaS and SWS providers. We analyze the factors that affect equilibrium outcomes, including user implementation costs, SaaS provider’s operation efficiency, and quality improvement over time. Bundling software with service lowers software implementation cost for users, and our results suggest that it increases equilibrium prices. In providing software services, SaaS providers have to incur significant operation cost. In the long run, service operation cost may significantly affect SaaS firm’s ability to improve its software quality.