乡村振兴战略下农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作行为演化博弈分析

农村人居环境整治是乡村振兴战略的重要内容,基于有限理性的演化博弈理论,构建了以地方政府、社会资本和农村居民为博弈主体的农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作行为演化博弈模型,运用Matlab软件分析了三方主体的初始意愿和政府规制对三方主体行为策略演化的影响。研究发现:(1)政府规制对农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作博弈系统演化的影响从大到小依次是:政府对社会资本的补贴资助、投机罚金、合作奖励和政府对农村居民的参与奖励。(2)与提高地方政府对社会资本的补贴资助力度和惩罚力度相比,提高地方政府的激励规制初始意愿更能促进农村人居环境整治PPP项目的顺利落地实施。(3)农村居民参与PPP项目的初始意愿的提升关键在于提高农村居民参与收益。最后,为促进PPP模式在农村环境治理领域的应用与发展和推动农村人居环境整治的可持续改善提出相应建议。     

旧工业建筑再生利用的政企演化博弈研究

为保护旧工业建筑的文化价值,助力解决棕地治理问题,提高地区竞争软实力,本文基于演化博弈理论构建了旧工业建筑再生利用的政企演化博弈模型,分析了博弈双方的演化稳定性及最优策略。博弈分析结果显示:政企双方存在四种演化稳定策略;企业对旧工业建筑进行再生利用的成本和收益、政府对相关企业的奖惩措施、旧工业建筑文化保护领域的媒体曝光度都会直接影响博弈结果。为实现可持续发展,政府应引入第三方监管机构,建立奖惩机制并广泛宣传旧工业建筑中蕴含的文化内涵;企业应主动寻求技术创新,积累再生利用旧工业建筑的相关经验。     

考虑零售商销售努力的制造商入侵策略研究

渠道入侵正逐渐成为企业开拓市场,实现多渠道销售的重要策略。在考虑零售商销售努力的前提下,研究了制造商渠道入侵策略。构建了四种Stackelberg博弈模型:不入侵和无销售努力、入侵和无销售努力、不入侵和有销售努力、入侵和有销售努力。研究结果表明,线上直销渠道与线下零售渠道之间的不对称替代水平越高,越不利于制造商入侵;在制造商入侵的情况下,零售商销售努力促使制造商降低批发价格;渠道入侵成本较大且零售商销售努力投资效率高的前提下,销售努力可以有效缓解制造商入侵带来的负面影响;渠道入侵降低了零售商销售努力的动机。     

A remark on the princess and monster search game

We consider two zero-sum search games in which a searcher moves along a continuous trajectory in a search setQ. The probability of detection depends on the distance between the two players. The problem is open loop, i.e. neither player receives any information about the other as the game progresses. The payoff to a hider is the elapsed time before detection. Optimal mixed strategies are obtained.     

Proportional navigation and the game of two cars

A stochastic version of Isaacs's game of two cars is considered. The motion of the players is confined to the pursuer's effective operation zoneD _P, and the cost function of the game is the probability of the event: {Before the evader enters his safe zone, the evader enters the pursuer's killing zoneK _P, at somet, 0tT, or the evader stays at the domainD _P–K _P, for allt[0,t ₀],t ₀>T}. By numerically solving a nonlinear parabolic boundary-value problem on a generalized torus in ³, it is shown that, for a range of values of some parameter, a proportional navigation guidance law is an optimal feedback pursuit strategy.     

Backward induction algorithm for a class of closed-loop Stackelberg games

In the paper a new deterministic continuum-strategy two-player discrete-time dynamic Stackelberg game is proposed with fixed finite time duration and closed-loop information structure. The considered payoff functions can be widely used in different applications (mainly in conflicts of consuming a limited resource, where one player, called leader, is a superior authority choosing strategy first, and another player, called follower, chooses after).     

Bottleneck routing with elastic demands

Bottleneck routing games are a well-studied model to investigate the impact of selfish behavior in communication networks. In this model, each user selects a path in a network for routing her fixed demand. The disutility of a user only depends on the most congested link visited. We extend this model by allowing users to continuously vary the demand rate at which data is sent along the chosen path. As our main result we establish tight conditions for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria.     

Sustainable cooperation in multicriteria multistage games

We use the imputation distribution procedure approach to ensure sustainable cooperation in a multistage game with vector payoffs. In order to choose a particular Pareto optimal and time consistent strategy profile and the corresponding cooperative trajectory we suggest a refined leximin algorithm. Using this algorithm we design a characteristic function for a multistage multicriteria game. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions for strong time consistency of the core.