Existence of value in pursuit-evasion games with restricted phase coordinates

Almost all results referring to the problem of the existence of a value in differential games concern games without restricted phase coordinates. In this paper, we introduce a concept of value for differential games of pursuit and evasion and prove, under some general assumption, the existence of it. The players are required to satisfy some general phase constraints. The arguments employed in this paper are based on some extent on Krasovskii's method of extremal construction. We also show that the lower value in the Friedman sense is a generalization of our value. In a special linear case, the equivalence between pursuit differential games and time-optimal control problems is established.     

A procedure for analyzing hypergames

A general methodology is presented for characterizing and analyzing hypergames which are conflicts where mistaken information is present. Hypergames are important for describing many real world disputes because often the participants or players do not share the same perception of the conflicts and, furthermore, players may have misperceptions which are based upon other players' misunderstandings. Since a comprehensive structure is provided for defining any type of hypergame, the improved metagame analysis algorithm can be employed to systematically model any hypergame and predict the possible resolutions or equilibria. The Allied invasion of Normandy in 1945 is utilized for demonstrating how an actual hypergame can be studied in practice.     

Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma

In order to improve outcomes of one shot noncooperative games a formal procedure for conducting preplay negotiations is proposed. For the prisoners' dilemma game it is shown that all the perfect equilibrium in the induced game (the game with the preplays) yield the cooperative pay-off. For another game it is shown that all perfect equilibrium payoffs converge to be Pareto optimal as the number of preplays increases.     

Consistency and the graph Banzhaf value for communication graph games

The graph Banzhaf value was introduced and axiomatically characterized by Alonso-Meijide and Fiestras-Janeiro (2006). In this paper we propose the reduced game and consistency of the graph Banzhaf value for communication situations. By establishing the relationship between the Harsanyi dividends of a coalition in a communication situation and the reduced communication situation, we provide a new axiomatization of the graph Banzhaf value by means of the axioms of consistency and standardness.     

基于双边平台匹配努力的共享供应链动态定价策略研究

考虑在一个由双边平台、制造商和零售商组成的共享供应链中,研究双边平台匹配努力下的共享供应链动态定价问题。其中制造商通过平台共享其剩余产能,平台为动态地匹配制造商和零售商的供需资源而付出匹配努力,以此改变其服务水平,进而影响共享平台的交易费用、制造商的批发价格和零售商的零售价格。利用HJB方程构建微分博弈模型,分别探讨集中和分散式共享供应链中最优平台匹配努力和各成员的动态定价策略,得到不同情形下的动态定价轨迹,并分析了关键参数对定价策略的影响。结果表明,平台匹配努力通过影响其服务水平对最优/均衡解有正向影响,供应链各成员的定价策略取决于平台初始服务水平和稳态服务水平之间的关系。     

基于博弈论视角的稀土矿区环境治理及监管策略研究

针对稀土矿区环境治理的复杂性,本文通过建立地方政府和稀土企业之间的动态演化博弈模型,分析了博弈双方在不同情形下的演化稳定策略及其影响因素,并利用matlab对其进行数值仿真。研究表明,地方政府的监管成本、执行环境规制时对稀土企业的奖惩政策、稀土企业的治污成本以及非法开采时的额外收益都会影响地方政府与稀土企业的演化稳定策略,降低地方政府的监管成本、稀土企业的治污成本等都会引导博弈双方的演化稳定策略趋向于{严格监管,合法开采},从而促进矿区环境的可持续性发展。     

质量约束下闭环供应链差异决策研究

针对由一原始设备制造商和一独立再制商所组成的闭环供应链系统,考虑到新品质量水平对独立再制商可回收量的质量约束效应,以及新品与再制品的价格及质量竞争,分别构建了原始设备制造商领导、独立再制商领导、无领导三种不同市场结构下闭环供应链决策模型,探讨了质量约束效应对闭环供应链运营的影响。研究表明:(1)三种市场结构下,新品和再制品两者在“质量水平-价格”两维度均有所差异,且市场地位的不对等有利于产品质量水平的共同提升;(2)质量约束效应的存在会对产品的价格和质量同时产生影响;(3)再制品具有质量劣势,且质量约束效应的增强,再制品质量劣势越大;(4)市场结构的变化及质量约束效应的强弱并不会影响市场总需求量,仅仅会影响成员企业的市场份额;在大多数情况下,消费者对新品需求更为活跃。但当原始设备制造商为市场领导者时,质量约束效应低于一阈值水平时,再制品销量反而高于新品销量;(5)无论从成员个体,还是从供应链整体,原始设备制造商为领导者的市场结构最有效,且新品质量约束效应并不会影响供应链总利润,仅影响成员企业在总利润中的分成;新品质量约束效应的增强更有利于原始设备制造商利润的改善,但同时会损害独立再制商利润。     

救援延迟效应如何影响政府企业救灾合作？基于微分博弈的研究

“政府主导、社会参与”的政企协同救灾成为我国救灾体制改革的方向。通讯中断以及运输路网的破坏经常导致救援的延迟,在救援延迟的应急场景下政企协同合作的救援效率一定高于自发救援吗？针对自发救援和协同合作两种救援模式,考虑救援延迟效应,构建了政企救灾合作的微分博弈模型,分析救援延迟对政企救灾策略的影响,以及政府成本补贴对提高协同救灾的适用条件。最后结合云南鲁甸地震的案例加以验证。结果表明,当延迟时间小于某阈值时,协同救援才更有效率。与自发救援相比,协同救援下政府救灾投入量随延迟时间急剧上升,而企业投入量变化较小。企业单位收益系数可作为衡量灾害严重程度的指标,数值越大,政府承担企业的救灾成本补贴比例越大。     

乡村振兴战略下农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作行为演化博弈分析

农村人居环境整治是乡村振兴战略的重要内容,基于有限理性的演化博弈理论,构建了以地方政府、社会资本和农村居民为博弈主体的农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作行为演化博弈模型,运用Matlab软件分析了三方主体的初始意愿和政府规制对三方主体行为策略演化的影响。研究发现:(1)政府规制对农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作博弈系统演化的影响从大到小依次是:政府对社会资本的补贴资助、投机罚金、合作奖励和政府对农村居民的参与奖励。(2)与提高地方政府对社会资本的补贴资助力度和惩罚力度相比,提高地方政府的激励规制初始意愿更能促进农村人居环境整治PPP项目的顺利落地实施。(3)农村居民参与PPP项目的初始意愿的提升关键在于提高农村居民参与收益。最后,为促进PPP模式在农村环境治理领域的应用与发展和推动农村人居环境整治的可持续改善提出相应建议。