On the core of network synthesis games

We use polynomial formulations to show that several rational and discrete network synthesis games, including the minimum cost spanning tree game, satisfy the assumptions of Owen's linear production game model. We also discuss computational issues related to finding and recognizing core points for these classes of games.     

MODELS FOR COOPERATION AND CONSPIRACY IN FISHERIES: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME

Fisheries regulation is considered necessary to counteract the effects of competitive forces which can lead to a “tragedy of the commons”. Yet management initiatives have often failed because they did not take into account competitive responses of fishing enterprises. In particular, open access fisheries provide strong incentives for the development of excessive harvesting capacity. This in turn leads to harvesting that is concentrated in space and time, with adverse effects on both the resource and markets. A coalition of fishermen, such as a fishermen's cooperative, has interests similar to those of a sole owner, and thus would be expected to produce more efficient behaviour. In practice, however, fishermen's cooperatives seldom persist. Game theory is used to explore relationships between the coalition structure of the industry, economic variables, and regulation. The models are based loosely on a purse seine fishery for herring. The results suggest that the potential to form stable coalitions is affected by changes in price and harvest. Changes in regulation also affect stability of coalitions. When interpreted in the light of historical changes in the herring fishery, these results suggest that industry may not accept regulations which do not permit formation of stable coalitions.     

A differential game of evasion with delays

A game of evasion (or contact avoidance problem) described by a system of differential equations containing delays in state and control is considered. There is given a sufficient condition for the existence of a strategy which ensures the contact avoidance. A method of constructing such a strategy is presented.     

Finitely additive stochastic games with Borel measurable payoffs

We prove that a two-person, zero-sum stochastic game with arbitrary state and action spaces, a finitely additive law of motion and a bounded Borel measurable payoff has a value. Received December 1996/Final version November 1997     

向量拟平衡问题的本质解及解集的本质连通区

本文研究向量拟平衡问题,得到了向量拟平衡问题解的一个存在性结果,证明了在满足一定的连续性和凸性条件的问题构成的空间Y中,大多数(在Baire分类意义下)问题的解集是稳定的,并证明Y的某子集中,每个向量拟平衡问题的解集中至少存在一个本质连通区。作为应用,我们导出了多目标广义对策弱Pareto-Nash平衡点的存在性,证明了在满足一定的连续性和凸性条件的多目标广义对策构成的空间P中,大多数对策的弱Pareto-Nash平衡点是稳定的,并证明了P中的每个对策的弱Pareto-Nash平衡点集中至少有一个本质连通区。     

兵力增援微分对策优化模型及解法

研究了对抗双方的兵力增援问题，建立了兵力增援微分对策优化理论模型及其最优性条件，给出了兵力增援的最优策略。本研究结果对作战方案的制定，评价和作战指挥决策具有理论指导意义。     

On computational complexity of membership test in flow games and linear production games

Let Γ≡(N,v) be a cooperative game with the player set N and characteristic function v: 2^N→R. An imputation of the game is in the core if no subset of players could gain advantage by splitting from the grand coalition of all players. It is well known that, for the flow game (and equivalently, for the linear production game), the core is always non-empty and a solution in the core can be found in polynomial time. In this paper, we show that, given an imputation x, it is NP-complete to decide x is not a member of the core, for the flow game. And because of the specific reduction we constructed, the result also holds for the linear production game. Received: October 2000/Final version: March 2002     

On strictly proper equilibria

In this paper, an example is given to show that a strictly perfect equilibrium need not be strictly proper It is proved that, for a bimatrix game, a strictly perfect equilibrium is strictly proper if it is also quasistrong. Finally, for such games, the structure of the set of strictly proper equilibria is described.     

量子博弈论及其应用

介绍了量子博弈理论及与经典博弈理论的关系，指出了量子博弈理论的优越性，及对现实物理世界的意义。     

Paths leading to the Nash set for nonsmooth games

Maschler, Owen and Peleg (1988) constructed a dynamic system for modelling a possible negotiation process for players facing a smooth n-person pure bargaining game, and showed that all paths of this system lead to the Nash point. They also considered the non-convex case, and found in this case that the limiting points of solutions of the dynamic system belong to the Nash set. Here we extend the model to i) general convex pure bargaining games, and to ii) games generated by “divide the cake” problems. In each of these cases we construct a dynamic system consisting of a differential inclusion (generalizing the Maschler-Owen-Peleg system of differential equations), prove existence of solutions, and show that the solutions converge to the Nash point (or Nash set). The main technical point is proving existence, as the system is neither convex valued nor continuous. The intuition underlying the dynamics is the same as (in the convex case) or analogous to (in the division game) that of Maschler, Owen, and Peleg. Received August 1997/Final version May 1998