On subgame perfect equilibria in quantum Stackelberg duopoly with incomplete information

The Li–Du–Massar quantum duopoly model is one of the generally accepted quantum game schemes. It has applications in a wide range of duopoly problems. Our purpose is to study Stackelberg's duopoly with incomplete information in the quantum domain. The result of Lo and Kiang has shown that the correlation of players' quantities caused by the quantum entanglement enhances the first-mover advantage in the game. Our work demonstrates that there is no first-mover advantage if the players' actions are maximally correlated. Furthermore, we proved that the second mover gains a higher equilibrium payoff than the first one.     

”Illusion of control” in Time-Horizon Minority and Parrondo Games

Human beings like to believe they are in control of their destiny. This ubiquitous trait seems to increase motivation and persistence, and is probably evolutionarily adaptive [J.D. Taylor, S.E. Brown, Psych. Bull. 103, 193 (1988); A. Bandura, Self-efficacy: the exercise of control (WH Freeman, New York, 1997)]. But how good really is our ability to control? How successful is our track record in these areas? There is little understanding of when and under what circumstances we may over-estimate [E. Langer, J. Pers. Soc. Psych. 7, 185 (1975)] or even lose our ability to control and optimize outcomes, especially when they are the result of aggregations of individual optimization processes. Here, we demonstrate analytically using the theory of Markov Chains and by numerical simulations in two classes of games, the Time-Horizon Minority Game [M.L. Hart, P. Jefferies, N.F. Johnson, Phys. A 311, 275 (2002)] and the Parrondo Game [J.M.R. Parrondo, G.P. Harmer, D. Abbott, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 5226 (2000); J.M.R. Parrondo, How to cheat a bad mathematician (ISI, Italy, 1996)], that agents who optimize their strategy based on past information may actually perform worse than non-optimizing agents. In other words, low-entropy (more informative) strategies under-perform high-entropy (or random) strategies. This provides a precise definition of the “illusion of control” in certain set-ups a priori defined to emphasize the importance of optimization. An erratum to this article is available at .     

毛细管电泳法高效筛选8-氧代鸟嘌呤DNA糖基化酶的核酸适配体

8-氧代鸟嘌呤DNA糖基化酶(OGG1)是人体中重要的功能蛋白,在修复DNA氧化性损伤过程中起关键作用。氧化应激等引起的氧化损伤易导致炎症反应的发生,对OGG1的抑制可以一定程度上起到缓解作用;对癌细胞OGG1的抑制有望作为癌症治疗的新方法。目前的研究多集中于小分子对OGG1功能的影响和调控,而OGG1的适配体筛选尚未见报道。作为功能配体,适配体具有合成简单、高亲和力及高特异性等优点。该文筛选了OGG1的核酸适配体,结合毛细管电泳高效快速的优点建立了两种基于毛细管电泳-指数富集进化(CE-SELEX)技术的筛选方法:同步竞争法和多轮筛选法。同步竞争法利用单链结合蛋白(SSB)与核酸库中单链核酸的强结合能力,与目标蛋白OGG1组成竞争体系,并通过增加SSB浓度来增加竞争筛选压力,以去除与OGG1弱结合的核酸序列,一步筛选即可获得与OGG1强结合的核酸序列。多轮筛选法在相同孵育条件和电泳条件下,经3轮筛选获得OGG1的核酸适配体。比较两种筛选方法的筛选结果,筛选结果中频次最高的3条候选核酸适配体序列一致,其解离常数(K_D)值在1.71~2.64 μmol/L之间。分子对接分析结果表明候选适配体1(Apt 1)可能与OGG1中具有修复氧化性损伤功能的活性口袋结合。通过对两种筛选方法的对比,证明同步竞争法更加快速高效,对其他蛋白核酸适配体筛选方法的选择具有一定的指导意义。得到的适配体有望用于OGG1功能调控,以抑制其修复功能。     

利用有机波谱教学网站iSpec进行游戏化课堂教学的实践*

针对学生在有机化学波谱学学习过程中枯燥、难以形象化的具体情况,介绍一个利用有机波谱在线学习的网站进行游戏化课堂教学的学习活动,以期提升学生在该课程学习中的积极性及学习效果。该教学活动的实施分为课堂和课后进行,主要依托iSpec网站游戏竞赛的答题模式,结合教师课堂教学及学生自主学习,进行相关知识技能的教授,最终提升学生的学习效率与效果。     

在划分系统下集合对策值的结构

A set game, in which the worth of a coalition is expressed by a set instead of areal number, is a new type of cooperative game.A F-restricted set game is a set game restricted by partition system.The main theorems show the structures of IM-value,OIM-value,SCM-value and ICM-value respectively,and the equivalency of IM-value and the OIM-value for monotonicset games restricted by partition system as well.     

考虑时滞效应与均值-方差效用的非零和投资与再保险博弈

在考虑时滞效应的影响下研究了非零和随机微分投资与再保险博弈问题.以最大化终端绝对财富和相对财富的均值-方差效用为目标,构建了两个相互竞争的保险公司之间的非零和投资与再保险博弈模型,分别在经典风险模型和近似扩散风险模型下探讨了博弈的Nash均衡策略.借助随机控制理论以及相应的广义Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellm...     

不完全契约下政府实施公共品负担对私人部门行为选择影响机制研究

政府部门往往会承担公共品负担提高社会公共福利和满足社会诉求,私人部门在PPP项目建设运营中会采取机会主义行为损害政府部门利益和降低社会福利。本文运用演化博弈分析私人部门的机会主义行为演化机制。通过模型分析可得,当政府补贴系数低于一定程度时,私人部门采取机会主义行为的概率随着公共品负担强度的增加而增加;当政府实施公共品负担小于一定强度时,私人部门会随着政府补贴程度提高而不采取机会主义行为,而当公共品负担强度大于一定值时,政府补贴政策正相关性就被严重削弱;私人部门占据更多的利益分配比重,更有倾向采取机会主义行为。根据研究结果,政府部门应增强契约精神,公共品负担下,政府补贴并不能有效降低机会主义行为,而应完善监管机制和提升私人部门对项目收益的信心。     

双边配给问题的Shapley解及其在博物馆通票问题中的应用

双边配给问题描述了现实生活中一类带有二部图结构的稀缺资源配置问题, 例如, 在自然灾害期间救援物资的配给; 电力和天然气等自然资源按需分配; 高校引进人才调配等。本文通过求解线性规划, 并从联盟边际贡献的角度出发定义了双边配给问题的一个Shapley解。之后, 通过合作对策模型和解的公理化方法说明新解的合理性。首先, 建立双边配给问题的合作对策模型, 论证了新解与双边配给合作对策的Shapley值一致; 其次, 证明了Shapley解是唯一满足优先一致性的有效配给方案。最后, 将Shapley解应用于博物馆通票问题的研究, 探讨了博物馆合作制定通票后所得单票和通票收益的分配方式。     

基于Shapley值法的三级闭环供应链收益分配模型

以合作博弈为基本研究方法,构建了由制造商、第三方物流和零售商组成的三级闭环供应链收益分配模型,不同合作方式下各合作联盟收益的特征函数的计算结果表明:在采取合作时,各合作联盟的收益均大于或等于各成员在不合作时各自的收益之和,文章验证了在三级闭环供应链收益分配模型中应用Shapley值法的可行性,说明构建的收益分配模型具有普遍适用性.然后运用Shapley值法求得三级闭环供应链收益分配的合理均衡解,最后结合算例进行了分析论证.