Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games

In this paper we consider finitely repeated games in which players can unilaterally commit to behave in an absentminded way in some stages of the repeated game. We prove that the standard conditions for folk theorems can be substantially relaxed when players are able to make this kind of compromises, both in the Nash and in the subgame perfect case. We also analyze the relation of our model with the repeated games with unilateral commitments studied, for instance, in García-Jurado et al. (Int. Game Theory Rev. 2:129–139, 2000). Authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Educaci ón y Ciencia, FEDER and Fundación Séneca de la Región de Murcia through projects SEJ2005-07637-C02-02, ECO2008-03484-C02-02, MTM2005-09184-C02-02, MTM2008-06778-C02-01 and 08716/PI/08.     

Animal network phenomena: Insights from triadic games

Triadic interactions have a very important role to play in games of animal conflict on complex networks, because triads are both the simplest groups in which asymmetric network phenomena can be studied and the groups beyond dyads in which analysis of population games is most likely to be tractable, especially when allowing for intrinsic variation. Here we demonstrate how analytical models of triadic games can yield novel insights into a variety of behavioral phenomena within networks, including coalition formation, eavesdropping, and victory displays. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity, 2009     

Henig proper efficient points and generalized Henig proper efficient points

Applying the theory of locally convex spaces to vector optimization, we investigate the relationship between Henig proper efficient points and generalized Henig proper efficient points. In particular, we obtain a sufficient and necessary condition for generalized Henig proper efficient points to be Henig proper efficient points. From this, we derive several convenient criteria for judging Henig proper efficient points.     

Computing the Minkowski Sum of Prisms

Within this paper we study the Minkowski sum of prisms (“Cephoids”) in a finite dimensional vector space. For a vector with positive components we write and denote by the associated prism. We provide a representation of a finite sum of prisms in terms of inequalities. Dedicated to the 65th birthday of Alexander Rubinov.     

Subadditivity of eigenvalue sums

Let be a nonnegative concave function on with , and let be matrices. Then it is known that , where is the trace norm. We extend this result to all unitarily invariant norms and prove some inequalities of eigenvalue sums.

     

A general theory of almost convex functions

Let be the standard -dimensional simplex and let . Then a function with domain a convex set in a real vector space is -almost convex iff for all and the inequality

holds. A detailed study of the properties of -almost convex functions is made. If contains at least one point that is not a vertex, then an extremal -almost convex function is constructed with the properties that it vanishes on the vertices of and if is any bounded -almost convex function with on the vertices of , then for all . In the special case , the barycenter of , very explicit formulas are given for and . These are of interest, as and are extremal in various geometric and analytic inequalities and theorems.

     

A Bipartite Analogue of Dilworth’s Theorem

Let m(n) be the maximum integer such that every partially ordered set P with n elements contains two disjoint subsets A and B, each with cardinality m(n), such that either every element of A is greater than every element of B or every element of A is incomparable with every element of B. We prove that . Moreover, for fixed ε ∈ (0,1) and n sufficiently large, we construct a partially ordered set P with n elements such that no element of P is comparable with other elements of P and for every two disjoint subsets A and B of P each with cardinality at least , there is an element of A that is comparable with an element of B.     

A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions

In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two standard models: (i) the marriage model due to Gale and Shapley and (ii) the assignment model due to Shapley and Shubik. Recently, Eriksson and Karlander introduced a hybrid model, which was further generalized by Sotomayor. In this paper, we propose a common generalization of these models by utilizing the framework of discrete convex analysis introduced by Murota, and verify the existence of a pairwise-stable outcome in our general model.     

On measurable minimax selectors

In this note we consider the upper value of a zero-sum game with payoff function depending on a state variable. We provide a new and much simpler proof of a measurable minimax selection theorem established 25 years ago by the author in Nowak (1985) [19]. A discussion of the basic assumptions and relations with the literature on stochastic games and (minimax) control models is also included.     

An acyclic relation for comparison of bargaining powers of coalitions and its interrelationship with bargaining set

This paper proposes a method to compare bargaining power of coalitions within the framework of games in coalition form with transferable utility. The method is expressed by a relation on the set of all coalitions in a game, the relation which is defined based on the players’ bargaining power. It is shown in this paper that the newly defined relation satisfies acyclicity. Also, it is verified in this paper that the set of all individually rational payoff configurations under which all coalitions have the equal bargaining power coincides with the bargaining set. Some examples demonstrate how the newly proposed method works.