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81.
An Iterative Procedure for Evaluating Digraph Competitions 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
A competition which is based on the results of (partial) pairwise comparisons can be modelled by means of a directed graph. Given initial weights on the nodes in such digraph competitions, we view the measurement of the importance (i.e., the cardinal ranking) of the nodes as an allocation problem where we redistribute the initial weights on the basis of insights from cooperative game theory. After describing the resulting procedure of redistributing the initial weights, an iterative process is described that repeats this procedure: at each step the allocation obtained in the previous step determines the new input weights. Existence and uniqueness of the limit is established for arbitrary digraphs. Applications to the evaluation of, e.g., sport competitions and paired comparison experiments are discussed. 相似文献
82.
D. Ghose 《Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications》1991,68(3):463-481
In this paper, a scalar game is derived from a zero-sum multicriteria matrix game, and it is proved that the solution of the new game with strictly positive scalarization is a necessary and sufficient condition for a strategy to be a Pareto-optimal security strategy (POSS) for one of the players in the original game. This is done by proving that a certain set, which is the extension of the set of security level vectors in the criterion function space, is convex and polyhedral. It is also established that only a finite number of scalarizations are necessary to obtain all the POSS for a player. An example is included to illustrate the main steps in the proof.This work was done while the author was a Research Associate in the Department of Electrical Engineering at the Indian Institute of Science and was financially supported by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Delhi, India.The author wishes to express his gratefulness to Professor U. R. Prasad for helpful discussions and to two anonymous referees for suggestions which led to an improved presentation. 相似文献
83.
Linn I. Sennott 《Mathematical Methods of Operations Research》1994,39(2):209-225
Zero-sum stochastic games with countable state space and with finitely many moves available to each player in a given state are treated. As a function of the current state and the moves chosen, player I incurs a nonnegative cost and player II receives this as a reward. For both the discounted and average cost cases, assumptions are given for the game to have a finite value and for the existence of an optimal randomized stationary strategy pair. In the average cost case, the assumptions generalize those given in Sennott (1993) for the case of a Markov decision chain. Theorems of Hoffman and Karp (1966) and Nowak (1992) are obtained as corollaries. Sufficient conditions are given for the assumptions to hold. A flow control example illustrates the results. 相似文献
84.
This paper deals with a class of equilibria which are based on the use of memory strategies in the context of continuous-time stochastic differential games. In order to get interpretable results, we will focus the study on a stochastic differential game model of the exploitation of one species of fish by two competing fisheries. We explore the possibility of defining a so-called cooperative equilibrium, which will implement a fishing agreement. In order to obtain that equilibrium, one defines a monitoring variable and an associated retaliation scheme. Depending on the value of the monitoring variable, which provides some evidence of a deviation from the agreement, the probability increases that the mode of a game will change from a cooperative to a punitive one. Both the monitoring variable and the parameters of this jump process are design elements of the cooperative equilibrium. A cooperative equilibrium designed in this way is a solution concept for a switching diffusion game. We solve that game using the sufficient conditions for a feedback equilibrium which are given by a set of coupled HJB equations. A numerical analysis, approximating the solution of the HJB equations through an associated Markov game, enables us to show that there exist cooperative equilibria which dominate the classical feedback Nash equilibrium of the original diffusion game model.This research was supported by FNRS-Switzerland, NSERC-Canada, FCAR-Quebec. 相似文献
85.
Weighted values of non-atomic games were introduced by Hart and Monderer (1997). They study these values by using two approaches:
the potential approach and the asymptotic approach. In this study we develop the random order approach (the mixing value,
Aumann and Shapley, 1974) to weighted values and prove that these values coincide with the asymptotic weighted values of Hart
and Monderer in pNA.
Received April 1995/Revised version May 1996/ Final version October 1997 相似文献
86.
New minimax inequality with applications to existence theorems of equilibrium points 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
A new minimax inequality is proved on a set which is the union of an increasing sequence of compact convex sets in a topological vector space. As applications, several existence theorems of equilibrium points for different games are obtained.The authors would like to thank the referees for their helpful suggestions. 相似文献
87.
We consider Nash equilibria in 2‐player random games and analyze a simple Las Vegas algorithm for finding an equilibrium. The algorithm is combinatorial and always finds a Nash equilibrium; on m × n payoff matrices, it runs in time O(m2nloglog n + n2mloglog m) with high probability. Our result follows from showing that a 2‐player random game has a Nash equilibrium with supports of size two with high probability, at least 1 − O(1/log n). Our main tool is a polytope formulation of equilibria. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Random Struct. Alg., 2007 相似文献
88.
Heinz-Uwe Küenle 《International Journal of Game Theory》1994,23(4):303-324
Two-person nonzero-sum stochastic games with complete information are considered. It is shown that it is sufficient to search the equilibrium solutions in a class of deterministic strategy pairs — the so-calledintimidation strategy pairs. Furthermore, properties of the set of all equilibrium losses of such strategy pairs are proved. 相似文献
89.
We investigate a dynamic oligopoly game where goods are differentiated and prices are sticky. We study the open-loop and the closed-loop memoryless Nash equilibrium, and show that the latter equilibrium entails a larger level of steady state production as compared to the former; both equilibria entail a larger level of production in steady state than the static game. We also study the effects of price stickiness and product differentiation upon the steady state equilibrium allocation and profits. The per-firm equilibrium output is increasing in both product differentiation and price stickiness, while profits are increasing in both product differentiation and the speed of price adjustment. The steady state social welfare monotonically increases in the speed of price adjustment, and the overproduction entailed by dynamic competition has beneficial effect from a social standpoint. 相似文献
90.
Cooperative equilibria in discounted stochastic sequential games 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper addresses the problem of computation of cooperative equilibria in discounted stochastic sequential games. The proposed approach contains as a special case the method of Green and Porter (developed originally for repeated oligopoly games), but it is more general than the latter in the sense that it generates nontrivial equilibrium solutions for a much larger class of dynamic games. This fact is demonstrated on two examples, one concerned with duopolistic economics and the other with fishery management. 相似文献