一类不确定长时延网络控制系统的H∞状态反馈控制

本文针对一类不确定的长时延网络控制系统，在系统方程右端加上扰动项，利用李亚普诺夫函数，借助线性矩阵不等式，设计出了使系统具有H∞性格指标的闭环系统渐近稳定充分条件，并设计出了状态反馈控制器，仿真实例表明结论具有可行性与有效性。     

一个一般的Motzkin定理及其应用

本文考虑局部凸拓扑向量空间中包含多值映射的不等式系统，在很一般的条件下建立了一个Motzkin型择一定理，并给出了该定理在向量最优化问题中的应用，本文结果涵盖并推广了许多已知择一定理     

厄米特矩阵和与积的特征值不等式

本文讨论了ｋ（≥２）个厄米特矩阵之和的特征值不等式，ｋ（≥２）个厄米特正定矩阵之和的特征值不等式，这些结果推广与改进（１），（４）的相应结果。     

非线性时滞系统的指数稳定H∞控制

研究非线性时滞系统基于 TS模型的指数稳定 H∞ 控制问题 ,针对一类控制对象 ,得到存在指数稳定 H∞ 模糊控制器的充分条件。此充分条件等价于两类线性矩阵不等式 (LMI)的可解性     

超线性与二次收敛的序列方程组可行方法

本文讨论不等式约束规划问题,给出一个线性方程组与辅助方向相结合的新可行算法,算法用一种新型的直线搜索产生步长.在一定条件下,当k充分大后,求方向dk每次只需解一个线性方程组.文中证明了算法的全局收敛性与超线性的收敛速度以及二次收敛性,并给出了方法初步的数值试验.     

The first-order approach to the principal–agent problems under inequality aversion

This paper considers the principal–agent problems under inequality aversion. We identify sufficient conditions for the first-order approach to be valid. Our results suggest that the first-order approach is restricted in the presence of inequality aversion.     

基于观测器的模糊时滞系统的指数稳定控制

研究一类模糊时滞系统的指数稳定和基于观测器的模糊控制问题.在系统状态未知的情况下,通过设计系统的模糊观测器利用矩阵不等式分析的方法给出了系统指数稳定条件和基于观测器的动态输出反馈控制器设计方案.仿真结果说明了所提方法的有效性.     

不等式证明中的概率思想方法

不等式的证明往往比较复杂,有时直观含义也比较抽象,代数的方法难以发挥作用。如果能够建立适当的概率模型,赋以一些随机事件或随机变量的具体含义,再利用概率的理论加以证明,则常常能使证明过程得到简化。同时还可以为抽象的数学问题提供具体的概率背景,沟通各数学分支之间的联系。文中通过几个不等式的证明阐明了常用的概率思想方法。     

Rationalized Haar approach for nonlinear constrained optimal control problems

This paper presents a numerical method for solving nonlinear optimal control problems including state and control inequality constraints. The method is based upon rationalized Haar functions. The differential and integral expressions which arise in the system dynamics, the performance index and the boundary conditions are converted into some algebraic equations which can be solved for the unknown coefficients. Illustrative examples are included to demonstrate the validity and applicability of the technique.     

What can you and I do to reduce income inequality?

ABSTRACT

Are there things that ordinary people can do in their private lives to reduce economic inequality? And, if so, how would these things work? To be sure, there are macro societal mechanisms for reducing inequality. But are there micro mechanisms for reducing inequality? This article first examines inequality measures and behavioral models that produce inequality effects, identifying five sets of inequality mechanisms which lead to levers that ordinary people can use to reduce income inequality, and next discusses the levers, with special attention to their feasibility, ease of use, and side effects. The five levers highlight transfers, equal additions, negative assortative mating, wage schedules that reward multiple personal characteristics, and compensation procedures with voting rules, many voters, diversity of thought, and secret ballots. This work raises new questions for research, such as the sources of diversity of thought.