基于λ-最大相容类的粗糙规划模型及其在企业战略联盟形成决策问题中的应用

企业战略联盟作为一种新型、双赢的商业竞争模式,近年来,其联盟的形成问题一直是学术界与应用领域广泛关注的研究内容。本文在分析影响企业战略联盟形成的各因素基础上,首先利用序关系G1法对各影响因素指标进行了权重确定,并用基于相似度的聚类分析法来对属性权重进行筛选和修正;其次以形成的联盟稳定性最高为目标,以λ-最大相容类模拟联盟中各企业之间的相似关系,利用粗糙规划模型的性质和特点,建立了基于λ-最大相容类的粗糙规划模型;最后结合企业战略联盟的具体实例,分析了该模型的特点和有效性。结果表明,该模型丰富了现有的理论成果,为战略联盟的有效形成提供了正确的决策参考。     

Evolutionarily Stable Coalition Structure

We analyze the formation and stability of coalitions for a situation where finitely many individuals form different coalitions and their payoffs depend on the consequence of a noncooperative game with different coalitions, and examine the moving path of individuals among various coalitions. Our main finding is to show that there exists at least one evolutionarily stable coalition equilibrium in ^nx.     

动态联盟形成与谈判集

在具有可转让效用的合作博弈中,T oen A rno ld和U lrich Schw a lbe提出了动态联盟形成及其吸收状态的模型:在联盟形成的动态过程中,当核心非空时,大联盟和核心是吸收状态.在此基础上,我们进一步推广了该模型:证明了Zhou L in谈判集是动态联盟形成过程的吸收状态之一,弥补了当核心是空集时,除了大联盟之外再无吸收状态的不足.该结果使得原模型更趋完善.     

COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY‐MAKING

ABSTRACT. We combine new concepts of noncooperative coalition theory with an integrated assessment model on climate change to analyze the impact of different protocol designs on the success of coalition formation. We analyze the role of “single versus multiple coalitions,”“open versus exclusive membership,”“no, weak and strong consensus about membership” and “no transfers versus transfers.” First, we want to find out whether and how modifications of the standard assumptions affect results that are associated with the widely applied cartel formation game in the noncooperative game theoretic analysis of international environmental agreements. Second, we discuss normative policy conclusions that emerge from the various modifications. Third, we confront our results with evidence on past international environmental treaties and derive an agenda for future research.     

具有联盟结构的position值

position值是图对策中著名的分支有效解, 该值充分体现了图的边在合作中的贡献, 因而也可作为网络中心性的一种测度方法。本文基于van den Brink等提出的具有联盟结构与图结构的合作对策, 将position值推广到具有联盟结构的图对策上, 提出了具有联盟结构的position值, 该值可以作为受优先联盟约束的网络中心性的一种测度方法。本文首先证明了具有联盟结构的position值可以由分割分支有效性和平衡边贡献性所唯一刻画。其次, 以跨国天然气管道网的收益分配为例, 对这个值与其他值做了比较分析。     

基于修正区间模糊Shapley值的“一带一路”PPP项目利益分配模型

多方合作的“一带一路”基础设施PPP项目是互联互通的基石,公平合理地分配项目利益则是保障其顺利实施的关键。为了构建科学的利益分配模型,考虑项目参与方组建的合作联盟预期收益为模糊数且分配时受多种因素影响,本文首先,基于区间模糊Shapley值构建“一带一路”PPP项目利益分配初始模型;然后,识别出利益分配影响因素并量化参与方的投入分担程度,据此修正初始的利益分配模型;最后,结合实际案例,将该模型与现存方法进行对比分析,结果显示本模型的可操作性更强,针对影响因素系数的测算更为精准,整体具有显著优势。     

Power,Embedded Games,and Coalition Formation

Applications of game theory frequently presume but do not show that social structures contain games. This study shows that multiple games are embedded in strong power structures and that power is exercised because 1) the game of those low in power contains a dilemma whereas 2) the game of those high in power does not. As in previous analyses, we find those low in power play the Prisoner's Dilemma game. New to this analysis is the discovery that those high in power play the Privileged game, a game with no dilemma. Also new is the extension of the analysis to the design of coalitions. That extension shows that, when coalition formation succeeds, it eliminates the dilemma of those low in power by transforming their game from Prisoner's Dilemma to Privileged. By contrast, exactly the same coalition structure does not alter the game played by those high in power. Applying well-known game theoretic solution concepts, we predict that low power coalitions will countervail power, but that coalitions of those high in power will not affect power exercise. Experiments testing this theory investigate 1) coalitions of those high in power, 2) low power coalitions organized against multiple high power positions, and 3) opposed coalitions struggling for power against each other. Results strongly support the theory.     

改进联盟结构的支付分配规则及其排序的TOPSIS方法

本文针对改进的联盟结构,在基于局中人个人理性与联盟结构集体理性实现的基础上,确立了一种支付分配规则,该规则成为联盟结构改进后保持稳定的一个必备条件,在此基础上,给出了对不同联盟结构优超关系进行排序的TOPSIS方法,从而可以对不同联盟结构的优劣进行区分比较．     

具有图结构和联盟结构的Banzhaf值及应用

Banzhaf值是经典可转移效用合作对策中一个著名的分配规则,可以用来评估参与者在对策中的不同作用。本文将Banzhaf值推广到具有联盟结构和图结构的TU-对策中,首先提出并定义了具有联盟结构和图结构的Banzhaf值(简称PL-Banzhaf值),证明了PL-Banzhaf值满足公平性、平衡贡献性和分割分支总贡献性,并给出了该值的两种公理性刻画。其次,讨论了PL-Banzhaf值在跨国天然气管道案例中的应用,并和其他分配规则进行了比较分析。     

基于图对策的收益分配

基于具有交流结构的合作对策,即图对策,对平均树解拓展形式的特征进行刻画,提出此解满足可加性公理。进一步地,分析了对于无圈图对策此解是分支有效的。并且当连通分支中两个局中人相关联的边删掉后,此连通分支的收益变化情况可用平均树解表示。这一性质是Shapley值和Myerson值所不具有的。最后,我们给出了模糊联盟图对策中模糊平均树解的可加性和分支有效性。